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 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
NIETZSCHE AND THE MASKS OF INTERPRETATION 
 
 Of all the metaphors deployed by Nietzsche in his texts, perhaps none is as fitting 
to his own project as that of the ‘mask.’   In the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of 
Morals, Nietzsche presents a theory that in order to survive as a type, philosophers have 
found it necessary to adopt the garb of a priest or sage and represent the ideals of those 
types to the masses.1  This echoes his statement from Beyond Good and Evil, where he 
states, “Every profound spirit needs a mask: what’s more, a mask is constantly growing 
around every profound spirit….”2  In the act of representing a priest or a sage to the 
general public, the philosopher often comes to mistake himself as a priestly type and take 
seriously the mask of the ascetic that he is representing.  Nietzsche’s argument is aimed 
at deciphering how philosophers have become moralizers and apologists for concepts and 
moral ideals that they themselves did not create.  An immediate interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s text here would suggest that the philosopher adopts this mask to serve his 
own ends – ends which are, in actuality different than the priest’s or the sage’s.  
Therefore, it would seem that the philosopher must discard this mask if he is to be a true 
philosopher and avoid the pitfalls associated with the ascetic priest, the sage, and
                                               
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Third Essay, 
Section 10. 
 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, eds. Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Section 40. 
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those types’ denials of life.  However, one aspect of the appropriateness of the metaphor 
of the ‘mask’ lies in the manner in which the interpretation that it seems to suggest 
immediately is itself a mask for a deeper criticism that is being made in the text.  The 
route out of asceticism is not the “resolute” adoption of a truthful “philosophical” 
existence in the face of this priestly interpretation of life.  Instead, Nietzsche writes that 
the ascetic priest is the “classical representative of seriousness” who forces life to turn its 
powers against itself in search of a transcendent meaning with which it can justify its 
existence:   
[The ascetic priest] juxtaposes [life] (along with what pertains to it: “nature,” 
“world,” the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite different 
mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself, 
deny itself: in that case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that 
other mode of existence.3   
 
Thus, our initial interpretation of the relationship between the philosopher, the priest, and 
the metaphor of the mask must be supplemented with the caveat that the philosopher 
cannot avoid becoming a priest simply by removing the mask that he has adopted out of 
its necessity for survival.  In taking seriously the ends of the philosopher as being true to 
himself, his nature, or his ideals, the philosopher interprets himself into becoming a 
priest; the mask, in being discarded, paradoxically becomes the philosopher’s ideal.  This 
ideal that the philosopher now represents and takes seriously is freed to assume a position 
of judgment over life in the hands of the philosopher-priest, a situation which Nietzsche 
repeatedly warns his readers against.   In this way, the “mask” is also an inappropriate 
metaphor for Nietzsche’s task because it shows that a traditional understanding of the 
                                               
3 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, Section 11 (emphasis in original). 
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way in which the meaning of Nietzsche’s text is revealed is not as simple as the 
deciphering or unmasking of a single metaphor.  Nietzsche’s metaphor of the mask must 
be considered twice, both in what it suggests about philosophers being masked and in the 
impossibility of their moving past being masked.  
 This “masking” and “unmasking” can also serve as a metaphor for the central 
concern of Nietzsche’s philosophical project.  For Nietzsche, the relationship between 
what we have traditionally taken to be true and good and the methods by which these 
concepts have been justified has become problematic.  Nietzsche argues that 
philosophers, when constructing their concepts, have not been attentive to their own 
masks; that is to say, following the preface of Genealogy of Morals, that “we are 
unknown to ourselves.”4  The effect that this has on the possibility of determinate 
philosophical knowledge is profound as far as Nietzsche is concerned and with good 
reason.  With Descartes’s radical questioning of the objective nature of philosophical 
knowledge, the guarantee of the univocity of meaningful statements about the world has 
been located in the philosophical subject’s immediate reflective transparency to itself.  
Nietzsche, in doubting this transparent immediacy of the subject to itself opens a doubt 
into the possibility of knowledge that Descartes did not reckon with sufficiently: the 
doubt that the meaning of our own ideas is stable within the subjective consciousness 
itself.  In some early unpublished writings, Descartes remarks: “Actors, taught not to let 
any embarrassment show on their faces, put on a mask.  I will do the same.  So far, I have 
been a spectator in this theatre which is the world, but I am now about to mount the stage, 
                                               
4 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Preface, Section 1. 
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and I come forward masked.”5  Descartes, seeing the world as a theatre, conceives 
momentarily of himself as being like an actor who voluntarily masks himself in order to 
appear unembarrassedly.  But, it seems, this mask does not stay on Descartes for long; or, 
if it does, another mask becomes far more important: “The sciences are at present 
masked, but if the masks were taken off, they would be revealed in all their beauty.  If we 
could see how the sciences are linked together, we would find them no harder to retain in 
our minds than the series of numbers.”6  This second invocation of the mask does not 
concern itself with the masking of the subject but of the possibility of unmasking nature 
so that the sciences may reveal their beauty.  The necessity of this task in Descartes’s 
writings precludes any meaningful kind of mask on the side of the subject because it 
demands the objective truth that the mask hides.  If consciousness is masked in 
Nietzsche’s sense and, therefore, not self-transparent, then the possibility of a stable 
meaning can be doubted as well.  Nietzsche accepts that if the subject is masked, then the 
meanings of that subject are also masked.  Paul Ricoeur observes that, in this way, 
“Nietzsche says nothing other than simply I doubt better than Descartes.”7  Nietzsche 
uses this insight, however, in such as way that enables a general critique of meaning 
beyond simply the criticism of consciousness.  Nietzsche introduces the concern that the 
apparent meanings that concepts seem to bear may only be masks for some different 
meaning.  For his philosophy, once the illusion of the subjective grounding of a univocal 
                                               
5 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I., trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2. 
 
6 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I., 3. 
 
7 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
15 (emphasis in original).  
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meaning is shown through consciousness’ failure to ground itself in immediate 
reflection, any concept or meaning may be treated as a possible mask for some alternate 
function or end that the concept may serve:  
There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of “immediate 
certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer’s 
superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark 
naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place from either the side of 
the subject or the side of the object.8   
 
Therefore, the key to understanding a concept lies in a reflective interpretation of it 
because concepts can only appear and be understood through a process of mediation.  
Every attempt to decipher a concept’s meaning must be accompanied by an act of 
interpretation that endeavors, through some kind of interpretive framework, to make clear 
the obstacles and conflicts that delay the understanding of that meaning.  Because 
meaning is no longer thought of as immediately given, Nietzsche argues that the process 
of deciphering a meaning must be accompanied by an act of interpretation.  This 
necessitates the approaches to knowledge that Nietzsche names “perspectivism,” and, 
later in his career, “genealogy.”   
 From Nietzsche’s earliest philosophical writings in Birth of Tragedy, it is clear 
that Nietzsche conceives of philosophy, in its production of both metaphysical and moral 
concepts and ideals, as engaged in acts of interpretation with life as its object.  
Nietzsche’s thinking of interpretation, of “genealogy,” grows from the soil of this 
investigation into Greek tragedy and the conditions for its appearance and disappearance.  
However, from this “extremely strange beginning,” Nietzsche develops a general 
                                               
8 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 16. 
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methodology with which to critique and reinterpret concepts.9  The methodology that 
Nietzsche adopts takes, generally, a perspective on concepts that runs counter to the ways 
in which these concepts have traditionally been understood.  His genealogical method 
utilizes two sorts of suspicion toward concepts.  The first is exemplified in the very act of 
questioning the immediacy or transparency of meaning of any given concept.  Nietzsche 
will treat the meaning of a concept or practice as an interpreted meaning, which is, 
therefore, always complex and always produced from an act of interpretation.  This first 
suspicion – the suspicion of the possibility of any immediate meaning – makes 
Nietzsche’s second sense of suspicion possible.  If meaning is produced or the result of a 
synthesizing activity then, as Nietzsche will argue, it is possible that any given meaning 
is an illusion fostered by forces of interpretation that seek to hide their motives.  Thus 
genealogy is a double suspicion of the everyday meaning of concepts – at once treating 
them as masks for underlying forces and treating those forces as active agents in the 
dissembling of their interests. 
In this work, I intend to answer two interrelated questions that Nietzsche’s 
method of genealogy indirectly raises with regard to itself.  As Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
interpretive at every step, it no surprise that it would raise problems as to how that 
interpretation itself is to be understood reflexively.  First, how are we to understand the 
project of genealogy as an interpretive gesture?  And, secondly, under what authority is 
Nietzsche entitled to the interpretations and evaluations that he wields as unremitting 
                                               
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What you Are in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight 
of the Idols and Other Writings, eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), “Why I write such good books, The Birth of Tragedy, Section 2.” 
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criticisms of traditional philosophical and moral concepts?  This question is raised 
concerning the grounding of Nietzsche’s genealogy.  Although it has been argued that 
Nietzsche, ultimately, has faith in a purified or “naturalized” ideal of truth10 – presumably 
beyond the reach of a radical reinterpretation of it – I will argue that it is best to 
understand Nietzsche’s genealogy as a hermeneutic philosophical project.  As my 
vocabulary has already indicated, in doing this I am following the path partly laid down 
by Paul Ricoeur in Freud and Philosophy and in his essays collected in The Conflict of 
Interpretations.  Ricoeur is the clearest proponent of the position that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is a reflexive philosophy engaged in a hermeneutics of meaning.11  By 
“reflexive,” Ricoeur means that Nietzsche’s work can be placed in a philosophical 
tradition within which consciousness is investigated in an effort to clarify its contents to 
itself.  Although Nietzsche appears in this way as the most skeptical of this line of 
thinking, this manner of situating Nietzsche’s project enables a productive comparative 
study of Nietzsche’s work with those thinkers that remain attached to many of the 
concepts that Nietzsche criticizes. 
 Most notable for this project and for most of Ricoeur’s works as well is the 
phenomenological school inaugurated by Husserl’s works.  Ricoeur interprets 
phenomenology as a reflexive philosophy precisely where it attempts to determine or 
                                               
10 I will treat these non-hermeneutic readings of Nietzsche’s texts in Chapter Three and attempt to 
demonstrate that Nietzsche’s critique of “truth” is not designed to set up a better version of “truth” but to 
open the possibility of interpretation. 
 
11 Michel Foucault explores Nietzsche’s genealogy in-depth as well but rarely makes explicit the 
connection between genealogy and hermeneutics, although it seems clear that he often had that in mind.  
See here Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in Gayle L Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, eds., 
Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy (Albany NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1990), 59-68. 
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constitute objective meaning through the interrogation of subjective consciousness.  
Through the practice of phenomenology, Ricoeur becomes concerned that 
phenomenological reflection is unable to ground itself in a self-transparent consciousness 
and that that subjective consciousness cannot simply be posited but must be constructed.  
This is the shared concern between Ricoeur and Nietzsche – that consciousness does not 
appear clearly to itself and may be actively or passively obfuscating its origins.  It is the 
very project of reflection that calls for hermeneutics, in Ricoeur’s estimation, as the 
constitution of consciousness does not appear all at once and must, therefore, be 
interpreted from its many varied appearances.  If the task of determining objective 
meaning is to be accomplished, then, for Ricoeur, this can only occur if the 
phenomenological method is “grafted” to a hermeneutics.12  Interpretation becomes an 
integral moment of the constitution of meaningfulness because it supplies the possibility 
of the grounding of objective meaning for the Ricoeurian phenomenology. 
 Ricoeur’s deployment of hermeneutics must traverse between two poles of 
certainty without ever settling on one or the other until the work of interpretation is 
completed.  The reason for this bivalent approach lies in the problem Ricoeur has in mind 
to solve.  The “poles” of interpretation that Ricoeur sees as essential to hermeneutics 
constitute the archaeological origin of meaning and the teleological destination of 
meaning.  Each pole is necessary for the project of determining the full meaning of 
human consciousness but is not itself sufficient because an over reliance on either pole 
can create the illusion of a fully determinate meaning before interpretation has run its 
                                               
12 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, (Evanston IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 6. 
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course.  Although Ricoeur’s project assumes a hope for full mediation between 
competing interpretations, he takes great care to avoid the premature closure of 
interpretation into an encyclopedic moment. 
 The archaeological pole of interpretation, which has already been mentioned as 
the element of the hermeneutics of suspicion, is concerned with uncovering the hidden 
origins of meaning and of the constitution of human consciousness.  Ricoeur’s model for 
this hermeneutic pole is Freud’s development of psychoanalysis, although both Nietzsche 
and Marx occasionally take prominent places in the analysis as well: “All three rise 
before [the contemporary philosopher] as protagonists of suspicion who rip away masks 
and pose the novel problem of the lie of consciousness and consciousness as a lie.”13  
Ricoeur argues that the hermeneutics of suspicion is a systematic interrogation of the 
forces and desires that construct and are also hidden by everyday meaning.  In this way, 
Ricoeur enables the comparison between Nietzsche’s genealogical method and a 
phenomenological hermeneutics.  In terms of the moment of suspicion, both Nietzsche 
and Freud assert, against the immediate certainty of the Cartesian subject, “that ‘think’ is 
the condition and ‘I’ is conditioned, in which case ‘I’ would be a synthesis that only gets 
produced through thought itself.”14  For the hermeneutics of suspicion, Ricoeur asserts 
that a theory of meaning and interpretation is advanced but that it takes the form of an 
“anti-phenomenology” where consciousness is reduced to the unconscious forces that are 
                                               
13 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 99. 
 
14 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 54. 
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synthesized in its production.15  This anti-phenomenological thrust of Nietzsche’s and 
Freud’s theories has kept them at a distance from the hermeneutic mainstream, but I will 
follow Ricoeur in arguing for the placement of Nietzsche’s genealogy among the other 
general hermeneutic theories and methods.  Ricoeur, however, argues that for any 
hermeneutics to reach a concrete or determinate meaning, archaeology alone is 
insufficient.  For a concrete meaning to emerge in any situation, Ricoeur holds that a 
complementary teleological model needs to be present as the appropriation of meaning.  
For the work of interpretation, Ricoeur holds that the object that he names the “symbol” 
will call for both suspicion and the progressive recovery of meaning.  Although Freud 
and Nietzsche are hermeneutic thinkers, Ricoeur will charge that they do not treat 
symbols as cites of both critique and appropriation but see them only as “idols” that must 
be destroyed.16  At this point we reach perhaps the most common problem in the 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts and project.  Ricoeur has recast this problem according 
to his phenomenological hermeneutic vocabulary, but the problem remains as one of 
appropriation. 
 To return to the initial Nietzschean metaphor, we can rephrase this difficulty in 
interpretation as the problem of the ‘mask.’  Nietzsche provides his readers with multiple 
tools for identifying, critiquing, and destroying the masked assumptions of metaphysics 
and morality.  However, what possibilities for meaning are left in the wake of this critical 
                                               
15 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CN: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 117, 118. 
 
16 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 529. 
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genealogy? 17  Is there some positive end that a reader of Nietzsche’s works can point 
at once the archaeological project has run its course?  Ricoeur denies that an 
appropriative end can exist alongside Nietzsche’s radical attempts to de-mystify the 
meanings of morality and metaphysics.  The charge is that Nietzsche remains mired in 
resentment and accusation and cannot raise his philosophy to the level of affirmation.  
The discipline of philosophy at this point would consist solely of the perpetual 
challenging of the interpretations offered for any meaning that is tied to an event; and 
philosophy would never be capable of prospectively granting any new or legitimate 
meaning to any phenomenon.  The task for this present work is to dispute this 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s project and identify how he is engaged in a hermeneutic 
philosophy and how his texts conceive of the interpretive pole of appropriation. 
 In order to approach this end there are several prior, proximate concerns that must 
be addressed in turn.  The first is the necessity of attaching Nietzsche’s concerns of 
interpretation to the phenomenological project.  Ricoeur’s work will here be my guide, as 
he identifies the necessity of the recourse to hermeneutics resulting from a gap in 
phenomenology between the apodicticity of the phenomenological ego and the adequacy 
of its content.  When the phenomenological method moves to examine the constitution of 
consciousness in its passivity, the project of interpretation becomes relevant, as 
consciousness can only grasp its contents which are active.  In order to understand its 
                                               
17 Daniel Conway, in Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game, highlights many of the difficulties associated with 
appropriating Nietzsche’s texts in political contexts, as well.  Conway argues that Nietzsche is unaware of 
the depths of his own decadence and that this necessitates a break with Nietzsche even when (and 
especially when) one is trying to follow him.  See Daniel Conway, Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), particularly chapters one and four.  Although I am more 
concerned here with Nietzsche’s conceptions of meaning, I will return to this when discussing the failure of 
any subjective attempt at pure reflection.   
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constitution, consciousness must reflect on the causes external to itself that have 
caused it to become what it is.  Thus, despite being anti-phenomenological in its 
reduction of consciousness to its compositional forces, a method like Nietzsche’s 
genealogy is a necessary part of any attempt to determine the meaning of the contents of 
consciousness or of a philosophical anthropology.  The second preliminary concern of the 
current text again follows Ricoeur’s lead in articulating Nietzsche’s hermeneutic 
methodology.  By arguing that Nietzsche’s philosophy is a hermeneutics, I will make the 
case that Nietzsche’s main concern is the building of a general theory of how meaning is 
created.  I will argue that genealogy is, therefore, less an epistemic doctrine or position 
than a series of interpretations designed to uncover the processes through which 
meanings are ascribed to events.  This concern will be present both in the discussions of 
Ricoeur’s depiction of hermeneutics as well as in the general reception and interpretation 
offered to Nietzsche’s texts directly.   
 With these concerns addressed, I will turn to the primary goal of this work, which 
is to elucidate the possible appropriative interpretive methods that Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutic exegesis employs.  Throughout his writings, Nietzsche is concerned with 
criticizing the unjustified ends to which previous thinkers have employed concepts, 
ethical rules, or history itself.  I will examine this in chapters two and three.  However, 
the genealogical critique of these ends does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
appropriation through the practice of Nietzsche’s method.  Nietzsche is a careful critic of 
eschatology, the prospect and expectation of a final, static end; but the other sense of an 
end, that of teleology, which is understood as a limited way is not necessarily foreign to 
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Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation.  I will argue that Nietzsche employs a 
teleological prospect in his hermeneutics while maintaining a general criticism of 
“superfluous teleological principles.”18  Although he does not frequently utilize either 
term, both the archaeological moment and the teleological moment figure into his method 
of genealogy as a whole.  We will look at Ricoeur’s descriptions of the routes of 
suspicion in the texts of Freud and Nietzsche, and this will serve as a contrast to the 
appropriative interpretive work that lies behind Nietzsche’s uses of the concepts of 
“health,” “nobility,” and “strength.”  Ultimately, I will attempt to account for this 
appropriative and archaeological conception genealogy through a discussion of 
Nietzsche’s moments of self-interpretation.  The texts where Nietzsche is explicitly 
concerned with interpreting both his past written works, as well as his life itself, are much 
more fruitfully read with this full genealogical interpretive method in place.  Nietzsche’s 
self-interpretation, especially in Ecce Homo, clarifies both his critique of metaphysics 
and morality as well as gestures toward the creation of meaning that takes its place as an 
appropriative, prospective hermeneutics.   
 Finally, before turning to the investigation proper, I want to clarify and begin to 
justify my choice of primary texts.  In the case of Ricoeur’s works, I have focused on his 
works where the conflict and starts of a collaboration between phenomenology are most 
pronounced, namely Freud and Philosophy and his collection Conflict of Interpretations.  
To trace his development of phenomenology, I will look at Fallible Man; but this is 
primarily to see how the problem of the “symbol” arises out of phenomenology and to 
                                               
18 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 13 (emphasis in original). 
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prepare the analyses of the hermeneutic works.  Ricoeur’s later work is addressed only 
obliquely as his interests spread into the philosophy of language, political philosophy, 
and to some small degree, away from a phenomenological hermeneutics in the service of 
a philosophical anthropology.   
 Regarding my selection of Nietzsche’s texts, I have attempted to be as narrow as 
possible in scope in order to minimize several concerns which are commonplace in 
Nietzsche studies.  The first concern regards the use of material from Nietzsche’s 
unpublished Nachlaß as well as the material collected and published as the volume The 
Will to Power.  The Colli and Montinari critical edition of Nietzsche’s texts firmly 
establishes that Will to Power is not a work of Nietzsche’s in the traditional sense of 
being planned, composed, arranged and edited by him and that Nietzsche himself had no 
plan for such a work at the end of his life.  However, there is still the issue of the 
philosophical importance of the writings which Nietzsche left unprepared for publishing 
and in his notebooks, especially considering the use that several of the most valuable and 
influential studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy have made of it.19  Bernd Magnus has 
notably divided Nietzsche scholarship into two groups that, while perhaps being 
oversimplified, still serve as a rough approximation for the opinions on the legitimacy of 
using the Nachlaß.20  Magnus divides the “lumpers” who use the unpublished writings 
freely from the “splitters” who regard as appropriate only the use of those texts prepared 
                                               
19 Of note here are works by Martin Heidegger, Pierre Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze,  Alexander Nehamas, 
and Richard Schacht. 
 
20 See Bernd Magnus, “Nietzsche’s Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the Übermensch,” in 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1986, pp. 79-98. 
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for publication by Nietzsche himself.  Although I think the relationship of Nietzsche’s 
published works to those of his notebooks is more complicated than this division allows, 
for my work I have adopted the “splitter” methodology.  I have done this for two reasons.  
The primary reason is that in imputing a hermeneutic method to Nietzsche I am 
undertaking a task more commonly associated with the “continental” interpreters of 
Nietzsche’s works, who tend to be “lumpers.”  To establish my claim as persuasively as 
possible, I have chosen the more narrow of the textual fields and will use only the 
published works.  My other reason for adopting this method is so I can focus more 
attention on a published work that has often languished for attention – Ecce Homo.  
While the Will to Power has had as much, if not more, scholarly attention than Ecce 
Homo, I hope to show in my final chapter and conclusion that Ecce Homo is a coherent 
philosophical work worthy of attention.  If my theory is sound, Ecce Homo can be seen as 
the demonstration of the Nietzschean archaeology and teleology as it is practiced on 
Nietzsche’s own life and texts.  Ecce Homo thus gives us a philosophical anthropology of 
the author Nietzsche as well as illustrates the critical and appropriative workings of the 
genealogical method.  In short, Nietzsche affirms himself as a product of this method in 
Ecce Homo while still dealing with the masks created for an by himself. 
 The second concern with the selection of Nietzsche’s texts is the issue of 
Nietzsche’s “periods.”  It is a fairly standard procedure to divide Nietzsche’s work into 
“early,” “middle” and “mature” periods; and I will not here challenge this division.21  I 
will restrict myself to the series of texts beginning with The Gay Science, which is a 
                                               
21 See Maudmarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), Chapter 4 for a detailed working out of these “periods.” 
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marker between his middle and mature periods.  Primarily, I will focus on those works 
written after Thus Spoke Zarathustra, including Book Five of Gay Science, where 
Nietzsche’s conceptions of strength, health, and interpretation take on the character that 
they retain throughout the remainder of his published works.  The exception to this focus 
on the mature period will be a brief discussion of the Second Untimely Meditation.  The 
conception of the values of historical thinking displayed there are remarkably relevant to 
the hermeneutic method that is to be gained from Nietzsche’s mature works. 
   
 17    
CHAPTER ONE 
 
RICOEUR’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF CONCRETE REFLECTION  
 
 Paul Ricoeur’s project of phenomenological hermeneutics arises as an attempt to 
achieve a philosophical anthropology through an analysis of mediation in general.  This 
investigation of mediation becomes necessary when Ricoeur’s project of an eidetic 
phenomenological description of human action and willing, announced in The Voluntary 
and the Involuntary, reaches an impasse that traditional phenomenology cannot 
surmount.  This problem is the seeming inscrutability of human fault and the passions, 
which do not easily lend themselves to a rational reconstruction and are only expressed in 
figurative or indirect language, whereas for phenomenology, “a direct language was 
thought to be available.”22  Because humans are subject to many passions that are not 
rational, a systematic philosophy such as phenomenology is not well-suited to deal with 
them because its insistence on rational reconstruction of objective meaning excludes 
them from its inception.  There is nothing essential to a phenomenon like fault or evil 
because if a totalized concept could be created, that would show how it is necessary, 
stripping fault or evil of its non-rational character.  For this reason, other discourses that 
strive to be purely rational will likely dismiss them as well: “Pure reflection makes no 
                                               
22 Paul Ricoeur, “From existentialism to the philosophy of language,” 316, in Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of 
Metaphor: Multidisciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language, trans. Robert Czerny with 
Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 315-322. 
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appeal to any myth or symbol.”23  The essential forms of human willing can be spelled 
out phenomenologically or, in general, philosophically; but this, for Ricoeur, will not 
touch on the nature of how those forms interact with the concrete experience of fault in 
human reality.  Domenico Jervolino states that “a gap remained between the description 
of the essences, in the phenomenological sense, and the concrete condition of 
humankind.”24  To achieve a concrete reflection on human willing and also human being 
in general, Ricoeur states an “empirics” of the will is necessary to complement an eidetic 
description of its forms: “[T]he new description could be only an empirics of the will that 
could proceed by means of a convergence of concrete representations; it could not 
proceed by means of an eidetics, which is an essential description, because of the opaque 
and absurd nature of fault.”25  This empirics will fill that gap, go beyond the eidetic 
descriptions of phenomenology, and attempt to show how a feature of human being – in 
this case fault – can arise, although there is nothing essential to it.  However, Ricoeur 
notes, these experiences of the play of the passions are not without their own discourse 
and language.  Myths and dreams attest for the particular sort of discourse that the 
passions may have or narratives that they may create.  Therefore, for a concrete empirics 
of the will to be possible and for a philosophical anthropology to be completed, Ricoeur 
must search for a way to unite these seemingly diverse forms of discourse through a 
method of mediation.  For this reason, hermeneutic reflection becomes necessary as a 
                                               
23 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 347. 
 
24 Domenico Jervolino, The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur, trans. 
Gordon Poole (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 12. 
 
25 Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), xli-
xlii (emphasis in original). 
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method of interpreting the meaningfulness of these separate narratives and appropriating 
their content into a unified whole.  Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, will describe the concrete 
ways that discourse gives insight into the being of the human being. 
This chapter will detail how hermeneutics becomes necessary for Ricoeur’s 
phenomenological research and will also trace the development of Ricoeur’s own 
hermeneutics as a mediation between the methodological poles of “suspicion” and 
“recovery.”  Ricoeur will follow a phenomenological method, rejecting scientific 
objectivity and other forms of reductionism, until that phenomenology appears as overly 
idealistic in its theory of meaning.  The plurivocity of meaning that the phenomenologist 
encounters requires not just a change of approach towards meaningfulness but also a 
reconception of the ideality that guaranteed meaningfulness – the subject.  The 
hermeneutic approach thus has as its goal a non-idealistic, concrete description of human 
being through the unpacking of the plurivocity of human expressions. 
For Ricoeur, the disparity of and conflict between various discourses concerning 
the being of humanity are problematic in that all seem to suggest, because of their 
multifarious descriptions of human existence when considered together, that a unified 
account of what it is to be human is impossible.  The explanations of the various sciences, 
history, theology, and art all seem to indicate and reinforce their standings as discrete and 
non-communicable fields of research.  However, Ricoeur points out that for 
contemporary philosophy “there is an area today where all philosophical investigations 
cut across one another – the area of language.”26  These various explanations of human 
                                               
26 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CN: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 3. 
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existence must be expressed in language; and, as such, this necessitates that they have a 
stake in an explanation of language as a phenomenon that bears the meaning of their 
findings.  But, as of yet, this discourse over human existence has not brought these 
disciplines closer together in understanding but has only reinforced their differences:  
“The very progress of the aforementioned disparate disciplines has both revealed and 
intensified the dismemberment of that discourse.”27  The act of putting forth reasons in 
language means for Ricoeur that these discourses must enter into the mediation between 
perspective and sense that Ricoeur speaks of in Fallible Man.  Ricoeur’s concept of 
language treats language less as a concept than as a “mediation; it is the medium, the 
‘milieu’, in which the subject posits himself and the world shows itself.”28 An analysis of 
the sorts of mediation possible through language may aid in a potential showing of the 
common root of all these discourses about humanity.   
Ricoeur begins from the position that human consciousness does not and cannot 
grasp all at once all of the perspectives that a phenomenon or object displays.  
Phenomenologically speaking, human perception is open to the world but only through a 
particular point of view.  Each human consciousness, when confronted with a perception 
that is in error or partial, can realize through reflection that it is “a finite center of 
perspective.”29  But this point of view also will make claims as to the meaningfulness of 
the whole through the subject’s use of language.  Discourse about a phenomenon 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 4. 
 
28 Jervolino, Cogito and Hermeneutics, 37 (emphasis in original). 
 
29 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 21. 
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“transgresses” this finite perspective in order to express the totality of the object all at 
once in meaningful signification.  Our perspectives strive for totality through our 
intended sense in discourse.30  Therefore, consciousness both perceives singular 
perspectives of phenomena and mediates between them through the act of signifying 
universally in language.  “This transgression,” for Ricoeur, “is the intention to signify.”31 
 Since all signification transgresses, Ricoeur will take this common feature of any 
discourse as an opportunity to demonstrate the possibility of communication between 
discourses.  The method of Ricoeur’s philosophical project is always to oppose apparent 
“dismemberment” or recourse to “eclecticism” with a philosophical hermeneutics that 
seeks to mediate between the differences of each discourse through the discovery of a 
transcendental logic that makes each discourse possible. 32  Ricoeur philosophically puts 
no stock in the idea that these accounts of language are completely incommunicable to 
one another; this would be “dismemberment.”  He also will not be happy with recourse to 
an “idle eclecticism” that would depict these discourses as aspects of a preconceived idea 
of philosophical progress that ignores their concrete differences in both projects and 
solutions.  “Eclecticism,” he states, “proclaims that all great systems ultimately say the 
same thing, at least if one knows how to distinguish the essential from the accessory.”33  
The methods of both dismemberment and eclecticism commit the mistake of presuming 
                                               
30 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 24. 
 
31 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 26. 
 
32 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 161. 
 
33 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1965), 43. 
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to know precisely what is at stake before the phenomena and texts are studied.  They take 
their particular expressions to account for the totality of the field under discussion rather 
than transgressions from a particular point of view.  In this way, these methods can teach 
and reveal nothing new, because they fail to acknowledge other valid points of view; nor 
can they engage in a dialogue about their own possibility, because they appear to 
themselves as necessary and not as merely possible.  Instead, Ricoeur argues that 
although totality cannot be abandoned as a regulative ideal, it cannot be gained all at once 
via reduction.  However, in spite of the discrete points of view that discourses operate 
from, rational reconstruction must be possible, even if never attained, because it is the 
“horizon” in which all philosophical efforts take place.34   It is the task of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics to account more fully for the nature of this “horizon.” 
Therefore, with these two sorts of reductionism put aside, the question of 
grounding this revelation of the conflict of discourses about human being must be posed 
philosophically as a hermeneutic question:  How can a critique of the possibility of 
conflict of accounts of the world be posed?  An answer to this question will satisfy the 
requirement for the possibility of communication between these various discourses about 
human being.  In both his hermeneutics and his phenomenology, Ricoeur seeks, through 
an analysis of actions and expressions, the fundamental manner in which the being of 
human being is embedded in the world and with others.  This horizon of meaning is often 
referred to by the term “belonging” by Ricoeur.  Belonging is the originary affirmation of 
                                               
34 Ricoeur, History and Truth, 50. 
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human willing and is “an immediate or unreflective relation.”35  If these disparate 
discourses can be shown to illuminate various regional aspects of that fundamental 
belonging to the world, then a ground for communication between investigations can be 
posited and described as they emerge from that belonging.  While Ricoeur does not claim 
to be the “Leibnizian” figure that could bring about the unification of all discourses, and 
he may in fact think that no such figure could exist, he does seek to reconstruct the 
differences between the conflicting viewpoints rationally and reconcile them.36 
 Following the principles of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, 
Ricoeur cannot accept any “objectivism” that would ground discourse and 
communication in the manner of the natural sciences, although this does not mean that 
these accounts have nothing to contribute.37  The natural sciences constitute knowledge 
on the basis of an individual’s understanding of an objective and measurable exterior 
world.  But Ricoeur states that Husserl’s phenomenology shows this subject/object 
constitution of knowledge in science as possible only on the basis of a prior “horizon” or 
“field of meanings anterior to objectivity for a knowing subject.”38  The arguments that 
the sciences must provide to demonstrate their applicability to existence or a certain 
problematic are possible only on the basis of some other intuition about the world, be it 
                                               
35 Leonard Lawlor, Imagination and Chance: The Difference Between the Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida 
(Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 54 
 
36 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 4; and Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 456-7.  The epigraph I have 
chosen for my entire project here points to Leibniz’s own awareness of this problem, even though he 
remains bound to an image of thinking as representation.   
 
37 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 8. 
 
38 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 9. 
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the truths of observation or of logic.  All disciplines must have, for Ricoeur, a basis in the 
“prephilosophical character” of existence – belonging – that provides the horizon within 
which reflection can take place.39  However, it is Ricoeur’s wager that each disparate 
discourse built on that horizon will reveal a different regional sense of that belonging as it 
is expressed in their discourse. 
Phenomenology’s sense of its own foundation is different than the grounding for 
any other discipline – such as positivism, history, or anthropology – in that 
phenomenology’s grounding claims a radical beginning “that cannot be framed in a 
demonstrative argument.”40  The radical claim here is that a phenomenological method 
must ground itself – be a Selbsts-Begründung – and, therefore, that its foundation must be 
directly or immediately found in intuition rather than provided by a deductive argument.  
In this, Husserl, and through him, Ricoeur, places himself in the one of the central 
debates of Plato’s Theatetus concerning the rational ground of perception and 
argumentation.  Phenomenologically, recourse to the certainty of intuition must occur in 
every attempt to ground any further science; so, these other sciences are, at the least, 
epistemologically derivative in their nature by virtue of being posterior to the self-
positing of intuition:  “[T]he truth of science is erected as a superstructure upon a first 
foundation of presence and existence, that of the world lived through perceptually.”41  
Although Ricoeur, as we will see shortly, will come to doubt the absolute primacy of 
                                               
39 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 4. 
 
40 Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. 
Thompson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 26-7. 
 
41 Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 9. 
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immediate intuition, he will not abandon Husserl’s critique of objectivist science or 
naturalism in general.  Rather, Ricoeur will question the direct access to intuition that 
Husserl claims is possible and attempt to replace that technique with the longer path that 
passes through an activity of mediation.   
For Husserl’s phenomenology, this recourse to direct intuition is achieved through 
the application of the “phenomenological epoche” which is utilized to neutralize all 
mental acts that would posit “any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.”42  By 
bracketing all questions of the reference of the contents of consciousness to “factual 
being” or existence, the epoche opens up, for phenomenology, direct access to 
consciousness and its intentional objects, the essences of which it is phenomenology’s 
task to describe.43  These intentional objects are the objects considered only insofar as 
consciousness is ‘consciousness-of’ them.  If Ricoeur were to remain utterly faithful to 
the Husserlian program, this would be the place where the investigation of language 
would begin.  Ricoeur would look at the specific essential “objectivality” of language as 
it appears as given in consciousness.44  It would then be the task to understand our 
perspective on it as it expresses a greater whole that we think as a totality.  The epoche 
would reveal the ideal sense of the thing intended by consciousness when it intends the 
object – in this case, language.  Thus we would come to understand the meaning of the 
object intended in consciousness through a synthesis of the intended sense and the 
                                               
42 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), 61. 
 
43 This is said in reference to Husserl’s earlier phenomenological project of eidetic description. 
 
44 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 39. 
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perspective.  However, for Ricoeur, Husserl’s phenomenology remains too idealistic 
because this field of eidetic meaning that is opened, revealed by the phenomenological 
epoche, is grounded by the indubitability of the existence of consciousness.  This 
grounding of sense is accomplished through the phenomenological assumption of the 
unity of the subject’s consciousness “by designating the subject as an intentional pole, 
directed outward, and by giving, as the correlate of this subject, not a nature but a field of 
meanings.”45  While the epoche reveals the significance of the meaning of being and 
objects and not just the beings themselves (which have been bracketed), it achieves this 
by relying on a theory of a unified consciousness and of the self-transparency of that 
consciousness.  Because Ricoeur is skeptical about the viability of this starting point of 
self-consciousness, as are most phenomenologists that historically follow Heidegger’s 
implicit criticisms of Husserl in Being and Time, he thinks Husserl’s theory an idealism 
because the univocal sense of beings is regulated by an inscrutable entity which seems 
achievable to Ricoeur only through interpretation and not eidetic description – the 
transcendental consciousness – and because the objective senses of intention are achieved 
prior to any experience. 
 
I.  Ricoeur’s Critique of the Cogito  
Although not an explicitly hermeneutic text, Ricoeur’s phenomenological 
descriptions in Fallible Man take into account many of his criticisms of the Husserlian 
subject as well as set up many of the structures that his hermeneutics will later populate 
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  27 
     
with content.  Here, Ricoeur begins the empiric description of human fallibility as it 
appears in acts of the will.  The phenomenological explanation of human willing shows 
humans to be fragile beings, that is, beings that belong in an intermediate role between 
two opposed poles in human experience itself.  These poles Ricoeur calls the “finite” and 
the “infinite.”46  For example, in the realm of theoretical knowledge, we mediate between 
a limited perspective in perception and total sense in language.47  However, we must be 
careful to see these poles as constituting the lower and the upper extents of human being 
and not as a mere spatial metaphor of humanity’s ontological locale: “Man is not 
intermediate because he is between angel and animal; he is intermediate within himself, 
within his selves.  He is intermediate because he is a mixture, and a mixture because he 
brings about mediations.”48  This statement, which Ricoeur will spend the entirety of the 
book unpacking, holds that human being is not immediately transparent to itself.  Due to 
the mediating function of consciousness between immediate presence, which is always 
perspectival, and the anticipated sense of the whole, which is shown in discourse, 
consciousness cannot achieve direct intuition of itself is a meaningful way.  Ricoeur 
stands strongly against any reductionist account of human being, which must assume a 
self-immediacy or transparency at some level with which to ground its theoretical 
grasping of the totality of the issue.  Husserl’s phenomenology still relies on this self-
immediacy.  However, the concretely situated manner in which humanity exists precludes 
                                               
46 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 2. 
 
47 See here Don Ihde’s analysis of this “phenomenology within Kantian limits” in Don Ihde, Hermeneutic 
Philosophy: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 59-80. 
 
48 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 3 (emphasis in original). 
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any immediate shift in perspective to an easily totalized viewpoint.  For ethics, ontology, 
and affectivity, it would be a mistake to attempt an anthropological explanation utilizing 
only either the finite or infinite standpoint because either alone would miss different 
concrete realities of existence.  Instead, Ricoeur undertakes the arduous investigation of 
the character of the mediation that humans are, saying of humanity: “His ontological 
characteristic of being-intermediate consists precisely in that his act of existing is the 
very act of bringing about mediations between all the modalities and all the levels of 
reality within him and outside him.”49  The “disproportion” of human existence – of 
being both “more than” and “less than” simultaneously – introduces a metaphoric 
distance between our abilities to reflect and comprehend.50  Direct philosophical grasp of 
the entirety of human consciousness is deferred by the concept of consciousness as a 
mediator, which makes a starting point like Husserl’s impossible.  Thus there is no direct 
access to the problem of a philosophical anthropology as a purely eidetic description 
because human consciousness never appears as whole to itself.   
This main concern with the impossibility of grasping the totality of consciousness 
will also appear in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic texts.  The “empirics of the will” will now be 
“determined as a symbolism” which must be hermeneutic.51  In these texts, however, 
Ricoeur deploys two complementary lines of thought to reveal the idealism of Husserl’s 
eidetic description of sense.  While the univocity of sense is the primary target here, 
                                               
49 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 3. 
 
50 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 5-6. 
 
51 Jervolino, Cogito and Hermeneutics, 12. 
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Ricoeur shows its impossibility by critiquing its correlate in the Husserlian system – the 
intentional pole of subjective consciousness upon which the unity of sense reposes.  The 
first argumentative line is characterized by its place within what Ricoeur refers to as the 
“reflective tradition” of philosophy and marks a continuation of arguments in Fallible 
Man.  The second marks the appearance of the “masters of suspicion.”52 
 Reflective philosophy is, in Ricoeur’s understanding of the school, a philosophy 
that aims for self-understanding from the starting point of reflection on the self and its 
understanding of the world and the relations of objects in that world.  It is, or has been, a 
philosophy of the subject; and its explicit historical trajectory runs roughly from 
Descartes, through Kant and the German Idealists, to Husserl and egological 
phenomenology.53  It is also, as Ricoeur notes often, the tradition in which he himself was 
trained.54  For philosophical systems of this sort, philosophical investigations proceed 
from the immediate certainty of self-consciousness toward representations, appearances, 
or meanings that are to be explained and understood.  Thus, the subject is the self-
grounded foundation for knowledge of the meaningfulness of the external world.  As an 
example, Descartes’s attempt to ground scientific knowledge about the external world 
proceeds from the absolute self-certainty of the concept of the cogito; or, the 
                                               
52 In the wake of Ricoeur’s work on Freud and the hermeneutics of suspicion, Ricoeur will broaden the 
scope of his dialectic and take seriously the work of structuralist linguistics, especially in the work of Levi-
Strauss, Hjelmslev,and Griemas.  Although I do not treat this debate here, much of it is similar in character 
with the approach that brings Ricoeur near to the “masters of suspicion” when they are conceived of as 
semiologists. 
 
53 Ricoeur sometimes extends this tradition beyond these “modern” figures to include the character of 
Socrates in the Platonic dialogues as well as St. Augustine.  See Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 236 
and From Text To Action, 12.   
 
54 See Paul Ricoeur, “Intellectual Biography” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: The Library of Living 
Philosophers, Vol. XXII, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 3-10. 
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indubitability of the inner life of self-consciousness provides the method for the 
grounding of the objectivity of scientific investigations into the behavior of material 
substance.  Similarly, for Husserl, the unity of the sense of objects after the 
phenomenological reduction relies on the unity of the Husserlian ego, or the subjective 
pole of intentionality.  This Husserlian subject produces the univocity of the sense of 
objects through the ideal sense that is either fulfilled or left empty through intentional 
perception.  The ego actively synthesizes, through an intention of some thing, an 
“anticipated sense” with the expectation of fulfillment through the perceived object.55  
Intentional consciousness may be always of some thing, but it is the meaning of that 
intended object to the ego that is important for Husserl’s project.  As Ricoeur writes, “It 
is this empire of sense, thus freed from any matter-of-fact question [after the epoche] that 
constitutes the privileged field of phenomenological experience, the domain of intuition 
par excellence.”56  Thus, Husserl’s too is a reflective philosophy that holds self-
consciousness to be an indubitable, immanent certainty that will provide a ground for all 
questions of the constitution of the sense of objects that appear in intuition.  Husserl’s 
phenomenology holds that we can reflect on the contents of consciousness, after 
implementing the epoche, to realize the meaning of those objects that appear in 
consciousness.  The fact of intentional consciousness sets forth ideals of sense-fulfillment 
that perception can fill.  We are able to fix these meanings even though “every 
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apprehension of transcendence is open to doubt but… self-immanence is indubitable.”57  
The expressions and perceptions of objects are themselves grounded in meaningfulness 
by the subject’s intentionality of the sense of the object, which can either be filled or 
empty. 
 It is at this point, for Ricoeur, where reflective philosophy begins to outstrip its 
ability to be also an egology – an immediate science of self-consciousness.  The 
discovery of intentionality, that consciousness is always consciousness-of something, 
raises the problem that it is impossible to capture the subject alone; that is, consciousness 
is never empty such that it can be known in a meaningful way.  There is not a direct 
intuition of the self as there is of the other objects in perception.  As consciousness is 
always consciousness-of, when it takes itself as its object, consciousness cannot in the 
same movement capture its own encompassing of the contents of consciousness.  The 
very act of attempting to totalize consciousness through a reflexive phenomenology 
reveals the impossibility of that act; there is always the aspect of reflection that is left 
untotalized by direct consciousness.  Because of intentionality, the phenomenological 
epoche does not itself get us closer to the totality of truths about the subject’s 
meaningfulness or adequately fulfill a philosophical anthropology.  Instead, the self, or 
self-consciousness as an intentional object, is certain as existing but never fully saturated 
in terms of meaning because it can never come to full intentional presence.  Therefore, if 
the sense of intuitions in consciousness is guaranteed as univocal by consciousness’ 
active syntheses, these active syntheses appear as founded on something without full 
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meaningful content of its own.  In this context, an effort to understand any truths about 
the subject pole itself will either be illusory, in attempting to describe something that 
does not exist, or empty, as the self does not directly appear.  Consciousness, we are lead 
to see, cannot totalize itself and become knowable directly; it cannot immediately 
account for itself because the only things given in it are the objects of its intentional 
perception.  Therefore Ricoeur is justified in concluding, “Although this certainty 
[consciousness] is unquestionable as certainty, it can be doubted as truth.”58  The 
phenomenological account of consciousness gives us apodicticity in the certainty of the 
existence of consciousness, but consciousness’s concept of itself is never adequate to the 
meaningful totality of that consciousness. 
 With this conclusion, Ricoeur moves the reflexive tradition away from one of its 
idols – self-consciousness’s immediate transparency – by virtue of a tool discovered 
within phenomenology.  “The great discovery,” Ricoeur writes, “of phenomenology, 
within the limits of the phenomenological reduction itself, remains intentionality, that is 
to say, in its least technical sense, the priority of consciousness of something over self-
consciousness.”59  This entails that phenomenological egology need not accompany 
phenomenological intentionality in philosophical reflection.  Without this egology, 
however, phenomenology can no longer assume the univocity of meaning, as its final 
bulwark is removed; but it is now also free for a less illusory reflection about the meaning 
of things and the self.  Don Idhe rightly claims that, “Ricoeur’s claim… means that all 
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intentions stop short of total fulfillment.”60  The signifying intention never finds full 
presence because the depth of the intention cannot be fully known through immediate 
consciousness.  Therefore, the intention always remains somewhat indeterminate.  If 
univocal, determinate meaning must be sought in full presence to consciousness, this is 
always a task for reconstruction rather than a specifically given meaning because 
consciousness is never identical to itself.  In this form, intentionality, in the Husserlian 
sense, remains central to Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics; but it is an 
intentionality deployed from a position that is skeptical concerning questions of the 
univocity of meaning.  As is demonstrated in Fallible Man, Ricoeur’s phenomenological 
hermeneutics will instead start from the objective pole to reveal the transcendental 
structures that make that appearing or sense possible. 
 Whereas Ricoeur criticizes Husserl’s early phenomenology for its excessive 
idealism of sense, Ricoeur does not abandon the structure of the synthesis of meaning 
that Husserl had been developing since the Logical Investigations.  Ricoeur notes that 
Husserl develops a theory that ties intentionality to signification where the act of 
signifying shows a movement from an empty sign in consciousness towards its 
fulfillment in the perception of the object it signifies.61  As we have seen, Husserl’s 
insistence on the immediacy of the ego forces this theory of signification towards 
idealism, but to Ricoeur this problem of the fulfillment of sense shows the necessity of 
interpretation to the constitution of the self.  Because the signs in consciousness cannot 
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be completely fulfilled because of the perspectival nature of perception, their unity must 
be the product of a synthesis between the ideality of the sign and the various perceptions 
of the presumed unified object.  “Therefore,” writes Ricoeur, “what we call ‘intuition’ is 
itself the result of ‘synthesis,’ of passive syntheses that already have their syntax, that are 
articulated in a prereflective and prejudicative (or prepredicative) sense.”62  Thus the 
phenomenological problem becomes the unpacking of these syntheses that make intuition 
itself possible; but Ricoeur must now accomplish this without the foundational subject to 
which Husserl refers.   
 The other track taken against the self-immediacy of the meaningfulness of the 
cogito is what Ricoeur broadly labels “the challenge of semiology.”63  Reflexive 
philosophy, after its self-criticism, finds itself at the starting point of much of 
“semiotics.”  If phenomenology can be characterized as giving a semantic theory of how 
signs are fulfilled by objects that they designate in intuition, the semiological standpoint 
will argue that such fulfillment and immediacy of intuition as is required by 
phenomenology cannot be found.  Instead of being transparent, consciousness’s workings 
are hidden from itself and can only be accessed as mediated through the expressions of 
sign systems.  Although structuralist linguistics plays a considerable role in this portion 
of Ricoeur’s thought, here I will focus only on the role of psychoanalysis as a semiotic 
theory in order to bring in gradually the importance of “suspicion” to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic work.   
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 Freud’s account of psychoanalysis challenges the self-immediacy of the cogito of 
the reflexive tradition but from a position outside that tradition.  What is most important 
at this point for Ricoeur’s reading of Freud is that Freud views consciousness as the 
product of forces or effect of causes that are hidden from itself.  Unlike the reflexive 
tradition, for Freud consciousness is not the sole, primary location of interest.  The fact of 
consciousness is undisputed, but the question of “what consciousness is” is accounted for 
by Freud in a distinct manner from its handling by Husserlian phenomenology.  Ricoeur 
argues that Freud shows the cogito to be “wounded” in that its existence is apodictic (just 
as Descartes, Kant, and Husserl have shown) but that our idea of self-consciousness is 
false and can never be adequate to itself.64  Consciousness is not merely opaque but false 
because it is generated on top of a wholly other unconscious that cannot be made 
transparent.65  The Freudian topographic theory reduces what we refer to as 
consciousness to a contested field fought over by three forces – the id, superego, and 
Reality – of which the individual’s self-consciousness is largely unaware.  This renders 
“the question of consciousness… as obscure as the question of the unconscious.”66  For 
Freud, consciousness is not a static location but is merely part of the system of the 
production of meaning and cannot be the supreme arbitrator that Husserl et al would have 
it be, because consciousness is not master of itself.  At the very least, the ego (or 
consciousness) is used by the competing forces of id and superego to produce their 
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desired perception of reality.  The “wounded cogito” that Ricoeur sees in Freud’s work 
can set itself up as the lone judge of experience, but it cannot itself decipher its own 
conditions for being – the unconscious forces that give it efficacy – through naïve 
reflection.  This can only be determined through the interpretive process that takes place 
in analysis concerning the patient’s expressions.  Because of this, consciousness is a lie 
insofar as it sees itself as the determining judge of the reality of what appears to it, when 
in fact it is only the effect of the productive forces have already determined our 
relationship to reality.  As David Kaplan writes, Freud indirectly shows Husserl’s 
egology to be founded on “the ‘transcendental illusion’ of a subject that ostensibly is 
immediately transparent to itself.”67 
The semiotics that Freud proposes acts as a reading of the signs of conscious 
expression so that the unconscious workings of desire can be interpreted.  If we want to 
come to know the self, or consciousness, we must pass through the signs of the forces of 
the unconscious that have dominated the ego and will continue to try and do so.  The ego 
is here reduced to the forces of desire that that produce it, in contrast to Husserl’s 
reduction of experience to the unity of intuition in consciousness.68  Thus, Freudian 
semiology removes consciousness from the position of ground or self-ground and makes 
it a field of signs (such as guilt or repetition) that derive their meaning from the processes 
of desire that come from the unconscious.  In this way, Freudian theory can be seen as an 
“anti-phenomenology” because “psychoanalysis undoes the evidence of consciousness,” 
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from which phenomenology starts.69  Knowledge of consciousness is, then, not a given to 
found univocal meaning upon but is rather a task accomplished by a long interpretation, 
and not merely self-interpretation, of its expressed signs.70 
 Together, these two critiques of the cogito that reveal it to be opaque and a 
product of other forces rather than its own auto-affection lead Ricoeur to seek an alternate 
method of articulating language and its plurivocity.  Rather than look to the ego or self-
consciousness directly, Ricoeur will focus on its expressions in order to find a concrete 
sense of self and the belonging from which it arises: “The beginning is not what one finds 
first; the point of departure must be reached, it must be won.”71  This shift will lead us to 
the founding of Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics and the need for a philosophy 
of language. 
 
II.  The Ricoeurian Reduction 
 If Husserl’s account of the univocity of sense has failed to ground itself, this does 
not entail Ricoeur’s abandonment of the insight of intentionality.  Instead, since the 
cogito is now seen as insufficiently unified to suit the task of guaranteeing univocity, 
Ricoeur will turn and embrace that which Husserl attempted to exclude with his logic – 
the plurivocity of sense.  As Husserl himself, according to Ricoeur, seems to realize in 
later works such as the Crisis of the European Sciences, “[i]t is in spite of itself that 
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phenomenology discovers, in place of an idealist subject locked within a system of 
meanings, a living being which from all time has, as the horizon of all its intentions, a 
world, the world.”72  The active synthesis of sense that occurs in a signifying intention is 
not made possible by an a priori univocal logical system - this would be the idealism of 
which Ricoeur speaks - but by a lifeworld [Lebenswelt].  Consciousness appears as finite 
in its possible determinations of sense because, in order to make determinations at all, it 
must be bounded.  The lifeworld is the pre-reflective, intersubjective world of relations of 
belonging to sedimented meanings as well as future possibilities of meaningfulness that 
consciousness finds itself in before it can begin reflection.73  It is this lifeworld (or our 
belonging to it) that is the condition for the possibility of phenomenological 
meaningfulness, but this world is not immediately given as bearing just one sense.  Or, 
rather, it is always carrying too much sense in that its plurivocality always threatens to 
undermine the grounds of science and objective knowledge for the consciousness that 
attempts its determination.   
 Because of this excess of meaningfulness in the lifeworld, Ricoeur will hold that 
Husserl’s version of the phenomenological epoche fails to reduce completely the being of 
the world to the sense of the being of the world.74  If eidetic description cannot account 
for the whole of experience, then the constitution of sense must occur in interpretation, 
which narrows the field of possible meanings from a horizon steeped in plurivocal 
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expressions.  With the guarantee of the ideal, whole cogito removed, we move from 
eidetic description to hermeneutics, which discovers “a manner of existing which would 
remain from start to finish a being-interpreted.”75  In place of Husserl’s idealistic epoche, 
Ricoeur will offer an epoche of a different sort from which to begin a phenomenological 
hermeneutics.  Rather than a reduction to a subjective pole of intuition, Ricoeur will 
argue for an epoche to expressions already in language.  The radical self-grounding that 
phenomenology seeks has discovered instead the lifeworld, which demonstrates that a 
simple starting point for reflection is not possible.  “Consequently,” for Ricoeur, 
“philosophy has to proceed as a second-order elucidation of a nebula of meaning that at 
first has a prephilosophical character.”76  Phenomenological analysis opens up the field of 
the lifeworld and the manner in which understanding functions as mode of human being, 
however there can only be access to this understanding through reflection that is a 
reflection on language:  “the point of departure [of ontological questioning must] be 
taken on the same level on which understanding operates, that is, on the level of 
language.”77  Again we see that language is the field upon which philosophical discourses 
must prove themselves, but now Ricoeur has raised the stakes.   
While an eidetic phenomenological investigation into language is proven to be 
excessively idealistic, the broader picture produced has shown language to be 
fundamental to the reflective understanding of the ontological constitution of the self in 
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the lifeworld, a self that is always a being-interpreted.  The beginning of a philosophical 
investigation, here Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, must start in the already 
mediated realm of human expressions and traditions.  Consequently, the question of 
language has become tied not to its virtual logical structures but to its actual expressions 
by human beings.  Because the field of the meaning of human being cannot be 
immediately reduced to a totalized realm of sense, Ricoeur thinks we instead must start 
from within what comprehension we do have of the possible totality.  And it is Ricoeur’s 
wager that if we bracket the possible transcendent reference of expression to examine the 
process of expression alone, we will be lead to a more complete knowledge of the manner 
in which language is a mediation between human desires and social reality.  We can no 
longer hope to discover the concrete meaning of language and the root of communication 
in consciousness alone.  Ricoeur discovers a “gap” between our total comprehension of 
the object and our pure reflection on it.78  Instead of referring to the supposedly pure 
contents of consciousness, the Ricoeurian epoche advises us to seek understanding of the 
consciousness of meaning in the “deciphering of its expressions.”79   
However, as we have seen, eidetic phenomenology cannot accomplish this as it 
can only justify language as being bound by the meanings in consciousness.  The 
publicity of meaning, its pre-philosophical existence as the horizon of our experience, 
requires that the meaningfulness of language not simply be bound by one consciousness.  
Ricoeur is here proposing that the surplus of meaning in the lifeworld and in language is 
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what provides the boundaries of consciousness and that language can only be studied as 
an ontological mode of understanding in its fullness, not in its “subjective” or “objective” 
structures alone.  Ricoeur’s philosophy of reflection now insists we reflect on meaning to 
understand consciousness – thereby inverting the reflexive tradition.  He states: “Seeking 
meaning no longer means spelling out the consciousness of meaning [as Descartes and 
Husserl do] but, rather, deciphering its expressions.”80  This entails that meaningfulness’s 
condition of being can no longer be sought internally to consciousness, for Ricoeur.  
Meaning and sense are external and in the world and in our traditions before they are 
appropriated to a singular consciousness.  And as consciousness itself is intentional, we 
can only understand it by understanding those signs produced by humans that bear an 
external, expressed sense that are then intended by consciousness.  We have moved from 
understanding consciousness as the condition of possibility of the meaningfulness of 
language to the fullness of language as being the condition of the possibility of 
understanding self-consciousness itself.   
In this way, Ricoeur’s phenomenology again reasserts the critical philosophy of 
Kant.  He will seek to articulate the structures of self-consciousness through a 
transcendental deduction based on the “object” understood as the fullness of language.  
Ricoeur states that this argument in the transcendental style is “a reflection that starts not 
with myself but with the object before me, and from there traces back to its conditions of 
possibility.”81  This transcendental investigation will not start with the immediate given 
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of consciousness or the sense of its noetic objects; instead it starts with the object of 
expressed language and search for the conditions of its possibility as the modes of 
understanding that exist in consciousness.  The conditions of the varied expressions in 
language will correspond to the synthesis constituted through intentional consciousness.  
By starting with the fullness of language, Ricoeur will attempts to work backwards to the 
synthesizing mediations effected by consciousness and, thereby, enable a description of 
that mediating and mediated consciousness. 
However, to this phenomenology of expression that Ricoeur is proposing, there 
must also be a method.  Even though a radical starting point cannot exist for philosophy, 
Ricoeur will attempt to reach or demonstrate the core of human being as the object of his 
method: “However, if philosophy is not a radical beginning with regard to its sources, it 
may be one with regard to its method.”82  The method that Ricoeur will propose is a 
“grafting” of a hermeneutics onto this phenomenology.83  A hermeneutics is necessary 
because, with the rejection of the Husserlian model of meaning, the meaningfulness of 
any phenomenon now exists as an external plurivocal field of meanings that must be 
appropriated or intended to be understood.  Gianni Vattimo’s statement about Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics holds true here for Ricoeur’s as well: “[I]t becomes clear that every type of 
knowledge and experience of the truth is in fact hermeneutical.  However, this 
universalization of the hermeneutic implies that all experience and all knowledge is to be 
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understood as linguistic.”84  Ricoeur follows classical hermeneutics here in holding that 
this work of reducing the distance between the sense of a text, whatever that is taken to 
be, and the reader is a work of interpretation.  Any instance of life that can understand 
itself can only accomplish this understanding through a process that passes through 
expressive objectification to appropriation.  By rejecting the self-immanence of 
consciousness, Ricoeur has refocused interpretation on expressions, specifically 
“expressions of life which have become fixed through writing.”85  Thus, if we are to 
understand language and, through it, ourselves via a reflective philosophy, we must 
undertake an interpretation of the plurivocal expressions of language and see what this 
reveals of their unity and ground.  To avoid any distorting reductionism, the sort that 
Husserl and the other purely “logical” views of language provide, attention must be paid 
to the “fullness, the diversity, and the irreducibility of the various uses of language.”86  
The transcendental grounding must take the form of a hermeneutics.  However, Ricoeur’s 
method also contains the goal of seeking the common belonging that these various 
expressive modes of language utilize and arise from.  The task of his philosophical 
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anthropology, despite the character of existence as being-interpreted, will be rational 
reconstruction of the totality.87 
The commonality that Ricoeur finds lies in the possibility for expressions to have 
more than one sense.  Depending on how an expression is interpreted, it can bear more 
than one meaning.  Interpretation can only begin, in fact, where plurivocality has been 
actualized: “To interpret is to understand a double meaning.”88  Rather than immediately 
undertaking a concrete hermeneutic reflection on these double meanings in language, 
Ricoeur proposes a more indirect path.  It may lead to a phenomenological hermeneutics, 
but Ricoeur must begin with a critique of the hermeneutic method.  This is what is most 
distinctive about Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.  If interpretation is to be an appropriation of a 
double meaning, then it must also be possible for alternate interpretations of any given 
expression to be articulated.  To launch into hermeneutics (or phenomenology, for that 
matter) without undertaking a critique of that particular hermeneutics’s ground of 
interpretation opens the door, for Ricoeur, to a one-sided exegesis and illusion.  
Therefore, with interpretation freed from univocity and interiority, Ricoeur must provide 
a new foundation for hermeneutics and his phenomenology.  In his earlier hermeneutic 
works, this ground is the symbol.89 
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III.  The Ricoeurian Symbol 
 The entryway to a philosophical anthropology for Ricoeur will always be 
mediated by language.  In his search for a coherent philosophy of language in which a 
philosophical anthropology can be couched, Ricoeur discovers that psychologistic 
theories of meaning are untenable and, with them, univocal theories of meaning.  So the 
turn to expressions and their plurivocality must be made, which has the effect of turning 
all reflection into interpretations of expressions in language.  Hermeneutic work, then, 
becomes central to any philosophy insofar as philosophy attempts to decipher the 
meaning of the expressions of consciousness; but here we are back to a seemingly diverse 
field of possible interpretations as well as theories of interpretation.  Importantly, Ricoeur 
does not deny this range of interpretation of what he calls the “hermeneutic field” but 
seeks to preserve it and understand its conditions for possibility.  For these reasons, 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is not presented directly but is developed only after a functional 
critique (in the Kantian sense) of hermeneutic possibility.  Ricoeur’s own hermeneutics 
will be a dialectic of concrete reflection on opposing hermeneutic methods; but first he 
must account for their mutual possibilities.  The opacity of self-consciousness when 
posited as the site of the grounding of the unity of sense leads Ricoeur to focus instead on 
the language in which intentional life is expressed.  In order to complete or at least 
critique the limits of a philosophical anthropology, Ricoeur holds that the mediating 
function of language must be accounted for.  This general theory of language that 
Ricoeur proposes and attempts is needed to decipher the plurality of ways that humans 
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express their interactions in the world and their self-reflection.  There is no direct access 
to the self; instead the self can only be known through its expressions, which exteriorize 
consciousness and make it available as an object.  These various types of expressions, 
however, characterize existence in radically different ways.  To account for this 
plurivocality, Ricoeur wishes to reflect on the condition for the possibility of this conflict 
of interpretation between fields of study.  He finds, in his early work, that it is the symbol 
that conditions the possibility of the actuality of polysemic language.  Adopting a phrase 
from Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Ricoeur states “symbols give rise to 
thought.”90   
Ricoeur founds this hermeneutic method by making interpretation the correlate of 
a concept he calls the “symbol,” which defines “symbolism and hermeneutics in terms of 
each other.”91  The symbol is any object of any hermeneutic field that bears a double 
meaning or has been interpreted in more than one way, which means that it can, from one 
perspective, be misunderstood.  Symbols account for the possibility of a conflict of 
interpretations because they occur when “one meaning, not satisfied with designating 
some one thing, designates another meaning only in and through the first 
intentionality.”92  The symbol stands as a trace of the thought of those who have come 
before, but, in appearing as symbolic, it has no one clear meaning but the possibility of 
intending several different meanings.  Symbols are the originary sites of double meaning 
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that both appear before reflective thought can begin and also call upon philosophical 
reflection in language.  This distance from being univocal calls forth, for Ricoeur, the 
task of thinking and interpreting what the symbol’s meaning and intentional fulfillment 
could be.  Although humans must first utter words or inscribe marks which are symbols, 
those symbols have a depth that is not exhausted in just one intentional meaning – they 
do not refer to only one possible noetic object.  Instead, symbolic expressions denote not 
only one intentionality but more meanings than can be appropriated by the interpreting 
party simultaneously.  Thus, while intentionality of meaning is the universal moment of 
the mediation from a finite perspective, the intentionality of the symbol “is not universal 
and necessary in a univocal sense.”93  The total fulfillment of the intentionality of a 
symbol cannot occur because it always refers beyond itself.  The depth of meaning in the 
symbol, its intentional plurivocity, provides the possibility of hermeneutics by provoking 
an attempt to grasp and account for the range of meanings contained within the symbol.  
In this way, Ricoeur writes of the symbol as an “enigma” that is capable of fulfilling 
several different sorts of intentionality without ever ceasing to leave room for further 
interpretation and exegesis.94  Any hermeneutics must deal with the excess of meaning 
that a symbol has, because this excess is what makes hermeneutics possible.  Exegesis 
cannot begin without a misunderstanding or “enigma” that spurs it forward as well as 
constituting its field.  The symbol raises the possibility of interpretative work through its 
complex intentional structure that keeps escaping all attempts to fix its meaning in its 
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entirety.  Lawlor writes, regarding this, “[b]y making contact with that which is totally 
other, the symbol for Ricoeur is actually the transgression of human finitude; it is 
completely unlike any mundane reality.”95  This transgression aims at a more immediate 
connection with the field of belonging. 
With this working concept of symbol, Ricoeur can bound its use – and therefore 
define the boundaries of the hermeneutic field – to specific sorts of exegetical work.  On 
the one hand, there can be, as of yet, no general hermeneutics of totalized mediation.  
Although all meaningful experience may be mediated for Ricoeur because of the nature 
of intentionality, the complex intentional structure of the symbol does not allow a total 
rational reduction or explication.  As Ricoeur wants to meditate on the fullness of 
language, he will hold that part of the excess of meaning of language is not immediately 
recovered in consciousness.  Only the immediate self-clarity of consciousness (or an 
equivalent idealism) could provide the unification necessary for a general theory of 
hermeneutics that accounts for the multiplicity of apparent meaning as a univocal totality.  
Without this unified subject, which is given, as we have seen, only as a task, a general 
mediation is not possible.  Instead, we must approach a general hermeneutics through the 
specific regions opened by particular interpretations of symbols.  In other words, all 
hermeneutic approaches are regional, construct their own hermeneutic fields, and are 
based in their own historical moments. 
In this way, Ricoeur argues against a “too broad” sort of hermeneutics that 
immediately bypasses all regional techniques or methods and moves to establish a 
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general mediation or primordial understanding too quickly.  This may be seen in 
Ricoeur’s criticisms of Cassirer.  Cassirer’s project, as it is understood by Ricoeur, is to 
establish symbolic mediation as the root of all expressions.96  The “symbolic” is here 
named as “the common denominator of all the ways of objectivizing, of giving meaning 
to reality.”97  This definition is too broad for Ricoeur’s liking because it tends toward the 
elimination of the distinction between univocal and plurivocal expressions.  Cassirer’s 
system may not immediately reduce all expressions to univocity, but it does posit that this 
is possible as well as desirable.  Plurivocality is expressed for Cassirer only on the basis 
of a signifying univocal process.  Ricoeur will instead argue that univocity and 
plurivocality are both required for hermeneutics to begin.  A generalized order, such as 
Cassirer’s, reduces hermeneutics to a discipline of the not-yet-conquered realms of 
experience.  This does not entail that Ricoeur thinks of the hermeneutic field as a 
generalized disorder, however.  Instead, each hermeneutics operates on specific 
plurivocal expressions by fixing the univocity of other expressions.  This relationship 
between the whole (the fixed signs) and the parts (the plurivocal) makes hermeneutics 
possible and is also necessary for the accounting of the fullness of language.  Cassirer 
will be forced to deny, ultimately, that the complex structure of intentionality inherent to 
the symbol is real – that his position is but one further historical moment of 
interpretation. 
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Therefore, the symbol cannot be taken as emblematic of all mediation, only that 
of meaning to meaning.  But, on the other hand, the relationship of meaning to meaning 
cannot be analogical.  This hermeneutics, which Ricoeur calls “too narrow,” seeks to 
obtain a perspective of the whole of symbolics from an exterior perspective.  If the 
position of Cassirer is that we can understand mediation clearly from the interior of its 
workings, an analogical hermeneutics would seek to contain the symbol’s 
meaningfulness within a determinate relation that would force it to reveal its real truth – 
its real referent.  As Ricoeur says, “The symbol does not conceal any hidden teaching that 
only needs to be unmasked for the images in which it is clothed to become useless.”98  
Symbolic meanings are not exhausted by one specific interpretation or determination that 
resolves their enigmatic status.  Interpretation is not a disposable ladder that discovers the 
real analogy between signs but is rather a successive unpacking of latent meanings 
hidden in a patent one.  And these latent meanings, contra the too narrow view (Biblical 
and Neo-Platonic hermeneutics) are not resolvable to a depiction by mere explication 
from a supposedly external viewpoint.  Thus, even though Ricoeur’s thought of the 
symbol flies under the Kantian banner of “the symbol gives rise to thought,” Kant’s own 
analogical use of the symbol must be denied.99 
With this act of double limitation, Ricoeur sets the boundaries on the concept of 
the symbol.  It is neither an expression that can be completely explicated immanently, nor 
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reduced to a simple relationship to another meaning from without.  The symbol is an 
expression of the surplus of literal meaning, the excess of the meaningfulness of 
language, as it arises in experience.  Ricoeur encloses this entire thrust of hermeneutics in 
the phrase “The symbol gives rise to thought.”100  The phrase indicates that thinking and 
interpreting results from the multiple possible determinations of meaning found in the 
symbol – the excess of meaning sets thought in motion in an effort to create a univocity 
out of a presentation of plurivocality.  We will study this directional aspect of 
interpretation more fully shortly.  Symbols function, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, as the 
objects of interpretation and are the correlates of true hermeneutics.  Where there are 
symbols, there is hermeneutics, and where there is hermeneutics, there are symbols.  This 
leads Ricoeur to his philosophic hermeneutics proper, which he calls “a philosophy that 
starts from the symbols and endeavors to promote the meaning, to form it, by a creative 
interpretation.”101  His philosophy is no longer strictly phenomenological because the 
failure of the phenomenological reduction points to a horizon that is a world of sense that 
cannot be completely idealized.  Therefore, all investigations into sense will have to 
wrestle with the fundamental plurivocity of its expressions as well as the manners in 
which that plurivocity has been determined into univocal expressions by the act of 
interpretation. 
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IV.  The Hermeneutic Poles 
 This hermeneutics of symbols, however, presents the interpreter with multiple 
ways in which to decode the possible meanings and intentions of symbols.  Since the 
possibility of a general hermeneutics has been ruled out as a hasty totalization of the 
hermeneutic field, there is no “general canon for exegesis” and all hermeneutic methods 
will be regional.102  Each will proceed from its own choice of interpretive objects towards 
the structures of meaning that make its object of interpretation possible.  Thus, as the 
objects of interpretation differ, so will the hermeneutic methods and the description of 
reality they give.  As Ricoeur says, “[t]he hermeneutic field, whose outer contours we 
have traced, is internally at variance with itself.”103  This variance arises from the 
symbolic object but also from the hermeneutic approach employed.  Ricoeur’s 
“hypothesis is that each [hermeneutics] is legitimate within its own context.”104  The 
analysis of symbols through interpretation necessitates a methodology that both calls for 
the “enumeration of symbolic forms” and a “study of the operations of interpretation.”105  
Taking the symbolic forms under discussion as the historical symbols that are related to 
us by tradition, we have to consider the specific methodologies of interpretation that 
allow us to follow the intentionality of the symbols considered.  Hermeneutics “looks at 
the symbols in texts as phenomena, and so in doing uncovers the intentional attribute that 
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makes them meaningful;” but this intentionality can be interpreted or followed in a 
multitude of ways.106   
This is the place of Ricoeur’s famous distinction between two supposedly 
opposite tendencies that are employed in the act of interpreting how meaning is 
transferred from the latent to the patent expression.  Although these competing 
methodologies are not the only two possible approaches to the problem of interpreting 
symbols, Ricoeur chooses this pairing to highlight the “most extreme opposition” of 
interpretive activities that still remain within the hermeneutic field and are concerned 
with the same symbols.107  His goal will be to demonstrate that even these antagonistic 
hermeneutic methods are not diametrically opposed and can be seen to explicate various 
complementary modes of human belonging through their exegetic work: “the double 
meaning aims here at deciphering an existential movement, a certain ontological 
condition of man, by means of the surplus of meaning attached to the even which, in its 
literalness, is situated in the observable historical world.”108  Each hermeneutic method 
will unpack the surplus differently, leading to differing characterizations of belonging, 
based on the presumed referent of the symbol.  Although Ricoeur gives this distinction 
many different formulations, we will refer to the distinction here as being between the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” and the “hermeneutics of recollection.”109  For the 
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hermeneutics of suspicion, symbols are to be interpreted as distortions of some other, 
often hidden, meaning that dissimulates itself.  Their goal, as stated by Ricoeur, is to 
dispel illusion.  Their practice of interpretation “refers to a new possibility which is no 
longer either error in the epistemological sense or lying in the moral sense, but 
illusion…”.110  On the other hand, to the hermeneutics of recollection, symbols are the 
sensible manifestation of a forgotten depth of human reality.111  The presence of symbols 
here indicates an authentic relationship with something outside of human experience that 
has been forgotten and is in need of retrieval.  Here, we will spell out in more detail the 
relationship between these rival hermeneutics, broadly conceived, before moving on to a 
more detailed analysis of Ricoeur’s reading of Freud’s hermeneutics and its relationship 
to Nietzsche’s hermeneutics in the next chapter.  The guide here will be Ricoeur’s 
statement: “Rival hermeneutics conflict not over the structure of double meaning but over 
the mode of its opening, over the finality of showing.”112  Their quarrel is over how the 
plurivocal object’s intentional sense is to be treated and the kind of ontology it points 
towards. 
A glance at Ricoeur’s description of hermeneutics that employ interpretation as a 
technique for demystification reveals “[t]hree masters, seemingly mutually exclusive: 
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Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.”113  Although they differ in their choice of the object of 
exegesis, the commonality between these three thinkers is twofold: each treats our 
everyday consciousness of meaning as naïve and our expressions as mediate products of 
something other than immediate consciousness; and each constructs, in the place of this 
naïve consciousness, a method of exegesis that works against this illusory meaning.  This 
first tack of their critique is against the immediacy of self-consciousness regarding 
meaningfulness.  Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx employ varieties of Ricoeur’s “semiotic” 
criticism to denounce consciousness as a false consciousness that is the product of a 
series of dissimulations.  Because of the illusion of immediate consciousness created by 
the idealist conception of the self, the apparent immediate meaningfulness that 
phenomena possess in consciousness cannot be taken as merely given because the 
meaning of consciousness is underdetermined.  Instead, the expressions of consciousness 
are to be taken as symptoms or symbols of disguised prejudices, be they economic forces, 
instincts, or desires.  Their diagnoses of false consciousness point toward conditions for 
the production of meaning that are often at odds with the meanings that are produced.  
These forces and instincts are self-concealing in the manner in which they produce 
illusions of morality and of metaphysics.  In this way do Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx not 
only denounce immediate consciousness and the immediacy of meaningfulness, they also 
strenuously deny the very object of the “sacred” sought by the opposing hermeneutics.  
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This object, too, in an illusion that can be reduced as expressions of certain drives or 
forces. 
However, even as iconoclastic hermeneutic approaches, their philosophical 
projects are not to be taken, for Ricoeur, as aiming at the total destruction of meaning or 
as nihilistic pursuits.  Ricoeur states, “These three masters of suspicion are not to be 
misunderstood as three masters of skepticism.”114  Although their projects have one goal 
as the demystification of illusory meanings, all three also attempt to decipher the 
workings of these illusions through their differing practices of interpretation.  The 
diagnosis of the genesis of illusion in each case is the result of the creation of a “mediate 
science of meaning, irreducible to the immediate consciousness of meaning.”115  This 
mediate science is a hermeneutic method derived from the objects of their critiques – 
ideology, libido, or moralistic metaphysical concepts.  In the next chapter we will look at 
Freud’s hermeneutic in more detail, followed by the examination of Nietzsche’s method 
of exegesis.  However, here it is enough to show that their methods are traced from the 
“unconscious” work of the production of meaning.  The hermeneutics of suspicion all 
“reverse” the processes that result in the creation of illusions.116  The technique of each is 
to trace the expressions of everyday life and consciousness, the patent meanings of 
symbols, backwards to their latent source of meaning, which can then be reinterpreted in 
a more meaningful way.  And in these reinterpretations, new practices can emerge or be 
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imagined.  For example, Nietzsche’s work in Genealogy of Morals is an interpretation of 
the commandments of Christian morality as expressions of drives that can also be 
interpreted as ressentiment and bad conscience.  He treats “good” and “evil” as plurivocal 
expressions – as symbols – rather than innately meaningful concepts and then exposes 
other ways of actualizing the forces he has diagnosed.  Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx all 
practice variations on a theme that Ricoeur describes in this way concerning Freud: “it is 
a question of substituting for this narration [the dream], unintelligible at the first hearing, 
a more meaningful text, which would be to the first as the latent is to the patent.”117 
All three hermeneutics of suspicion, then, motivate their programs of 
demystification according to what Ricoeur refers to as an archaeological principle.  Their 
methodologies start from the overdetermination of the meaning of certain concepts and 
expose that surplus of meaning in an effort to delegitimize those concepts traditionally 
taken as univocally true entities.  They show traditional philosophical concepts to have 
the status of symbols that rely on interpretation for their meaningfulness.  Without the 
guarantee of a simple, immediate meaning, these symbols can then be subjected to an 
immanent critique that reveals their status as kinds of transcendental illusions.  The mode 
of this critique is said to be archaeological because the illusions are reinterpreted through 
a mediate science of meaning with a reference that points backwards to a moment that is 
preconscious.  Conscious meaning is shown to depend on forces that precede the 
development of consciousness: Freud’s unconscious, Nietzsche’s will to power, Marx’s 
economic substructure.  They “displace the center of reference” for the meaningful sense 
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of consciousness and the symbols under consideration to the non-totalizable origin of 
their production.118  Their mode of opening on the problem of plurivocity charts a 
regressive course to the archai of produced meaning; sense is realized in a backwards 
movement. 
 Regarding the project that will later be called the “hermeneutics of recollection,” 
Ricoeur writes, in The Symbolism of Evil: “It is not regret for the sunken Atlantides that 
animates us, but hope for a re-creation of language.  Beyond the desert of criticism, we 
wish to be called again.”119  This approach to the plurivocity of symbolism recognizes 
that the intentional fulfillment of signs that refer to phenomena called “sacred” is 
problematic.  However, the phenomenology of religion – Ricoeur’s prime example of the 
hermeneutics of recollection – recognizes, at least in Ricoeur’s formulation of it, that 
once this immediacy of belief is lost that meaningfulness is always mediated.  Therefore, 
this hermeneutics looks to the compound intentionality of the symbol as the possibility of 
an indirect showing of the “sacred” or as a mediated hierophany.  The goal of recollection 
is the achievement of a post-critical ontology through the roundabout method of 
interpretation of signs and symbols and the creation of new key figurations of ultimate 
human reality.  Ricoeur calls this goal a “second immediacy” or a “second naïveté.”120 
 The archaeological mode is thus supplemented with an alternate mode of showing 
the intentionality of the symbolic.  If the surplus of meaning of the symbol is pre-
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philosophical, that is if the “fullness of language” is the horizon of philosophic reflection, 
then the symbol, as the object of his transcendental deduction, may also call for 
speculative thought.  “Symbols give, they are the gift of language;” states Ricoeur in the 
familiar refrain of his thought, “but this gift creates for me the duty to think, to inaugurate 
philosophic discourse, starting from what is always prior to and the foundation of that 
discourse.”121  Therefore even if myths are understood as muthos and not as logos, they 
may be interpreted to symbolize, for the hermeneutics of recollection, innovative 
“existential concepts” of a concrete reflection that touch upon an ontology.122  Rather 
than abandoning rational reconstruction of these concepts of the modes of being of 
human being, recollection invites us to speculate towards the revivified idea of a 
philosophical totality.  Ricoeur argues that new concepts and new cultural figures need to 
be created in this speculative mode.123  But, again, they will not legitimately give a 
totality achievable by the ideal immediacy of self-reflection.  In this manner, we get the 
first name for this mode of opening – teleology. 
 The teleological mode of hermeneutics seems necessary to Ricoeur for the 
movement of concrete reflection through the hermeneutic method.  Reflection remains 
abstract if it has only dealt with the regressive movement of interpretation and not the 
progressive element whereby the lessons from the critique are ordered and appropriated.  
As consciousness is not complete, this teleology is the progressive synthesizing of self 
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“in the succession of figures that draw consciousness forward away from itself.”124  
Ricoeur here draws on the Hegelian phenomenology of Spirit where meaning is gradually 
revealed as a “becoming conscious” that comes about because of the successive 
realization of mediation’s role in the production of meaning.  In this way, reflection, as a 
hermeneutic procedure, allows “consciousness [to be] intelligible to itself only if it allows 
itself to be set off-center.”125  Whereas the de-centering accomplished by archaeology 
moves consciousness towards an uncontrollable origin, the teleological movement pulls a 
singular consciousness toward universal meaning by making explicit in new concepts the 
implicit anticipations of meaningfulness in previous events of consciousness.  It is as an 
appropriation of the “instinctual ground” of consciousness that the gradual process of 
becoming conscious is made possible through the mediation of a “cultural aim.”126  In 
other words, recollection aims at a total fulfillment of the intentionality of symbolic 
figures wherein the sense of the subject is drawn from their ultimate referent and is not 
just a reduction of the illusions of the false sense of self-mastery that consciousness 
originally possessed.  
 Thus, for Ricoeur, the goal of concrete reflection can occur only when a dialectic 
is created between the archaeology of the instincts and the teleology of Spirit.  Both serve 
to distance consciousness from itself and its false conceptions of its self-adequacy as a 
concept through revelation of the mediation necessary for self-consciousness.  However, 
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the dialectic seeks to re-appropriate this self on the other side of its self-illusions through 
a progressive meditation on its powers and goals towards the universality of meaning.  
Reflection then takes as its task reflection on the cultural figures found in consciousness, 
making the implicit intentions explicit and making consciousness, thereby, more fully 
self-aware.  The dialectic allows the creative constitution of a conscious self through the 
exegesis of its intentional objects. 
 “Reflection,” Ricoeur states, “is what holds together regression and 
progression.”127  As consciousness is de-centered through the exorcism of immediate 
certainty of meaning, that sense is recovered through the hermeneutics of the symbols, 
which reveals the appropriative activity of self-constitution.  However, as this teleology 
draws consciousness toward a total exegesis of its figures, Ricoeur has already placed this 
complete fulfillment at an insurmountable distance.  Symbols themselves, we have said, 
contain an intentional surplus of meaning such that the finality of mediation is never 
given or accounted for.  Therefore, the Hegelian moment is also insufficient for Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of recollection.  It must be supplemented with an eschatological mode, the 
second mode of recollection, that treats the fulfillment of symbols as “only a promise, 
promised through the symbols of the sacred.”128  The deferral of the end of interpretation 
confirms the opaque nature of the symbol and its plurivocity.  This recollection strives for 
better understanding despite the fact that symbols “are resistant to any reduction to 
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rational knowledge.”129  Just as Husserl’s reduction to the meaning of beings failed, so 
too does Ricoeur’s excavation of sense always remain incomplete.  Yet the hermeneutics 
of recollection treats this not as a failure but as a confirmation of its central insight 
concerning the plurivocity of its objects of interpretation.  Although rational 
reconstruction will never be complete, Ricoeur holds the project to be meaningful in 
explicating the horizon of human belonging and both the acts of reflection and 
appropriation of that into self-consciousness.  Eschatology here functions as the 
regulative ideal for reflection that remains philosophical and dialectical while fending off 
reduction and eclecticism.  This regulative ideal posits that the symbols reflected upon by 
both the hermeneutics of suspicion and recollection are the same. 
For Ricoeur, only by instituting a dialectic between the archaeological and 
teleological interpretations of symbolics can reflection onto the belonging of human 
being be made concrete.  This concretization is eschatological insofar as is asserts 
“ultimately that a phenomenology of the mind [or Spirit] and an archaeology of the 
unconscious are not speaking about two halves of man but speaking each of them to the 
whole man.”130  Both archaeology and teleology are seen to be working on the same 
symbols.  Only in this way can a philosophical anthropology be creatively appropriated 
through the process of mediation from the non-transparent nature of human being and its 
expressions.  Ricoeur’s nascent philosophy of language here shows meaning to be bound 
not to the subject’s consciousness but to objective realizations of that subject’s 
expressions.  Through the interpretation of these expressions, we appropriate more and 
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more of the subject’s intentions, both as arising from a primordial origin and as aiming at 
a goal.  However, this appropriation of the fundamental belonging of human being can 
only approach totalization obliquely and by increments.  As Ricoeur affirms that a single 
horizon of meaning is promised, it must be thought as an eschatological concept and not 
as an ontological one, as the full totality of it cannot be revealed.131  Concrete reflection 
is, then, the process of this appropriation through archeological exegesis and speculative 
reflection aimed at both the reduction of illusions and the creative promotions of new 
meanings and cultural figures.  Concrete reflection, therefore, is a promised goal of 
philosophy but is never directly actualized.  The disparate discourses concerning human 
being all touch upon regions of the horizon of meaning and human belonging, without 
ever fully recapturing it.   
 Having given the broad outlines of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, we will in the next 
chapter explore the specific readings of Freud’s and Nietzsche’s theories of interpretation 
given by Ricoeur.  The goal of that chapter will be twofold: to show how Ricoeur’s 
reading of Freud and Nietzsche attributes to them an explicit archaeology but a need for a 
complementary teleology; and to begin to draw out Nietzsche’s possible reasons for 
opposing this interpretation of his theory of interpretation.  Ricoeur, within the 
eschatological mode, argues that both have implicit teleological structures; but we will 
begin to articulate Nietzsche’s opposition to eschatological reasoning and the impact that 
has on his possible teleology.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY IN HERMENEUTIC PRACTICE – FREUD 
AND NIETZSCHE 
 
 Ricoeur’s route from a reflective phenomenology to a hermeneutic 
phenomenology reveals the necessity of pairing interpretation with reflection in any 
investigation of or determination of the sense of beings.  If philosophical thinking is to 
avoid unwittingly falling prey to the transcendental illusion of the immediate certainty of 
the contents of consciousness, then our understanding of the process by which the 
meaning of those contents is produced must be critically deduced.  Ricoeur attempts to 
show that a concrete determination of the meaning of beings in experience is produced by 
an activity of mediation between an intended sense and a particular perspective; and he 
discovers that any knowledge of the synthesis performed in this activity must be a 
methodological accomplishment that cannot merely be achieved by a quick reduction to 
an immediate consciousness of meaning.  In order to decipher the concrete meaning of 
beings, specifically the human being, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic method provides a long but 
productive detour through the whole of human expression, focusing on those expressions 
which Ricoeur calls “symbols” which provide actual conditions for interpretive activity.  
Symbols, being overdetermined in their intentional meaning, spur thinking towards the 
conditions for the actual conflict of interpretations that a concrete determination of sense 
is intended to alleviate: “The hermeneutic problem therefore is not imposed on reflection 
  65 
     
from without, but proposed from within by the very movement of meaning, by the 
implicit life of symbols taken at their semantic and mythical level.”132  The 
overdetermination of the meaning of symbols itself calls for interpretive activity not 
because of a perceived lack of meaning but because the mediated nature of the symbol 
cannot be explained in only one determination.  With regard to the methods of 
deciphering the nature of this overdetermination, Ricoeur identifies two dominant and 
opposing tendencies of interpretative methods regarding the possibility or reliability of 
determining an authentic and transcendent meaning to these symbols – suspicion and 
recovery.  And, as we saw in chapter one, he argues that the construction of a dialectic 
between these two poles is necessary if reflection is to avoid the fallacies of reductive 
immediacy, on the one hand, and the assumption of a totalized and general mediation, on 
the other.  Therefore, the description of the synthesis of meaning in human consciousness 
must allow for both of these poles of interpretation, if it is to be genuine for Ricoeur. 
 In this chapter, my goal will be twofold.  The first task will be to elucidate the 
archaeological pole of a hermeneutics of symbols as Ricoeur sets it out in his studies of 
Freud’s archaeological psychoanalytic method.  For Ricoeur, Freud’s work is most 
representative of the hermeneutics of suspicion because the psychoanalytic viewpoint 
attempts to carry universal import regarding the interpretation of texts while denying the 
possibility of a philosophy that begins from the certainty of the self-understanding of the 
consciousness of a thinking subject.  However, Freud is not alone among the rolls of the 
practitioners of interpretive demystitification; Ricoeur routinely includes Marx and 
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Nietzsche as well.  The second task will be to introduce another of the practitioners of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion – Nietzsche.  In doing this, I will attempt to piece together 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the import of Nietzsche’s philosophy of interpretation from 
the various indications Ricoeur gives and to show how Ricoeur absorbs Nietzsche’s 
problematic into Ricoeur’s dialectic of suspicion and recovery.  This attempted 
reconstruction of a Ricoeurian reading of Nietzsche’s texts will then be my starting point 
for my further investigation into Nietzsche’s hermeneutics in chapter three.  I wish to 
begin to draw from Nietzsche’s texts reasons for a different sort of distinction regarding 
the hermeneutic poles than the one drawn by Ricoeur.  Ricoeur argues that the 
archaeological and teleological trajectories of the hermeneutics of suspicion and 
recovery, respectively, need to be reconciled in a dialectical movement directed toward 
the reinvigoration of meaning and a restored, or second, naïveté of meaning.  His 
readings of Freud’s texts as archaeological investigations and Hegel’s texts as 
teleological explanations bear this out.  It is my contention that, as it is applied to 
Nietzsche, Ricoeur’s schematic of archaeology and teleology is insufficient and that 
Nietzsche’s interpretive methodology contains more resources and depth than is 
attributed to it by the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion.”  While Ricoeur is right in 
reading Nietzsche as a practitioner of hermeneutics and as someone for whom “the whole 
of philosophy becomes interpretation,” I will begin here to show a difference between the 
archaeological strategy of Freud’s psychoanalytic practice, as it is described by Ricoeur, 
and what I will call the genealogical strategy that Nietzsche employs in interpretation.133  
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Although both point to a new form of ascesis through their critical methodologies and 
iconoclastic interpretations, I will try to show that the process of the re-codification of 
meaning that is necessary for Ricoeur’s reading of Freud works somewhat differently in 
the case of Nietzsche.  Therefore, it may be premature to posit that both Nietzsche and 
Freud have the same end of the work of interpretation in mind.  Noting the difference in 
the goals of their interpretive strategies will help to reveal the difference in their 
methodologies, as well.  However, Ricoeur’s interpretive strategies in dealing with 
Nietzsche’s texts will still be illustrative in demonstrating how other critics have 
appropriated, with more or less success, Nietzsche’s texts to their own use.   
Their encounter in the final section of this chapter will be staged, as Ricoeur 
would have it, around the interpretation of symbols – in this case the cultural symbols of 
Oedipus Tyrannus.  Reaching that point, however, will require several preliminary steps.  
First will be the demonstration of Freud and Nietzsche as iconoclastic interpreters and of 
the similarities that cause Ricoeur to consider them together as practitioners of 
demystification.  Then I will look into the manner in which Freud and Nietzsche 
determine the energetics that underlie their hermeneutics.  This will be the location of the 
core of their differences.  Finally, I will consider their interpretations of certain cultural 
symbols and show how Nietzsche’s genealogy separates itself from Freud’s 
archaeological methodology, in Ricoeur’s sense, precisely because of Nietzsche’s 
critique of an eschatological vision such as Ricoeur employs, and not because of its lack 
of a teleological sense.  Nietzsche’s hermeneutics does not display either an impulse to a 
supposed naturalism (as Freud could be accused of following) or to a final, as yet 
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undiscovered and reconciling truth that would exist in common to all interpretations.  
Genealogy remains a hermeneutic method but does not necessarily fit within the 
boundaries of hermeneutics as Ricoeur has drawn them.  This discussion will set the 
stage for the fuller working-out of Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation as a critical 
hermeneutics in subsequent chapters. 
 
I.  Freudian Suspicion 
 The task of hermeneutic reflection, for Ricoeur, is “the appropriation of our effort 
to exist and our desire to be by means of works which testify to this effort and this 
desire.”134  The concrete meaning of the being of the human being as existing and as 
desiring must be interpreted from its various actions and expressions.  And to Ricoeur’s 
mind it is the texts of Freud that most clearly and thoroughly interpret the connections 
and disconnections between the explicit works of humanity and the implicit desires of 
humanity.135  The role of Freudian psychoanalysis – or Freud’s method of interpreting 
human action in light of desire – is, for Ricoeur, that of an archaeology into the 
conditions of human desire that cause consciousness to gravitate towards certain 
expressions of those desires.  Freud himself often speaks of psychoanalysis as being akin 
to archaeological excavation, although we must be careful to the extent to which this 
metaphor is employed.  Freud’s account of the ontogenesis of the individual always 
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focuses on the vicissitudes of the drives; and it is the role of psychoanalysis to bring to 
light the causes of those conflicts as they are expressed in works and actions.  However, 
the act of revealing these conflicts is not the only goal, for the symptoms that 
psychoanalysis wishes to treat do not dissolve upon having their causes made patent.136  
Additionally, psychoanalysis must deal with the interaction between our desires and our 
expressed behavior in an attempt to change our consciousness of ourselves.  Jonathan 
Lear puts it this way: “This new technique [psychoanalysis] is designed to address the 
problem of appropriation: what is involved in people being able to take up their own 
psychological states in ways that genuinely make them their own.”137  The interpretative 
method of psychoanalysis is designed to facilitate the ability of consciousness to give 
meaning to itself, instead of having the meaning of its actions be determined by 
unconscious instincts.  This is the sentiment behind Freud’s famous phrase “Where id 
was, there ego shall be,” which Ricoeur is fond of quoting.138  The relationship between 
our desires and their expressions or representations are at the root of the meaning of 
consciousness for Freud.  However, it is a defining characteristic of psychoanalysis that 
the causes of psychical conflicts are not merely buried or lost but are repressed.  
Therefore, the process of appropriation that constitutes the psychoanalytic “cure” requires 
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a method to uncover what is actively repressed in the production of consciousness and its 
meaning. 
Repression refers to an activity of the psychical whole wherein it hinders or works 
to prevent ideas from entering into consciousness internally and also to keep those ideas 
from being noticed as perceptions or from being acted upon.  Regarding the phenomenon 
of repression, the dynamic description of the psyche postulates an active process whereby 
mental forces mobilize to oppose the becoming-conscious of some ideas for a variety of 
reasons, regardless of the internal or external origin of the ideas.  The dominant reason 
for this active repression lies in the conflict of the instincts with each other:  “In the 
course of things it happens again and again that individual instincts turn out to be 
incompatible in their aims or demands with the remaining ones, which are able to 
combine into the inclusive unity of the ego.  The former are then split off from this unity 
by the process of repression….”139  As instincts exist which have as their goal some 
endpoint that is repugnant or undesirable to some other, stronger instinct or bundle of 
instincts, the mechanism of repression excludes these “other” desires and their aims from 
its construction of the unity of an ego.  The principle behind this repression is the 
principle of the constancy of the quantity of mental energy, which we will elucidate 
shortly.   
The mechanism of repression is a general feature of all mental life for Freud, and 
the fact of its presence in relationship to our dreams suffices to show its ubiquity.  For 
example, sleep, “the condition of rest free from stimulus,” has not only external threats to 
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its functioning but internal ones, as well.140  This internal possibility of disruption is 
caused by instinctual forces that are not allowed expression during the waking states of 
consciousness.  During sleep, there is, for Freud, a “diminishing of repressions” that 
allows the unconscious greater reign; however, repression is not abolished even then.141  
The phenomenon of dreaming is thus explained as a mechanism for the expression of 
unconscious desires but in a veiled manner so that sleep will not be interrupted.  Dreams 
are caused by the lessening of repression, which allows the unconscious expression; but 
dreaming also witnesses the phenomenon of repression in that unconscious desires are 
not expressed directly but instead are transferred into the symbols that appear in dreams.  
Thus, for Freud, the manifest contents of dreams are made from the repressed expressions 
of unconscious desires.   
Freud notes that repression in the therapeutic setting often takes the form of 
forgetting.  One form of forgetting is a type of repression applied to external stimuli: 
“Forgetting impressions, scenes, or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting 
them off.”142  Again, Freud repeats that the vicissitudes of the instincts are subject to 
repression by the instincts which have unified into the ego.  Psychoanalytic practice 
reveals that the psyche frequently makes use of this repressive mechanism to avoid the 
disturbances caused by external stimuli; however, this alone does not account for the 
radical nature of psychoanalytic suspicion that is involved in the concept of repression.  
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Repression shows its full force when dealing with those disturbing psychical processes 
that arise from within the psyche.  These processes – “phantasies, processes of reference, 
emotional impulses, thought-connections” – arise from the workings of the 
unconscious.143  What is telling for the verification of the existence of repression is that 
through the therapeutic technique, these impulses which have been resisted by the 
conscious portions of the psyche can be remembered when a repression is undone.  
Repression, therefore, also occurs unconsciously, on behalf of the ego: “In these 
processes it particularly often happens that something is ‘remembered’ which could never 
have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at any time noticed – was never conscious.”144   
Freud’s archaeology is not just a technique for bringing the repressed to light but 
also give a “theory of the relationship between the repressed and that which represses.”145  
This theory will also give us the method by which the process of the appropriation of our 
desires can proceed.  In short, psychoanalysis is searching for a method of interpretation 
for the expressions of human desires as symptoms of the vicissitudes of instincts within 
the human being.  These expressions, or “texts” produced by the psyche, contain more 
meaning than an individual’s reflective consciousness acting alone can comprehend, 
because in most cases consciousness actively represses many of these expressions.  
Therefore, the archaeology of the psyche’s expressions cannot occur without the external 
diagnostic presence of the analyst.  The analyst, the interpreter of the psyche, will attempt 
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to make appropriation and recovery of a unified ego possible through the archaeology of 
the psyche.  In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud employs an archaeological 
metaphor to convey the depths of the psyche that he wishes to investigate.  He states: 
“Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but 
a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past….”146  In drawing a metaphor of 
this sort, an archaeological analogy between the excavations of a historical site and the 
psyche is set.147   
The interpretive suspicion operative in Freud’s accounts of our mental lives is due 
to the lack of transparency of the meaning of consciousness to itself because of the 
manner in which Freud deduces that consciousness originates.  Freud’s descriptions of 
the second topography of the human psyche situate the conscious aspects of the ego as 
arising from the unconscious forces of the psychical whole.148  However, these 
unconscious forces cannot be perceived, just as the name would suggest, by the thinking 
consciousness.  Therefore, the archaeology cannot be direct in its grasping of the 
underlying material of the unconscious.  For reasons we will see shortly, Freud is forced 
to assume that “powerful mental processes or ideas exist… which can produce all the 
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effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do (including effects that can in their turn 
become conscious as ideas), though they themselves do not become conscious.”149  The 
archaeological method will attempt to uncover the unconscious forces through the 
technique of the interpretation of manifest expressions and not through an immediate 
discovery of something like unconscious ideas.  Here, the Rome that Freud describes in 
Civilization and Its Discontents is important for his method beyond its obvious 
metaphorical value in describing the mental apparatus as having a past that exists prior to 
the “founding” of an individual’s consciousness.  Freud asks about “a visitor” to present-
day Rome who wishes to see the wall of Aurelian or the Servian Wall or other such past 
buildings that are preserved now only in ruins.  No guesses can be made, he says, with 
regard to any archaeological formations that no longer exist or have left us no trace.  The 
archaeology that can progress, however, must begin from what is revealed by the site’s 
surface.  Without these expressions of the buried past making themselves known in a 
partial, disguised, or mutilated manner, that past remains unknowable to the 
archaeologist.  The archaeology of the psyche is similar in that the analyst must also work 
from the fleeting expressions of conscious thought, even though Freud postulates that it is 
possible that nothing psychical – nothing experienced by the mind – is ever lost.  Freud’s 
clinical experience of the childhood “screen memories” of his patients shows for him that 
“[n]ot only some but all of what is essential from childhood has been retained in these 
memories.”150  Our “mental” Rome may still witness its versions of gladiatorial combat 
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or barbarian invasions, whereas for the physical Rome, those days have long since 
passed.  But Freud “never gives up hope of exhuming Rome” or making conscious the 
past conflicts that determine the meaning of the psychical whole’s present neuroses.151  
Despite the suspicion that must be assumed with regard to consciousness and any 
attempts it may make to define itself, Freud does not abandon the work of the 
appropriation of the desires that motivate the conscious ego and also its symptoms of 
illness.  In any case, the meaning of the surface events and structures can be explained by 
reference to the formations that lie beneath them, spatially in terms of Rome, 
chronologically in terms of the psyche. This is the main sense of Freud’s archaeology of 
consciousness.  Past events and desires, both contained as memories in the unconscious, 
will be at the root of present psychological conflicts and must be worked through if 
appropriation is to be possible. 
Regarding the excavation involved in psychoanalysis, Freud stresses that 
“consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus”152 and that the psychoanalyst, like 
the “visitor” mentioned earlier, must be content with “studying whatever is present for 
the time being on the surface of the patient’s mind, and [employing] the art of 
interpretation mainly for the purpose of recognizing the resistances that appear there, and 
making them conscious to the patient.”153  This implies that although Freud’s method is 
an archaeological one – or a “depth psychology” – it is properly a “surface archaeology” 
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that can only begin its diagnoses from what is expressed by the patient.154  Our latent 
desires can be brought to consciousness through analysis only if they are expressed in 
some veiled, although patent, form.  Freud makes this aspect of psychoanalysis clear 
when speaking of the interpretation of dreams: “What has been called the dream we shall 
describe as the text of the dream or the manifest dream, and what we are looking for, 
what we suspect, so to say, of lying behind the dream, we shall describe as the latent 
dream thoughts.”155  Just as in any other hermeneutic method, psychoanalysis is an 
interpretation of a text – in this case the patient’s dream-text or the text of her conscious 
thoughts.  The unconscious, as field of inquiry, is not represented directly and, therefore, 
can only be reached through this surface archaeology, which uncovers the roots of 
meaning in the drives of the unconscious through the interpretation of conscious 
expression.  Discovering the precise way in which a patient’s unconscious desires reach a 
textual actualization is the practical task of the interpretive method of psychoanalysis.156  
Because of this criterion of manifestness, psychoanalytic inquiry is limited to studying 
the conscious expressions of the psyche and cannot leap directly into the formulation of 
any knowledge of the unconscious.   
However, this does not preclude all inquiry into the workings of the unconscious 
thanks to a general metapsychological rule that Freud adopts regarding a principle of 
psychological operations.  He asserts that through the findings of the techniques of 
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psychoanalysis that it is given that “the course taken by mental events is automatically 
regulated by the pleasure principle.”157  This does not mean that it is consciousness itself 
that is aware of its seeking pleasure, or that consciousness does seek pleasure, but rather 
that the drive towards pleasure is a constant feature in all psychical operations.  This 
entails the theoretical assertion that our predominant psychical drive is oriented towards 
achieving as much pleasure as possible and ridding ourselves of as much negative 
pleasure as is possible.  Pleasure and pain, as they are considered by Freud, refer to any 
change or alteration in the “quantity of excitation” that is present in the psyche.158  
Unpleasurable sensations “impel [the psychical apparatus] towards discharge, and that is 
why we interpret unpleasure as implying a heightening and pleasure a lowering of 
energetic cathexis.”159  Thus we have Freud’s depiction of the pleasure principle as a 
tendency whose “final outcome coincides with a lowering of [the] tension” caused by its 
conflict with other, unpleasurable forces.160  Our patent expressions will display or 
disguise the conflicts the pleasure principle faces and the syntheses it utilizes to achieve 
its aims.  No specific psychological agency – such as consciousness – is necessarily 
imputed by the existence of this pleasure principle; nor, however, do we have direct 
knowledge of it.  Rather the ego is now to be interpreted as a product of this economy of 
pleasure and unpleasure.  It is the energetics of desire, seeking pleasure and avoiding 
unpleasure, that underlies the synthesis of what will be consciousness. 
                                               
157 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 3. 
 
158 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 4. 
 
159 Freud, The Ego and the Id, 15. 
 
160 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 3. 
 
  78 
     
Freud quickly recognizes, as Ricoeur was shown to do earlier, that the subject 
always finds herself within the fullness of experience wherein the aims of pleasure are 
already compromised or conflicted regarding their objects.  In other words, the 
observation of patients and their psychical conflicts leads Freud to posit the pleasure 
principle as the condition for those conflicts’ possibility, as “instincts are known to us 
only in their aims.”161  Freud essentially performs the Husserlian Rücksfrage in a non-
thematized manner by beginning from the synthesis of psychical conflict found in 
neurotic expressions and working backwards to the motivating principles for the 
conflict’s genesis.  Jonathan Lear also emphasizes this specifically analytic character of 
psychoanalytic inquiry when he states, “Adult neurotics never display a pure culture of 
the pleasure principle or a pure culture of the reality principle.  Neurotic behavior and 
imaginative activity are always conflicted.”162  To state this in more Ricoeurian terms, 
Freud’s method starts from the fullness of neurotic expression, understood as a synthesis 
of conflicting desires, and traces back to the causes of this conflict in order to resolve the 
conflict.  The etiology of neuroses reveals to Freud an unquestionable desire for pleasure.  
But, in fact, the pleasure principle is merely a logical by-product of Freud’s more 
fundamental metapsychological principle.  This is “the hypothesis that the mental 
apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or 
at least to keep it constant.”163  This entails a second hypothesis that Freud expresses as a 
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principle of constancy.  This “principle of constancy” points to the economic basis of 
Freud’s method of interpretation.164  The dynamism of the unconscious regulates itself by 
the principle of constancy which requires that any excitation of the psyche be balanced 
economically by ridding the psyche of an equal amount of excitation.  The meaning of 
consciousness and of its conflicts and neuroses will be tied now to this economic problem 
given in the principle of constancy.  What Freud’s archaeology is to discover in the 
patient is the general way in which this meta-psychological principle is satisfied or 
unsatisfied from the economic standpoint.  With this postulation of the principle of 
constancy, two fundamentally important things to Freud’s method of interpretation come 
into view.  The first is the general economic principle that will be applied by Freud in all 
his attempts to clarify the meaning of human expressions.  The other is the suspicion 
toward everyday consciousness’s transparency to itself. 
Freud’s analyses of the psyche will begin as diagnoses of everyday consciousness 
as it is perceived – what he calls “the system Pcpt.-Cs.”165  Consciousness is here treated 
only as a perceived consciousness and not as an absolute given but rather as a 
phenomenon or set of phenomena that we may become aware of alongside other 
phenomena.  Freud says: “This system [Pcpt.-Cs.] is turned toward the external world, it 
is the medium for the perceptions arising there, and during its functioning the 
phenomenon of consciousness arises in it.”166  In other words, the system Pcpt.-Cs. for 
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Freud, as for Ricoeur, cannot be known but through our intending of it in perception.  
This intended object is labeled in Freud’s second topology as the “ego.”  The ego is 
described by Freud as the “part of the id [or unconscious instincts] which has been 
modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the Pcpt.-
Cs.; in a sense it is an extension of the surface-differentiation.”167  This modification is 
not entirely spontaneous, however, but is performed in response to an economic demand 
on the part of the principle of constancy.  As the primary drive to pleasure encounters 
objects the difficulties and threats it faces in achieving those objects of its aims causes a 
redistribution of its aims to pleasure because of economic reasons.  The development of 
the economic demand to avoid displeasure results in the “coherent organization of mental 
processes” into the ego.168  The ego’s coherence, however, has the purpose of securing 
more firmly the demands of the pleasure principle through its replacement by the “reality 
principle.”169  The ego serves no immediate purpose of its own but rather serves the 
modified purposes of the instincts.  This reality principle is a further evolution of the 
principle of constancy, with self-preservation occupying a more central role than it does 
in the “pure” pleasure principle.  However, the explanation of the consciousness of the 
ego is still an economic one.  Therefore, both the ego and the objects that it considers and 
aims for are subject to the economics of desires.  The distinction between subject and 
object is nullified at the economic level by the economic vantage point of Freud’s method 
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of interpretation.  Both are explained as being contingent upon the vicissitudes of our 
instincts and those instincts’ distribution according to the principle of constancy.  The 
Freudian topography, therefore, is to be understood as the condition for the possibility of 
understanding the subject/object distinction.170  As such, human subjectivity is not an 
absolute but is only the development of a synthesis that relies on other forces for its 
efficacy. 
In Ricoeur’s attempt to render psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that at this point in his procedure he refers to psychoanalysis as an “anti-
phenomenology.”171  Earlier, we saw that Ricoeur arrives at the need for a hermeneutic 
method from the development of a phenomenology; and contemporary hermeneutic 
theory is often viewed as being derived from the investigations of phenomenologists.  
However, what Ricoeur has in mind here is the type of suspicion proper to 
psychoanalysis.  This suspicion is based on the deduction of the unconscious from the 
aforementioned symptoms and the constructed nature of the conscious ego.  
Psychoanalysis is anti-phenomenological because of the method that arises as a response 
to the resistance that the psyche displays in its symptoms.  Phenomenological 
investigations create the site for the exposition of meaning by placing the transcendent 
references of objects in consciousness into the bracketing function of the epoche, but 
Freud hypothesizes that consciousness also must be bracketed if we are to find the origin 
of meaning past the resistance and repression displayed by everyday consciousness.  
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Ricoeur states: “Whereas the Husserlian epoche is seen as a reduction to consciousness, 
the Freudian epoche is seen as a reduction of consciousness; thus we speak of it as an 
epoche in reverse.”172  The Freudian epoche considers consciousness as a product of 
other forces which themselves must be diagnosed.  This necessitates that consciousness 
of meaning, so valuable to phenomenology, must also be accounted for as the product of 
some system other than consciousness.  Because Freud treats consciousness only as it 
appears through perception, the meaning of this particular perception is as problematic as 
that of any other that we attempt to make sense of through the examination of the 
contents of consciousness.  Ricoeur states, “Freud’s originality consists in shifting the 
point of coincidence of meaning and force back to the unconscious itself.”173  The 
meaning of consciousness is identical with and as obscure as the meaning of the 
unconscious in Freud’s account.  Both arise from the energetics of unconscious desire.   
Therefore, like Ricoeur’s hermeneutical project, Freud’s archaeology starts from 
the fullness of a specific actualized field of human expressions.  However, Freud’s 
chosen field of analysis regards the conflicts of our psychical realities as they appear as 
symptoms.  The Freudian correlate to the role of the symbol of the sacred in the 
phenomenology of religion is the symptom of the conflicted consciousness.  Starting 
from the symptom, however, Freud closes off all possible transcendent references of its 
multiple meaning in favor of an “analytical and regressive movement” of 
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interpretation.174  Freud says of his own research in the New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis that psychoanalysis’s “path [of development] led from symptoms to the 
unconscious, to the life of the instincts to sexuality….”175  This is his archaeological path 
from given surface phenomena – the ill expressions of consciousness – towards those 
forces unknown to consciousness that condition these diagnosed symptoms.  In this 
archaeology, Freud displaces the source of meaning from consciousness and also places it 
at a point beyond the reach of immediate self-reflection.  Consciousness, or “being 
conscious,” is for Freud only one aspect or expression of the psychical whole of humans: 
“[P]sychoanalysis cannot situate the essence of the psychical in consciousness, but is 
obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the psychical….”176  Therefore, the 
phenomenon of consciousness arises from a ground, the whole of the psychical; and this 
psychical whole cannot be reflected upon totally through self-reflection.  Freud postulates 
this because of the clinical observations of repression and resistance on the part of the 
analysand.  The symptoms of the ill patient arise for reasons unknown to the patient’s 
consciousness and frequently continue regardless of conscious effort to curb their 
actualization.  This necessitates that the reality of the unconscious is a “diagnosed reality” 
based on a quasi-transcendental deduction from Freud’s identified empirical 
symptoms.177  As meaning’s home is in the unconscious instincts, pure self-reflection will 
never, for Freud, find a fully transparent determination of meaning. 
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Freud’s interpretive archaeology is, therefore, to be understood as a hermeneutic 
method that reduces consciousness to a product of the aims of our unconscious instincts.  
However, since these instincts are never encountered directly, Freud must deduce their 
existence and principles from the expressions of the psyche.  The possibility of meaning 
of human activity must be discovered from our actual expressions.  Freud postulates that 
at the roots of our behavior are desires that we gain knowledge of only through 
recognition and appropriation of their aims.  However, his archaeology reveals the 
inability of consciousness or the ego to comprehend fully its foundations in these 
unconscious forces.  Ricoeur here summarizes Freud’s archaeology as demonstrating the 
“unsurpassable character of desire” and the “secondary process’s inability to establish 
itself.”178  Viewing consciousness as a “secondary process” establishes the necessity of 
casting a wary eye on its expressions, which are motivated by the instincts and not 
necessarily by self-conscious intentions.  Nevertheless a sort of appropriation of these 
underlying desires is possible based on this archaeology.  I will describe that more fully 
when discussing Freud’s and Nietzsche’s treatment of cultural symbols.  At this point, let 
us turn to Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche as a practitioner of suspicion. 
 
II.  Nietzschean Suspicion 
 As is the case with Freud’s psychoanalytic method, Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
interpretation also argues that the reach of human consciousness is not adequate to the 
demands of a system of meaning that must be guaranteed by the transparency of the 
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contents of consciousness.  Conscious thought, for Nietzsche, is not adequate to its own 
demands for knowledge, even concerning itself.179  Ricoeur’s reading of what he has 
termed Nietzsche’s archaeological project is based around this point, which Nietzsche 
articulates in this manner:  “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and 
with good reason.  We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should 
ever find ourselves?”180  These first lines of the Genealogy of Morals announce the 
project of Nietzsche’s most conventionally organized work, as well as his other more 
aphoristic texts – a diagnosis of the conditions that make morality and truth as they are 
traditionally conceived of by ourselves and interpreted possible.181  In sorting out the 
conditions for what we take to be true or moral, Nietzsche will formulate the diagnosis of 
human consciousness as fundamentally weak.  It is this diagnosis that Ricoeur takes to be 
central to the Nietzschean project of demystification and as his central point of 
comparison to the interpretive goals of Freudian psychoanalysis.  To this end, Ricoeur 
sets out two interwoven strains of this reductive interpretive method that Freud and 
Nietzsche purportedly share – a philological movement and a genealogical one:   
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It is a philology, an exegesis, an interpretation insofar as the text of our 
consciousness can be compared to a palimpsest, under the surface of which 
another text has been written.  The task of this special exegesis is to decipher this 
text.  But this hermeneutics is at the same time a genealogy, since the distortion 
of the text emerges from a conflict of forces, of drives and counterdrives, whose 
origin must be brought to light.182  
 
This is the fundamental manner in which Ricoeur links the interpretive work of Nietzsche 
and Freud as critics of the immanence of self-consciousness to itself, contesting the 
concept of a transcendental subject.183  In his diagnosis of “we men of knowledge,” 
Nietzsche, for Ricoeur’s reading of his texts, sets out a theory of the origin of our 
illusions about our morality and philosophy (the genealogical aspect) and also proposes a 
method for decoding our expressions of these illusions (the philological aspect).184  This 
double interpretive movement constitutes for Ricoeur Nietzsche’s archaeology into the 
foundations of morality and meaningfulness. What is arguably of primary importance for 
Ricoeur’s reading is that this archaeology is directed to be a criticism of consciousness 
and its supposed transparency to itself.  However, since Ricoeur did not publish a detailed 
interpretation of this aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking, I will here attempt briefly to 
reconstruct these elements of what Ricoeur might see as a Nietzschean archaeology to 
complement the Freudian archaeology that is explicitly drawn out in Ricoeur’s texts.  
This will provide a foundation to begin to show how Nietzsche’s hermeneutics does 
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work, although it might outstrip the characteristics that Ricoeur reads as its essential 
features.   
 Concerning the adequacy of consciousness, Nietzsche indicates that he is, in his 
own way, merely following Kant’s critique of the paralogisms:  “Kant essentially wanted 
to prove that the subject cannot be proven on the basis of the subject – and neither can the 
object.”185  What is being identified here, in part, is the failure of self-consciousness to 
ground adequately the meaning of itself on the fact of its own existence and, 
subsequently, its failure to adequately account for the meaning of objects, as well.  Even 
if we grant that the expression of the “fact” of the subject is apodictic, its meaning is not 
thereby given as simple or univocal.  In contrast to the apparent simplicity of the 
Cartesian or phenomenological cogito, Nietzsche will advocate that the very “fact” of the 
manner in which the cogito is given might be dubitable.  Nietzsche asserts that “people 
are wondering… whether the reverse [of the cogito] might be true; that ‘think’ is the 
condition and ‘I’ is conditioned, in which case ‘I’ would be a synthesis that only gets 
produced through thought itself.”186  Ricoeur, even as late in his career as Oneself as 
Another, will reiterate this very point in relation to an earlier text of Nietzsche’s: “At least 
in these fragments [of 1882], Nietzsche says nothing other than simply, I doubt better 
                                               
185 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. and ed. Rolf-
Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Section 54 
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Preface of the Genealogy.  The point is not that a specific type of drive or human cannot perform if it has 
self-knowledge, it is that self-knowledge is like any other kind of knowledge, that is, synthetic. 
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than Descartes.”187  Nietzsche does not doubt that the cogito appears as simple and as a 
fact, but he does doubt that its meaning is given immediately and that its givenness is 
original.  The method Nietzsche utilizes here is similar to Freud’s: take a phenomenon 
assumed to be given simply – in this case consciousness – and ask if it is possible if that 
concept is instead produced as an effect of other activities.  The task then becomes 
archaeological for Ricoeur in the determination of the causes and constituent parts of the 
synthesis that produce the phenomenon – the transcendental subject – in question.  
Essentially, Nietzsche, the “old philologist,” treats the meaning of the “text” of 
consciousness as an expression of the activity of the instincts overwriting themselves.188  
Our understanding of this process, then, is liable to misinterpret the process as an original 
substance.  Just as Freud’s depiction of the psyche likened it to a modern Rome, built 
upon ruins, Nietzsche’s description of consciousness includes a necessary reference to 
that which exists before consciousness – the forces of thought itself.  The diagnosis of 
these forces will show that not only is consciousness liable to take itself to be a substance 
but that it prefers to do this, as well. 
However, if we see this as Nietzsche’s version of the Kantian paralogisms, a 
crucial difference must be noted.  As Ricoeur interprets it, the problem of consciousness 
for Kant was one of how consciousness can represent itself in its entirety to itself.  With 
the Nietzschean turn to interpretation: “It is no longer the Kantian question of how a 
                                               
187 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
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subjective representation or idea can have objective validity; this question, central to a 
critical philosophy, gives way to a more radical one.”189  The Nietzschean question can 
be posed as “how does interpretation (and not representation) produce not only meaning 
but also illusion?”  If Kant sought the objective ground of subjective perceptions and 
accomplished this through reference to certain facts of knowledge and the laws of 
thinking that accompanied them, Nietzsche will attempt to radicalize this solution.  This 
more radical question that Nietzsche poses questions the necessity of these “facts” of 
knowledge themselves.  Nietzsche states it this way: “[T]he time has finally come to 
replace the Kantian question ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ with 
another question ‘Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?’ – to realize, in other 
words, that such judgments must be believed true for the purpose of preserving beings of 
our type….”190  In a sense, the fact of knowledge that is to be proven by the Kantian 
critical project is marked by Nietzsche as an object produced by the critical project, as is 
the consciousness that guarantees its meaning.  The belief in the existence of the 
synthetic a priori judgment is necessary if one wants to preserve a certain set of truths or 
“facts.”  The Kantian critique sought to ground certain truths in the production of “new 
faculties”; but the Nietzschean project is to ask ‘why these truths and not others?’ and, 
perhaps more starkly, ‘why truth at all?’.191  For example, the purpose of the Genealogy 
is to examine the kind and type of forces and thoughts that require the truths that Kant is 
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attempting to justify through the mechanism of the synthetic a priori judgment.  What 
desires require consciousness to be an original substance?  What kinds of thoughts or 
forces demand the ascetic ideal, or which ones require the coupling of bad conscience 
and evil?  This is meant to be the form of the critical question as far as Nietzsche is 
concerned – “What force determines that such-and-such is a fact?”.192  For Ricoeur, the 
critical philological question here asks which forces determine these judgments to be 
true; and the genealogical question asks the origin of those forces and their quality.193  
Nietzsche’s project utilizes both questions, as well as an explicit hermeneutics that states 
that interpretation and not a fixed form of judgment is responsible for the truths 
produced. 
 The “philological” aspect of Nietzsche’s project here is to elucidate: 1) the 
activities of thinking that combine to form consciousness and; 2) the relationships 
between these activities which determine the character of consciousness.  Rather than 
viewing the surface of consciousness’s appearance as a closed text from which authentic 
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readings can begin, Nietzsche treats the text of consciousness as a palimpsest that is 
being continually overwritten by other activities of thinking.194  This can be seen in his 
various exercises in the etymology of the word “good” performed in the first essay of the 
Genealogy.  The benign concept of “good” is shown to have, at the very least, alternate 
possible meanings based on its derivation from other Indo-European languages.  These 
competing definitions would mark “the good” not as “the useful,” “the pleasant,” or “the 
lawful” but as “the warrior” (from the Latin “bonus”), “the one who has reality” (from 
the Greek “esthlos”), and “the godlike” (from the German “gut”).195  The seeming 
immediacy that the concept of “good” has in consciousness is not due to the concept 
alone but to a whole series of historical and instinctive activities.  But beside this explicit 
sort of philology, Nietzsche’s decisive philological step, for Ricoeur, is to identify 
conscious thought as something produced by many competing instincts: “[T]he greatest 
part of conscious thought must still be attributed to instinctive activity and this is even the 
case for philosophical thought.”196  Consciousness is, then, nothing profound in itself but 
is rather “a surface.”197  This move is critical because it would replace traditional 
philosophical questions with, in Nietzsche’s language, a “psychology” or “physiognomy” 
of the instincts that make consciousness possible.  These instincts can also be interpreted 
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from the sorts of questions that consciousness or a type of consciousness will attempt to 
answer.  Nietzsche writes: “To grasp psychology as morphology and the doctrine of the 
development of the will to power, which is what I have done – nobody has ever come 
close to this, not even in thought: this, of course, to the extent that we are permitted to 
regard what has been written so far as a symptom of what has not been said until now.”198  
Nietzschean “psychology” is an interpretation of the symptoms expressed in order to 
clarify the wills to power that produce those effects.  It is this Nietzschean “psychology” 
of the instincts that is rendered as “philology” in the Ricoeurian reading.  This instinctual 
model for Nietzsche is more evocative of his depiction of thinking and willing as 
“complicated” and as activities that are not simple but are synthesizing activities whereby 
a diverse manifold of instincts are unified and disguised as consciousness.  An 
examination of section 19 of Beyond Good and Evil will aid in showing Nietzsche’s 
reasons for this conclusion as well as the fundamental sort of synthesis that consciousness 
is. 
 In the first book of Beyond Good and Evil, “On the prejudices of philosophers,” 
Nietzsche undertakes to reveal one or more dogmatic beliefs that remain for even those 
critical philosophers who attack the problem of dogmatism in general.  As Ricoeur often 
states, it is the unproblematic status of the subject, that “soul-superstition that still causes 
trouble as the superstition of the subject or I,” that is a primary target of the Nietzschean 
critique.199  A critical philosophy that remains uncritical about the status of the subject as 
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a guarantor of meaning will only shift the focal point of the dogmatic elements it 
criticizes and not remove them.  Nietzsche’s “instinctual” model of consciousness takes 
pains to avoid this sort of dogmatism.  Nietzsche asserts that just as consciousness is not 
knowable without reference to something outside of consciousness, the instincts of life, 
which are also frequently referred to as “wills,” are not knowable simply in themselves.  
If we are to trace their morphology as they become conscious thoughts, the problem of 
deciphering them is compounded as we never encounter a simple or singular will: 
“Willing strikes me as, above all, something complicated, something unified only in a 
word – and this single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whatever 
minimal precautions philosophers might take.  So let us be more cautious, for once – let 
us be ‘unphilosophical.’”200  Philologically, the meaning of consciousness is determined 
by the interactions of these instincts or “plurality of feelings”; but, in turn, their meaning 
is not discernable in isolation from one another either.201  The illusion of a simple will or 
consciousness is reflected in grammar, but it is not the grammar or word that is 
responsible for the illusion – it is the relationships that the instincts assume with respect 
to one another.  The philological for Nietzsche problem is the interpretive untangling of 
this complicated series of wills.   
 To this end, Nietzsche stipulates that the syntheses that produce consciousness are 
effects of a hierarchy of command and obedience among the instincts, affects, or wills.  
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This hierarchy is deduced in the genealogical moment of the interpretive process.  The 
affects, which are the component parts of instinctual activity, are not indeterminately 
synthesized: “[T]he will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking, it is fundamentally 
an affect: and specifically the affect of the command.”202  This affect of command is 
essentially the same in its function as the one of the Kantian faculties is in what Kant 
holds to be its legitimate domain – although for Nietzsche, the only criterion of 
legitimacy is the display of strength.  The synthesis of willing is legislated by or under an 
affect of superiority – or a “commanding thought.”  Consciousness, which is identified as 
a particular type of willing by Nietzsche is a synthesis of various instincts of feeling and 
thinking which are unified and become meaningful under the sign of the strongest 
“commandeering” instinct.  Nietzsche’s archaeology of consciousness here deduces a 
complex of competing and subordinating wills or instincts whose various desires are 
appropriated by a legislating will which coerces obedience.  And, in a moment that 
reveals a difference in Nietzsche’s deduction from Freud’s, this synthesis or legislation 
follows not the principle of constancy, but what I will refer to as a principle of 
expenditure.  Nietzsche writes:  “Every animal – therefore la bête philosophe, too – 
instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all 
its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power....”203  Instead of seeking a 
conservation of its instinctual means while achieving pleasure, Nietzsche deduces that the 
legislative instincts desire only to express their strength, whatever the means or ends.  As 
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Pierre Klossowski notes: “It is excess that makes manifest that which exists….”204  
Appropriation, here, has its goal in itself:  “Physiologists should think twice before 
positioning the drive for self-preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being.  
Above all, a living being wants to discharge its strength....”205  The psychoanalytic 
principle of constancy, on the other hand, expresses a conservative nature in the psyche.  
For Nietzsche, consciousness, a result for Freud of the reconciliation of conflicting 
desires, is not a necessary outcome of the syntheses of the instincts.  Nietzsche does not 
deduce a self-regulating principle at work in the instincts. 
 To understand why consciousness itself is not necessary, we must see as coupled 
to this legislating synthesis of wills Nietzsche’s suspicion of all forms of “immediate 
certainty,” which leads to his perspectivism.206  If, as Nietzsche has stated, the “I” is an 
effect of various drives, then the certainty of any consciousness of that “I” could only be 
guaranteed by the interaction of those drives.  What appears as consciousness has been 
argued to be the result of drives; therefore, the certainty of any thought to that 
consciousness must also be a product of those drives.  However, the status of thought is 
not self-assured, as it (and therefore its certainty) depends upon whichever will is playing 
the commanding role.  If “willing is complicated” then for Nietzsche the products of that 
will are also necessarily complicated: “There are still harmless self-observers who 
believe in the existence of ‘immediate certainties,’ such as ‘I think,’ or the ‘I will….’ But 
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I will say this a hundred times: ‘immediate certainty,’ like ‘absolute knowledge’ and the 
‘thing-in-itself’ contains a contradictio in adjecto.”207  The contradiction in terms here 
that Nietzsche is referring to is the contradiction of arriving at non-mediated knowledge 
from a consciousness of meaning that is explained as synthetic but without a fixed 
hierarchy of legislation.  This raises the question of what it is that wills consciousness or 
certainty in any form.   
The synthesis of the “I” that Nietzsche invokes leads directly to the need from 
interpretation as the condition for knowledge.  It is not the “I “ alone that is to be doubted 
as bearing a determinate meaning but any meaning, due to the process of synthesis: “In 
fact, there is already too much packed into the ‘it thinks’: even the ‘it’ contains an 
interpretation of the process an does not belong to the process itself.”208  In any 
determination of the meaning of consciousness, interpretation will make that 
determination possible.  And this interpretation must come from a particular perspective: 
“There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’….”209 Nietzsche here 
finds himself in proximity to the aspect of Ricoeur’s phenomenology that was discussed 
earlier under the rubric of perspective and sense.  Each instinctual force seeks to interpret 
from its perspective; and the sense that a phenomenon bears will depend on which forces 
are actively determining its meaning.  It appears that although Nietzsche is not a 
phenomenologist (as he lacks a concept of the phenomenological epoche and does not 
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seek a fully determined logic of sense) he is treading on ground which Ricoeur will 
recover in a phenomenological way when he argues that interpretation is necessary for 
the constitution of sense between competing wills or forces.  For Nietzsche, the 
commanding will is the legislator of sense, the interpreter; but sense is no more fixed than 
the identity of its interpreter is.  There will be no final codification of meaning as an 
eschatological result or as a strong kind of teleology.  Here we can see Nietzsche’s 
description of the “well-turned-out person” as essentially the same as the role of the 
commanding will in a synthesis of sense: “Instinctively he collects from everything he 
sees, hears, lives though, his sum: he is a principle of selection, he discards much.”210  
The strong, selective instinct is responsible for the synthesis of sense as well as for the 
determination of worth.  And in the field of evaluation, selection is the activity on the part 
of the instincts that is called “interpretation” in the field of meaning.   
 The problem of appropriation here is identical to the problem of which will or 
instinct is legislating.  The force that determines the synthesis of meaning, for Nietzsche, 
is the one that successfully appropriates the action of the other forces under its own 
meaning.  This appropriative synthesis is revealed, for example, in the illusion of free 
will: “What is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the affect of superiority with 
respect to something that must obey.”211  The suspicion of consciousness on Nietzsche’s 
part here is due to this plurality of wills and the dynamics of their syntheses into what 
appears as a free consciousness and free will.  What is concealed, however, is precisely 
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that “[o]n the one hand, we are, under the circumstance, both the one who commands and 
the one who obeys… [o]n the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and 
deceiving ourselves about this duality [of command and obedience] by means of the 
synthetic concept of the ‘I.’”212  This concept, being the product of a synthesis, is only the 
appropriation of certain drives into a central illusion of unity.  This appropriation of 
obeying wills by a commanding one is the hidden text behind every consciousness, 
revealed by Nietzsche’s philosophical philology.  In this way, for Nietzsche, is 
consciousness produced as a surface effect – “L’effet c’est moi.”   
 Because the philological approach shows that the origins of expressions are 
“complicated” and plural, it becomes necessary to add a genealogical element to 
hermeneutics lest the philological argument fall quickly into another dogmatic position.  
A hermeneutics without this complement devolves into just a new method of the 
deciphering of static symbols according to a set of techniques.  In other words, that 
hermeneutics would run the risk of criticizing and then reproducing a dogmatic system 
based on the self-immanence of what is interpreted and its meaning.  For Nietzsche, 
Ricoeur argues, genealogy finds its purpose as a demystifying procedure exposing the 
nihilism at the source of religious and ethical value claims.  In other words, Nietzsche’s 
genealogy is mobilized to show that the interpretation of a symbol is always at a distance 
from the circumstances of the expression of that symbol.  As was also the case with 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud, Nietzsche is shown to interpret ethical prohibitions not 
as expressions of supra-temporal values or ideas but as an expression of weakness on the 
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part of the forces that compose the prohibition.  As Ricoeur writes, “The genealogical 
task is to reveal the emptiness of this source.”213  In this way, he argues that Nietzsche’s 
genealogy is not itself nihilist but rather that the objects of his diagnosis are nihilist, 
insofar as their origin is nothing.  The counterpart of metaphysical dogmatism, which was 
the target of the philological thrust, is the metaphysical nihilism at the heart of a certain 
kind of moral judgment.   
 Central to this account is the interpretation of the forces that compose 
consciousness as originating as weak forces or desires.  Weakness is used by Nietzsche to 
designate a force or will that does not actively seek determination or synthesis – 
preferring not to act.214  The usual position taken by a weak force is one that has been set 
down by some other determining agent and then merely followed by the weak.  
Nietzsche’s discussions of slavery need always to be understood in this light, as ‘slave’ is 
just another designation for Nietzsche of a force that cannot determine itself.  For these 
weak forces, synthesis is replaced by the phenomenon of belief: 
Metaphysics is still needed by some, but so is that impetuous demand for 
certainty that today discharges itself in scientific-positivistic form among great 
masses – the demand that one wants by all means something to be firm (while 
owing to the fervour of this demand one treats the demonstration of this certainty 
more lightly and negligently): this is still the demand for foothold, support – in 
short, the instinct of weakness that, to be sure, does not create sundry religions, 
forms of metaphysics, and convictions but does – preserve them.215 
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As both knowledge and any determination of sense have been discussed as products of 
synthesis and expression, these weak forces are called such because of their failure or 
inability to determine their own syntheses.  Nietzsche also states that this “slavish” 
weakness in determination correlates to a demand for a fixed truth.  And this demand for 
an unchanging determination of meaning is tied to those forces’ inability to actively 
determine meaning for themselves.  In this way does belief in a fixed truth or meaning 
become more important than the act of synthesis to these weak forces.  Thus their 
meaning is always secondarily derived from some other synthesis, determination, or force 
and then posited as arising from some event other than the synthesis by which it became 
determinate.  The instincts of weak morality that Nietzsche diagnoses, being unable to 
actively synthesize values or meanings, have no recourse for their desires except to 
preserve a realm of “ideal being.”216  This realm is supposedly the home of all the values 
and truths that weak forces want to exist in the world but are unable to enact 
efficaciously.  In fact, Nietzsche repeatedly states that the motive behind this invention is 
one of vengeance or ressentiment.  The diagnosis of this “realm” however shows it to be 
“‘nothing.’  It emerges only from the weakness of the slave morality, which projects itself 
into the heavens.”217  In lieu of creation and affirmation (which are generally afforded a 
positive evaluation from Nietzsche), the slave morality makes an illusory creation of a 
realm of ideal being from which judgments can proceed.  The Nietzschean genealogy 
here reveals this realm to be merely a representation of specific desires that are unable to 
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manifest themselves through action with other forces.  As Ricoeur summarizes it: 
“Behind the so-called autonomy of the will is hidden the resentment of a particular will, 
the will of the weak.  Because of... this genealogy, the god of morality, to speak in the 
manner of Nietzsche, reveals himself as the god of accusation and condemnation.”218 
 Therefore, we see that Ricoeur sees and uses Nietzsche’s critical project here 
primarily as an indictment of any morality that is based on abstract conceptions of duty 
and punishment.  A crucial element to the Ricoeurian reading of the genealogical projects 
of both Freud and Nietzsche is the concretizing of seemingly a priori principles by their 
reduction into forces that are hidden in their projection.  Ricoeur writes of Freud and 
Nietzsche that “what seemed to be a strict necessity, the formal principle of obligation, 
now appears as the result of a hidden process, a process that refers back to an original act 
of accusation rooted in the will.”219  Ricoeur here refers obliquely to both the philological 
hermeneutic of the reduction of an act to a process as well as the genealogical 
hermeneutic of ascertaining the hidden origin of the act.  Central to Ricoeur’s reading is 
that the Nietzschean critique shows the real cause of ethical prohibition to be rooted in 
the desires of those who “read” existence as possessing a condemnation of itself.  This 
self-negation of any force of life by itself is criticized as ‘nihilism’ by Nietzsche.  The 
emptiness here is the result of a positive process attempting to negate itself through 
abstract means – slavish desires which attempt to have determinations of sense without 
actively determining them.  In the positing of an abstract judgment of life, weak forces do 
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nothing positive in terms of synthesis (or in Nietzsche’s terms “creation”).  Instead they 
only accuse life in an empty manner with abstract means, borrowed from other synthetic, 
interpretive acts.  Even the seemingly naturalistic explanation of life as being primarily 
concerned with the preservation of itself is diagnosed by Nietzsche as arising out of 
weakness:  “To wish to preserve oneself is a sign of distress, of a limitation of the truly 
basic life-instinct, which aims at the expansion of power and in so doing often enough 
risks and sacrifices self-preservation.”220  With these expressions of weakness, belief and 
representation take the place of active determination.   
 For Nietzsche’s archaeology of consciousness, then, the problem of consciousness 
is “To what end does consciousness exist at all when it is basically superfluous?”221  This 
statement of the superfluity of consciousness reveals Nietzsche’s deep suspicion that not 
only is consciousness deceptive in matters of ethics and of truth but that it is also 
unnecessary and a product of weak forces.  The principle of constancy that in Freud 
makes the conscious ego a necessary outcome in any normal reconciliation of the 
vicissitudes of the instincts would also fall under Nietzsche’s suspicion here.  This, again, 
shows that a different economics of the instincts is active in Nietzsche’s work.  The 
appearance of consciousness as an effective agent is made possible by the instinctual life 
that provides it with its force and direction.  But it remains to be seen what sort of instinct 
it is that commands in the creation of consciousness.  How is it that “the most fragile 
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organ it [the body] has developed, comes to dominate the body”?222  However, this 
picture does not give the full import of Nietzsche’s interpretation of consciousness from 
Ricoeur’s standpoint.  The synthetic nature of the “I” just described also does not testify 
to the radicality of Nietzsche’s interpretation.  With this basic outline of Nietzsche’s 
suspicion, let us now turn to the comparison of Ricoeur’s readings of Freud with 
Nietzsche with the intent of disentangling the two.  As was stated before, this will turn on 
their interpretations of the symbols of the tragedy of Oedipus Tyrranus. 
 
III.  Two Archaeologies of Tragedy 
 Ricoeur has argued that the nature of the hermeneutics of suspicion is to eschew a 
general hermeneutic approach for a regional and critical approach.  A genuine 
hermeneutic strategy is too easily compromised if it turns too early to a universal account 
of all phenomena.  For Ricoeur this general hermeneutics is to be hoped for but is not to 
be the starting point.  Part of the apparent similarity of the approaches of Freud and 
Nietzsche lies not only in their archaeological accounts of human instincts but also in 
their preference of symbols from Greek tragedy.   
 For Freud, this preference can be traced to his proposal that “dreams are the 
dreamer’s private mythology and myths the waking dreams of peoples, that Sophocles’s 
Oedipus and Shakespeare’s Hamlet are to be interpreted in the same way as dreams.”223  
The symbols that are chosen to represent the instincts in both dreams and tragedies are 
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chosen because of their “sedimented” character.224  The complex denoted by the tragic 
figure of Oedipus finds its earliest artistic symbolization in the tragedy but derives its 
universal import from the conflicting desires and instincts that all humans must work 
through.  According to psychoanalytic investigation, the tragedy of Oedipus lies in the 
desires and emotional ambiguity towards his parents that his character symbolizes.  In his 
actions, Oedipus, in Freud’s interpretation of the tragedy, represents the demands made 
on consciousness by the often-conflicting sources of civilization and the instincts.  This 
“universal drama” stems from the earliest desires on the part of the (male) child, who 
develops an identification with his father and also an object-cathexis with his mother.225  
But the complex truly blossoms when this object-choice becomes more intense and the 
father with whom the child has identified himself becomes an object of hostility, due to 
his being perceived “as an obstacle” to the child’s desires.226  Lear notes, however, that 
Freud gives this formulation only as the most simple example for communicating the 
theory: “For one gets an impression that the simple Oedipus complex is by no means its 
commonest form, but rather represents a simplification or schematization which, to be 
sure, is often enough justified for practical purposes.”227  The importance, it seems is not 
in the precise details of the complex but rather in the emotional ambivalence towards the 
parents and the vicissitudes of the instincts that the myth represents.  For this reason, Lear 
states “[t]his is the familiar structure of the Oedipus complex and Freud basically admits 
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that it never occurs.”228  Thus the Oedipus complex arrives as a moment of emotional 
ambivalence on the part of the child to the demands made by his own instincts, on the one 
hand, and by the situation of reality, on the other.  The character of Oedipus is tragic 
precisely because he acts out these desires in the killing of his father and the marriage to 
his mother.  The fact that this situation is unknown to Oedipus at the time of his 
accomplishing of these aims does not deter Freud’s reading on this point precisely 
because the nature of these desires are repressed by the ego of a “normal” adult.  Freud’s 
point is that our situation would be identical to Oedipus’s if we allowed the desires of 
childhood full play.  The reason for this ascribed identification must be the principle of 
the constancy of the instincts, which will demand reconciliation from a conflict of this 
magnitude. 
 In his actions and pronouncements, the character of Oedipus represents our 
primitive desires as well as those conflicting desires to avoid pain that attempt to arrest 
the achievement of the goals of the more primitive instincts.  In this way can Freud say 
that the overcoming of the Oedipus complex is the foundation of the agency of the 
superego.229  The conflict that Oedipus undergoes in searching for the murderer of the 
king forces him to identify with the desires of the community against his own libidinal 
urges to kill the father and take his place.  This symbolizes for Freud the alteration of the 
energy of the libido which was previously used for its own aims into energy that attempts 
to inhibit the realization of those goals which are repugnant to society.  Oedipus must 
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then be punished for his transgression of the laws of the civilization.  The symbols of the 
tragedy hold such importance for Freud because “repression and culture, intrapsychical 
and social institution, coincide in this paradigmatic case.”230  All such symbols, then, in 
order to be grasped as tragic, must display some universal vicissitude of instincts to 
which all of us are prey as well as the downfall of a character who fails to integrate or 
synthesize those instincts in an appropriate manner.  Tragedy relates the unity of 
“ontogenesis, the individual secret, with phylogenesis, the universal destiny.”231  In this 
way does the mythic figure of tragic Oedipus carry symbolic weight in the analysis of our 
own conflicting desires.  At this psychic and cultural level, Ricoeur finds that the symbol 
of Oedipus has a profound importance as a demystifying symbol to reflection.232  The 
myth of Oedipus can be said to be one of the primary archaeological symbols regarding 
the origins of human conflict.   
 A case could be made that the central symbol of Nietzsche’s philosophical work 
is tragedy233 and his preoccupying concern is the sort of culture that is capable of 
creating tragedy or understanding “tragic feeling.”234  However, here it will be sufficient 
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to show the manner in which these specific tragic symbols that Freud interprets as 
symbolizing the Oedipal complex appear differently in Nietzsche’s analysis of them.  
This will enable the progressive distanciation of the Nietzschean hermeneutics from the 
Freudian.   
 For Nietzsche, no special place among tragedies is given to Oedipus Tyrannus.  
While tragedy as a phenomenon holds an elevated rank over other phenomena, and 
cultures that are capable of creating it are also esteemed more highly, Oedipus’s specific 
origin and destiny in action are not what is essential.  In Freud’s interpretation, the 
repetition of the Oedipal event is what is both to be feared as well as appreciated as an 
essential event in the development of a healthy consciousness.  The difference in 
Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy in general is twofold: 1) it is not in the specific 
characters of the drama that the essence of the tragic unfolds; 2) the repetition that is 
sought in understanding the tragedy is an evaluative one, not necessarily one involving a 
gain in knowledge.  Nietzsche rhetorically asks if the affectivity of the tragedian 
demonstrates a valuable possibility for evaluation: “Does [the tragic artist] not display 
precisely the condition of fearlessness in the face of the fearsome and questionable?”235  
This fearlessness marks the “tragic” as distinct from the “slavish,” as it need not respond 
to suffering as ressentiment.  It is, instead, the affective disposition towards affirmation in 
the face of suffering that is primarily selected as the worth of tragedy: “Affirmation of 
life even in its strangest and sternest problems… that is what I called Dionysian, that is 
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what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.”236  In the discussion 
of any particular tragedy, we should expect this invocation of affirmation or resistance to 
ressentiment through fearlessness.  And characteristic of Nietzsche’s references to 
Oedipus is the mention of Oedipus’s vision and his fearless, nearly reckless questioning: 
The problem of the value of truth came before us, - or was it we who came before 
the problem?  Which of us is Oedipus?  Which one is the Sphinx?  It seems we 
have a rendezvous of questions and question-marks. – And, believe it or not, it 
ultimately looks to us as if the problem has never been raised until not, - as if we 
were the first to ever see it, fix our gaze on it, risk it.  Because this involves risk 
and perhaps no risk has ever been greater.237 
 
This “Oedipal” moment is not found as an archaeological relic of desire but as a 
progressive, active desire, unrepressed and even encouraged by culture.  In this, we can 
see Nietzsche’s distance from the Freudian deduction of the instincts.  There is no 
presence of a state of equilibrium that is to be maintained in the life of the instincts, but 
rather a progressive conflict, subordination, or prostration among them.  But as is always 
the case in Nietzsche, the notion of individuation that we normally take for granted is 
suspended.  However, not only does the passage distance us from consciousness, it also 
multiplies the possible origins of the questioning.  Are we, as those who seek the truth, 
Oedipus or the Sphinx?  Are we the tragic hero or the monster of uncertain origin?  This 
question, though, is only pertinent regarding the value of what Nietzsche calls the “will to 
truth.”  The correct answer to the Sphinx’s question causes her/it to take her own life – 
but the answer to Oedipus’s investigation results in his blindness as well.  Both results are 
meant to show the nihilism operating in the seemingly unconditioned desire for truth and 
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not necessarily any kind of profound identification with the actions of either character.  
With the mechanism of identification absent, we are clearly dealing with a different 
symbolism of Oedipus than there is in Freud’s texts.  As Assoun states, “there is thus no 
theory of identification [in Nietzsche’s works] as an elaboration of the paternal 
model.”238  Without this mechanism of identification, Nietzsche’s archaeology is quite 
different than Freud’s, as well.  The past, either psychical or historic, is not in danger of 
being repeated in Nietzsche’s archaeological strategy.  With this repetition absent, the 
appeal to the principle of expenditure is less one of regaining force that has been lost than 
it is in the expression and affirmation of new syntheses.  Said in a negative manner, 
Nietzsche’s archaeology reveals a different emphasis than Ricoeur places on his texts in 
saying “What Nietzsche wants is to augment man’s power and restore his force....”239  
Ricoeur reads Nietzsche here in a manner that is closer to Freud’s more conservative 
archaeology than to Nietzsche’s valorization of expenditure.  Another of Nietzsche’s 
references to Oedipus will help clarify this. 
 In a less ambiguous reference to Oedipus, Nietzsche links him with the hero 
Odysseus.  The basic thrust of the appeal to these heroes, however, is the same as in the 
previous passage: 
To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and 
fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and 
drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, from 
now on, the human being, just as he already stands before the rest of nature 
today, hardened by the discipline of science, - with courageous Oedipus eyes and 
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sealed up Odysseus ears, deaf to the lures of the old metaphysical bird catchers 
who have been whistling to him for far too long....240 
 
Oedipus’s eyes, blinded after his search for truth, are valorized as are Odysseus’s ears, 
sealed to the calls from speculative metaphysics for an abstract conception of truth.241  
Again, the genealogical question is raised as to what it is that wills truth.  Oedipus, it 
seems, in this passage has learned to resist this call – the call not just for a particular 
interpretation of truth but for any truth whatsoever.  The particular characters (here 
Oedipus and Odysseus) symbolize not just their particular actions but in general the 
affectivity of a tragic conception of life.  In summarizing this passage, Jacques Derrida 
states: “Oedipus, no longer naive, does not assume their [the metaphysical bird catchers’] 
blinding charge any more than he disclaims it.”242  Oedipus, here the symbol for the 
tragic, neither assumes nor denies the truth of the metaphysicians’ claims.  Rather, he and 
this ‘Odysseus’ aim at something else.  The aim here is what, for Nietzsche, is labeled as 
“noble.”  The noble in thought, distinguished from the slavish, is precisely the active 
determination of the synthesis of sense that was discussed earlier.  And, it is nobility that 
is also at the heart of the principle of expenditure.  Nietzsche glosses this nobility as 
“[being] incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds 
seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess 
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of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget....”243  It is nobility, as an affect 
or as a taste, for which Nietzsche the author claims to be aiming.244  His statement of this 
is remarkable for its proximity to the stance taken by Nietzsche’s Oedipus:  “My taste, 
which may be called the opposite of a tolerant taste, is even here far from uttering a 
wholesale Yes: in general it dislikes saying Yes, it would rather say No, most of all it 
prefers to say nothing at all....”245 
 If any aspect of Oedipus as a character is important for Nietzsche as a symbol, it 
is not his action of killing his father and marrying his mother.  For Freud’s archaeological 
interest, this aspect is key.  Instead the importance of the myth for Nietzsche could be 
seen to lie in Oedipus’s rule of the kingdom and his demand for truth, which ends up 
proving Oedipus to be both the legitimate and illegitimate ruler at the same time – while 
not being the master of his own destiny, either.  In blinding himself, it seems that 
Oedipus transforms into a symbol for the critique of the value of truth for Nietzsche.  
Oedipus reaches the point described in the Genealogy of Morals where he must “patere 
legem, quam ipse tulisti” – submit to the law you yourself proposed.246  From a 
philological perspective, we can see Oedipus as a Nietzschean symbol for the many 
forces that coalesce to produce a singular fate.  But, from the genealogical perspective, 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis is startlingly different than that which was Freud’s.  The origin of 
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these forces, particularly the ones criticized by Nietzsche, lie in the weakness of the will.  
Nietzsche introduces not just a criticism of the morality of duty but also a criticism of 
morals, broadly construed.  The will to truth and the weakness of the slavish moralities 
are deduced to spring from the same sources.   
 The affirmative symbolism of the tragic is what Nietzsche opposes to this 
weakness.  Whereas in Freud’s texts, the Oedipal symbol gives us only the goal of 
acclimating ourselves to the fate it communicates, the goal Nietzsche has in mind is much 
different.  And is on this point precisely where Nietzsche can be seen more clearly to 
break from the hermeneutic framework that Ricoeur has proposed as belonging to the 
hermeneutics of suspicion.  Throughout, the predominant criticism that Ricoeur has made 
of the hermeneutics of suspicion is that it needs completion in a progressive hermeneutics 
of creation.  His refrain has been that Nietzsche and Freud remain too archaeological, and 
while this is a needed corrective to a naive investigation of things as being simple in their 
meanings, it is insufficient for the task of an affirmative account of human nature.  Part of 
Nietzsche’s use of the symbols of tragedy, however, calls for the definite affirmation of a 
goal – what Nietzsche will call the goal of nobility.  In this, it appears that as an 
archaeological task, Nietzsche’s methodology has lead to some profound differences 
from Freud’s analytic archaeology.  This is reason enough, despite the initial appearances 
of similarity, to pose the problem that Nietzsche’s genealogy, while being a type of 
hermeneutics, poses significantly different diagnoses of interpretive conditions than 
Ricoeur’s poles of archaeology and teleology allow.247  How can we reconcile the 
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principle of expenditure and the critique of the will to truth and its moralism with 
Ricoeur’s hope for a dialectical resolution to the problem of the multiplicity of meaning?  
At least, the route we must take through Nietzsche’s texts is markedly distinct from the 
route we would take through Freud’s.  In the next chapter, I will attempt to lay out in 
more positive terms Nietzsche’s hermeneutic strategy, building from Ricoeur’s insights 
into his hermeneutic method but incorporating Nietzsche’s own criticisms of the polarity 
that Ricoeur has been working between.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE TELEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN NIETZSCHE’S GENEALOGICAL 
METHOD 
 
 For Nietzsche, the value of interpretation lies not only in its capacity to provoke 
suspicion, as Ricoeur has suggested, but also in its ability to enable what Nietzsche refers 
to in Twilight of the Idols as “war.”248  Nietzsche mobilizes this symbol at the beginning 
of The Gay Science, as well, in a poem entitled “Heracliteanism”: “Happiness on earth, 
friends,/ only stems from war!”249  This symbol of ‘war,’ and its associated other names, 
plays the part for Nietzsche of a complementary hermeneutical pole to that of 
“suspicion,” akin to Ricoeur’s description of the “hermeneutics of recovery.”  Whereas 
Ricoeur criticizes Freud for focusing excessively on the archaeology of desire – despite 
the possible recourse that Freud’s theories have in the mechanism of sublimation – little 
is said in Ricoeur’s accounts of Nietzsche’s archaeological method of a possible 
Nietzschean counterpart to sublimation, other than to criticize its absence.250  In this 
chapter, my goal will be to elucidate this generally neglected or overlooked teleological 
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dimension of Nietzsche’s hermeneutic method, which is produced from the activity of 
conflicting interpretations:  “War has always been the grand sagacity of every spirit 
which has grown too inward and too profound; its curative power lies even in the wounds 
one receives.”251  The apparent wisdom that Nietzsche locates in war lies in its expression 
of the exteriority of interpretive forces and their conflicts.  Metaphorically, war arises on 
a contested field of interpretation over the meaning of concepts; and its activity is the 
progressive reinterpretation and appropriation of those concepts on that field.  In this 
chapter, I intend to show that the critical force that Nietzsche’s method possesses derives 
its power for appropriative activity from the very concepts that it criticizes.  In the place 
of a dialectical progression toward a concretized final determination of sense, the 
Nietzschean conflict of interpretations valorizes the activity of the conflict, under the 
symbol of ‘war,’ between the exegetical tactics but without renouncing a certain, limited 
impulse to teleology.  In this way, ‘war’ utilizes the forces at hand in a directed attempt to 
reinvigorate those which have turned inward, like those of the bad conscience, to a kind 
of health.252  Far from denying the hermeneutics of appropriation, Nietzsche’s texts 
conceptualize a type of appropriation that resists eschatological impulses and – contra 
Ricoeur and others – engages in a creative process of sense-building and not merely in a 
critique of meaning.  However, the critique of the hope for eschatology that Nietzsche 
offers alters the kind of appropriation possible to a determination of sense that lies 
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beyond the bounds of Ricoeur’s sense of recovery.  As Nietzsche writes, “Another form 
of recovery, in certain cases more suited to me [than war], is to sound out idols….  There 
are more idols in the world than there are realities….”253  The criticism of idols, the idol 
of God in particular, will lead us to the problem developed in Nietzsche’s texts of how 
appropriation is possible once eschatological hope has been “sounded out” as hollow and 
disregarded.  One aspect of Nietzsche’s idea of “recovery” will be this continuing work 
of suspicion, of iconoclasm. 
 The task for this chapter will be to construct this interpretive position in 
Nietzsche’s works and begin to show how it operates as a part of his genealogical 
method.  As I am arguing that there is a teleological trajectory in the accounts of 
Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation, it will be necessary to show how this method 
emerges from Nietzsche’s discussions of interpretation, genealogy, and perspective.  It is 
possible that finding this Nietzschean “soil” of interpretation can also reduce a number of 
the apparent paradoxes that emerge in Nietzsche’s texts – and are aided and abetted in the 
secondary literature surrounding those works.254  It will be argued that Nietzsche’s 
chosen field of battle will be the field of sense and that it is as a critique and 
appropriation of sense that his genealogy or hermeneutics is best understood.  His 
criticisms of “teleology” and “ends” must be considered with this in mind, as well.  I 
contend that the sense of teleology understood as an eschatological termination of 
movement or change is the primary target of Nietzsche’s criticisms of teleology – and 
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also one of the targets in the invocations of the “death” of the concept(s) of god.  A 
second sense of teleology as a “directedness” to sense is retained by Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutics and can even be considered as “healthy.”  If this is successful as a reading 
of Nietzsche’s texts, then the Nietzschean hermeneutic will avoid the precise 
categorizations of the Ricoeurian poles of hermeneutics while remaining a hermeneutic 
method.  And Nietzsche’s method would retain a powerful criticism of a hermeneutics of 
recovery, such as Ricoeur employs, by removing the goal of an interpretive finality from 
within the hermeneutic method itself. 
 
I.  Interpretation and War 
For Nietzsche, the process of critique is inseparable from the activity of 
interpretation.  In his genealogies, the interpretive act is the attempt to determine the 
meaning of certain concepts according to the conditions that have enabled these concepts 
to become actualized.  All interpretive acts, however, proceed from a particular 
hermeneutic standpoint or perspective.  According to what Nietzsche calls his 
“perspectivism,” however, “all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, 
and boundlessly individual.... that due to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of 
which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world turned into 
generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator....”255  Becoming-
conscious of a field of meaningfulness is a result of the application of a certain 
perspective to the symbols and signs encountered.  Thus, each interpretation of the 
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conscious world is but an interpretation of a sign or symbol and the application of a 
concept to it.  In fact, the constitution of a world at all is the result of the work of 
interpretation, as Eric Blondel states: “The body is a series of instincts (Instinke) or drives 
(Triebe) that constitute reality as they interpret it.”256  Although it is not necessarily 
important here to develop Blondel’s concept of the body, I agree with the manner in 
which he situates interpretation as simultaneously working on and working in the world 
as it is constructed.  Nietzsche is not discussing the construction/interpretation of the field 
of objectivity by a transcendental subject.  Instead, following the earlier discussion of the 
construction of the subject through interpretation, it is important to extend that analysis to 
objects as well: “As one might guess, it is not the opposition between subject and object 
which concerns me here [discussing perspective]; I leave that distinction to those 
epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk 
metaphysics).”257  Perspectivism and interpretation are the activites by which both subject 
and object are constituted.  Here, I also agree with Christoph Cox’s assessment that 
“Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation holds that objects are nothing given but that they, 
too, are only ever constructions of one or another interpretation.258  And, in a manner 
similar to that described by Ricoeur, each interpretation of the world must necessarily 
occur from a particular, finite perspective of a drive.  What is distinctive about 
Nietzsche’s method, however, is that genealogy interprets the causes of these concepts to 
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be both historically based and contingent – and neither transcendent nor necessary.259  As 
Nietzsche states in his exegesis of the meanings of the pair of concepts “good” and 
“evil”: 
Fortunately, I learned early to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice 
and ceased to look for the origin of evil behind the world... A certain amount of 
historical and philological schooling... soon transformed my problem into another 
one: under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil?  
and what value do they themselves possess?260 
 
Thus, a questioning of the meaning of the judgments “good” and “evil” must look into 
the historical and psychological conditions that make those judgments possible.  
Nietzsche’s critique of this sort of moral judgment both shows us the actual conditions 
for their employment and also that the terms “good” and “evil” mean something different 
than what the morality which claims them in its domain would have us believe.   
Moral judgments, if subject to the historical process with its accidents and 
developments for their meaningfulness, can neither be justified by transcendent ideals nor 
judged according to events not actualized.  Michel Foucault states regarding this that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical project “rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies.  It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins.’”261  
The interpretations offered by genealogy criticize the deployment of concepts from a 
non-transcendent standpoint and look for their actual meaning and value as they have 
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developed in history.  Nietzsche’s criticism of final ends comes from the same reasoning 
as his criticism of any origin that would be characterized as causa sui – or as the cause of 
itself.  His late works, with their intertwining yet distinct itineraries, all form part of what 
Nietzsche proclaims is his “No-doing”:  “After the Yes-saying part of my task had been 
solved [in the works through Thus Spoke Zarathustra], the turn had come for the No-
saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war – conjuring up a 
day of decision.”262  This dense passage of self-interpretation marks a kind of departure 
in the works from Beyond Good and Evil to Anti-Christ towards a critical enterprise – a 
work of suspicion.  However, the genealogies articulated in those texts form a sustained 
project of interpreting how the metaphysical and moral assumptions and concepts of 
philosophy are made possible through the work of the forces that compose them.  
Although these texts develop as distinct works, distinct genealogical trajectories, the 
similarities in the forces that are expressed accounts for the commonality in the targets 
that Nietzsche finds in the philosophical tradition.  Thus, Beyond Good and Evil, with its 
broad critique of Modernity, reveals the same forces at work that the Genealogy of 
Morals does, although the latter book attempts to focus on a narrower moral field.263  
Nietzsche’s No-doing is coextensive with his declaration of war on these metaphysical 
concepts as both activities offer a critical re-evaluation and, ultimately, re-interpretation 
                                               
262 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), “Beyond Good and Evil,” Section 1 
(emphasis in original). 
 
263 To complete the list, I read Twilight of the Idols broadly as a genealogy of truthfulness, The Case of 
Wagner as a genealogy of “German idealism,” The Anti-Christ as a genealogy of European Christianity, 
and, finally, Ecce Homo as a genealogy of the subject “Nietzsche.”  I will return to this claim in Chapter 4 
as I think it gives us a good insight into how to read Ecce Homo as a work of hermeneutic philosophy.  See 
here Ecce Homo, and specifically, “Why I write such good books.”   
 
  121 
     
of metaphysics and morality.  If, as Ricoeur has said, Nietzsche wants to be able to say ‘I 
doubt better than Descartes’ then a Nietzschean wish to ‘critique more fully than Kant’ 
must be seen at work here, as well.264  This desire to fulfill the Kantian attempt at critique 
leads Nietzsche to his greatest expenditures, but it remains to be seen if those can be 
viewed as successful ventures from Nietzsche’s own standpoints.  As David Farrell Krell 
writes, “Genealogical critique attacks the grounds of the metaphysics of Descartes and 
Kant, but finds itself compelled to question whether such an attack remains within the 
Leibnizian metaphysics of ground….”265  Is there some thing that remains fundamental in 
Nietzsche’s critique and, therefore, exempted from critique?  The answer to this problem, 
I think, lies in the extent to which Nietzsche advocates deploying ‘war.’ 
 The reasons for taking Nietzsche’s statements of ‘war’ as a key symbol of his 
critique lie in Nietzsche’s method of critique.  War, as a depiction of a conflict of forces, 
is not a representative of a critique that arrives from a radically exterior or transcendent 
source; war derives its power from a source immanent to that which is criticized itself – 
its “curative power lies in the wounds one receives.”266  In other words, critique cannot 
operate other than with tools that are already actualized in some manner and on concepts 
or ideals as they have been actualized.  This is the sense of Nietzsche’s conclusion 
regarding the critique of ascetic ideals:   
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All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-
overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of “self-
overcoming” in the nature of life – the lawgiver himself eventually receives the 
call: “patere legem, quam ipse tulisti [Submit to the law you yourself 
proposed].”267   
 
In this context, Nietzsche’s criticism of the ascetic ideal and its conditions for possibility 
is made possible by an unrealized aspect of that very ideal.  When a command to know 
the meaning of all things cannot know the meaning of itself, or has necessarily deceived 
itself about its meaning, it can no longer stand as it once had because of the very reasons 
immanent to that initial command.  Nietzsche’s texts recognize the aims of the Kantian 
project but desire to reach Kant’s end of a critique that is immanent to itself without the 
illusions caused by the morality that Kant assumed uncritically – “that [morality] of a 
cunning Christian....”268  The moral illusions that what Nietzsche terms the “will to truth” 
has demanded will ultimately be subjected to that same will to truth through its desire for 
universality.  For this reason, Nietzsche likens Kant to “a fox who strays back into his 
cage.  Yet it had been his strength and cleverness that had broken open the cage!”269  
Kant’s critical method inquires into the ground of the same concepts that Nietzsche 
critiques, but Kant’s work assumes their rightful existence for moral reasons alone.  With 
the critique of morality that we have seen Nietzsche employ, he aims to rid philosophers 
of the very cage – morality – that continues to dog attempts at completing the Kantian 
project.   
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 As Nietzsche himself notes, he is “warlike by nature.”270  But this is meant to 
signify that his practice of critique is different than any criticism that comes about by 
ressentiment.  Nietzsche’s genealogies have their origin not in a desire for revenge, if we 
take him at his word, but in an “aggressive pathos [that] belongs just as necessarily to 
strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to weakness.”271  The employment of war in 
this case is opposed to way in which weakness gives birth to ideals.  Forces that 
Nietzsche characterizes as weak discover a need for a change in evaluation because of an 
experience with suffering caused by a “hostile external world.”272  These values that are 
created in response to this suffering, which Nietzsche refers to as products of a “slave 
morality,” have as their motivation the resentment of those who are unable to act, “that 
are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary 
revenge.”273  Part of the form of this revenge is the setting-up of ideals from which the 
weak can (negatively) judge the “external world” and find it lacking in all that it 
seemingly does to inflict pain upon them.  In this way, slave morality, in all of its 
expressions, approaches problems contemptuously as things to be explained and justified.  
Nietzsche’s adoption of the symbol of “war” is done for the sake of opposing this 
resentment but not from the standpoint of a resentment that resents itself.  This is why 
Nietzsche proclaims, “Equality before the enemy: the first presupposition of an honest 
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dual.  Where one feels contempt, one cannot wage war; where one commands, where one 
sees something beneath oneself, one has no business waging war.”274  In his attempt to 
raise counter-ideals to those created by slave morality, Nietzsche is operating on “objects 
of resistance.”275  These “objects” he is concerned with are not objects of hatred on his 
part but are viewed as “equals” which do have a power that can be opposed.276  Even 
though Nietzsche sees these ideals as products of resentment, as problems Nietzsche must 
treat them as synthesized products of other forces, even if those forces are diagnosed as 
weak.  And it is Nietzsche’s attempt to distance himself from any reciprocal charges of 
resentment when he states, “attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of 
gratitude.”277  He must treat the products and ideals of slavish morality as legitimate 
targets for reinterpretation and appropriation and not merely as “evil” objects that ought 
not even be touched.  When qualified in this way, if we take Nietzsche’s texts at their 
word, the intent of the critique is to offer something other than a slavish resentment 
towards resentment or “an accusation of accusation.”278 
 Another of the benefits for Nietzsche’s philosophy of the symbolism of “war” is 
that its references and participants are never external to the field where it is deployed.  
War symbolizes an immanent conflict between actual adversaries and not an imposition 
from a radically exterior or transcendent viewpoint onto a field that it has already 
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overcome.  As Deleuze writes, “Transcendental philosophy [Kant’s critique] discovers 
conditions which still remain external to the conditioned.”279  In Nietzsche’s terms, this 
reflects the “inversion of the value-positing eye – this need to direct one’s view outward 
instead of back to oneself....”280  Nietzsche, on the other hand, uses genealogy to uncover 
the hidden internal sources – the contests and conquests between wills – of the genesis of 
values and truths.  If judgment occupies a vertical scheme of “one who judges” and “that 
which is judged,” with its attending problems, then war works on a horizontal plane as a 
conflict between actual forces or wills.  Nietzsche, in opposing the judgments of slave 
morality is already “an incarnate declaration of war and victory over all ancient 
conceptions of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’.”281  And as it is possible without invoking external 
transcendental conditions, the primary importance of the symbol of war is that it eludes 
any description according to law.  While there is a conflict or war of interpretations, there 
can never legitimately be a law of interpretation for Nietzsche.  Such a law would 
mistakenly judge an interpretation or sense from a “heaven” of concepts and never fulfill 
a project of critique.  Indeed, the imposition of a law of interpretation would return 
interpretation to the condition of a table of judgments and never free interpretation on its 
own account.  Genealogy shows us that interpretation can be internally bound by a will – 
for example the will to truth – but not externally bound by a law.  In order for humans to 
operate according to laws, “man himself (sic) must first of all have become calculable, 
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regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself....”282  In other words, lawfulness 
itself is a phenomenon that must be conditioned; and those conditions can be sought 
through genealogy.  Pierre Klossowski asserts that for Nietzsche “[l]aws exist only 
because of our need to calculate.”283  Also, the need for and feeling of being constrained 
by a law is a mark of the weak: “The slave worked under the pressure of the feeling that 
he was doing something contemptible: ‘doing’ was itself contemptible.  ‘Nobility and 
honour (sic) are attached solely to otium [doing] and bellum [war]’ – that was the ancient 
prejudice!”284  We also see it in one of Nietzsche’s characteristically ambivalent passages 
regarding the character of Jesus: “Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for servants, - 
love God as I do, as his son!  Why should we care about morals, we sons of God?....”285  
Respect for an external law, for Nietzsche, is always tied to a moral quality displayed by 
weakness and negation.  That forms of judgment continue to arise from an unquestioned 
moral stance (in accordance with the law) in Kant’s texts is essentially Nietzsche’s 
criticism of Kant and, potentially, of any form of transcendental idealism. 
However, as interpretation’s “law” is replaced as “war” for Nietzsche, this does 
not entail that Nietzsche abandons any sense of method or prediction in the sense in 
which we have see Ricoeur use those terms.  The preface to the second edition of The 
Gay Science tells us that that book is full of “goals that are permitted and believed in 
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again.”286  One piece of the difficulty in making sense of Nietzsche’s texts is the manner 
in which they deploy both a critique of systems and maintain a diagnostic stance that 
Nietzsche seems to believe has traction or explanatory power.  As Nietzsche maintains, 
even the critical effort of Beyond Good and Evil contains “pointers to a contrary type that 
is as little modern as possible – a noble, Yes-saying type.”287  In order to capture this, it is 
necessary to see a limited teleology at work in Nietzsche’s method – a teleology without 
an eschatological movement.  Such a teleology would presumably be immanent to the 
wills in the conflict and not an externally conditioning force operating on the conflict 
from a position beyond it.  It would mark an intended or actual end of the wills but not a 
transcendent end from which one could objectively judge the conflict that has preceded it.  
In this way can we understand both the Nietzsche of “the will to system is a lack of 
integrity” and “Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal....”288   
 Insofar as the literature on Nietzsche has focused only on one or the other of these 
aspects, it has neglected the resources of the whole of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics.  In 
Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche, for example, he focuses primarily on Nietzsche’s critique 
of consciousness and of a system of knowledge built on that consciousness.  Under this 
interpretation, Nietzsche’s texts become wholly archaeological in their use with their 
possible “teleological” pole left underdeveloped.  For Ricoeur, as for Alexander 
                                               
 
286 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Preface to the second edition, Section 1. 
 
287 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Beyond Good and Evil,” Section 2. 
 
288 Respectively, Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “Maxims and Arrows,” Sections 26 and 44. 
 
  128 
     
Nehamas289, the value of Nietzsche’s texts is as a critical perspective on the difficulties 
and task of realizing or recovering an authentic self or authentic knowledge.  We can take 
as emblematic of this approach Ricoeur’s discussion of Nietzsche’s announcement, 
specifically in The Gay Science, of the “death of God.”290  First, it must be noted that 
Ricoeur’s intention here is to discover what, if any, meaning Nietzsche’s pronouncement 
has for religion – if there can be any faith after the acknowledgement of the criticisms by 
Nietzsche and Freud.  He intends to take up the “great hermeneutical conflict... between 
the priest and the philologist” but in such a way as to recover a kind of meaning to 
religious faith after the iconoclasm of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s criticisms of its 
expressions.291  Ricoeur writes: “If we are now to investigate the theological meaning of 
this atheism, we must first say what sort of atheism is here in question.  Everyone is 
familiar with the famous expression of the madman in The Gay Science: ‘God is 
dead.’”292  Presumably, Ricoeur has in mind that the sort of atheism that Nietzsche and 
Freud advance may leave conceptual space for a Ricoeurian retrieval of a different brand 
of theism, a theism not dominated by “accusation” and “consolation.”293   
 Ricoeur frames his exegesis of the proclamation ‘God is dead’ as a tripartite 
response: “[T]he true question is to know, first of all, which god is dead; then, who has 
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killed him (if it is true that this death is a murder); and finally, what sort of authority 
belongs to the announcement of this death.”294  Ricoeur judges the ‘God’ that has died to 
be the god of metaphysics or of ontotheology.  ‘God is dead’ sums up for Ricoeur the 
result of Nietzsche’s criticism of the concepts of traditional metaphysics – “first cause, 
necessary being and the prime mover, conceived as the source of values and as the 
absolute good.”295  In this, Ricoeur follows Heidegger, who interprets Nietzsche in part as 
the figure who tries to end metaphysics.296 
 The ethical import of this ‘death’ is that all forms of a priori ethical “obligation” 
can be viewed as constructed value claims and be made subject to a genealogical 
analysis.  For example, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Essay Two analyzes the 
concept of “original sin” in just this way and finds it to be an expression of weakness and 
a negative judgment of life from that weak perspective.  Ricoeur writes that “Concrete 
accusation thus appears as the truth of formal obligation.”297  The death of God 
symbolizes for Ricoeur that metaphysical truths are grounded on a baseless ethical 
judgment of obligation.  The obligation is seen as a priori only so long as we value life 
negatively and construct ethics as accusation.  The concept of God, the great accusation 
of life, has buttressed metaphysical claims regarding truth.  With the former gone, 
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Ricoeur thinks we are freed from the latter as well and become able to seek truth 
differently, affirmatively. 
 Ricoeur’s second response can be seen as developing one aspect of the 
Nietzschean question of “which one?”.  Who or what is it that has murdered God?   
Ricoeur’s reply is that the “god of morality” has been murdered by metaphysics itself, as 
it is understood as nihilism.  Again we have an iteration that Nietzsche’s texts are not 
necessarily themselves nihilist but only report the nihilism already evident in metaphysics 
itself.  “It is not the atheist [Nietzsche or Freud] but rather the specific nothingness that 
lies in at the heart of the ideal, the superego’s lack of absolute authority.”298  Ricoeur’s 
interpretation hinges on the inability of this concept of God to ground itself adequately as 
a solution to the demands of certainty placed on it by metaphysics, which effectively 
“kills” the concept because it can no longer be viewed as rigorously true.  The ideal 
cannot maintain the coherence required of truth and falls victim to the “cultural process, 
the process of nihilism” that is deployed in all such searches for absolute truth.299  As it 
arises from accusation and weakness, the concept of the god that fills the needs of the 
weak succumbs to the weakness or nihilism at its origin by failing to deliver on its 
promise of universal truth and consolation. 
 Ricoeur’s final interpretive question here asks the authority of Nietzsche’s 
interpretation.  And Ricoeur is not alone in asking this type of question of hermeneutics 
and of genealogy in particular: “What sort of authority is invested in the words that 
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proclaim the death of the god of morality? – everything suddenly becomes problematical 
once again...  Everything becomes doubtful when we ask: Who is saying this?  The 
madman?  Zarathustra?  The madman as Zarathustra?  Perhaps.”300  Similarly, Lawrence 
Hatab reads the pronouncement of the death of God as the madman’s attempt to summon 
the threat of nihilism for “nonbelievers who are chastised for not facing the consequences 
of God’s demise.”301  In these cases, what is being driven at here is the problem of how 
we are to take the prospective, appropriative aspect of Nietzsche’s critique if there is no 
finality that we can hope to recuperate.  The Nietzschean genealogist asks “which one?” 
in revealing the ruses of culture and morality; and here Ricoeur asks precisely this 
question of Nietzsche’s texts themselves.  The texts’ critical force is unquestioned, but 
Ricoeur finds problematic the sweeping positive claim that Nietzsche’s pronouncements 
can be proven: “At least we can say in negative terms that this type of thinking does not 
prove anything conclusively one way or the other.  ‘The man with the hammer’ has only 
the authority of the message that he proclaims, namely, the will to power.”302 
 The question of the authority of Nietzsche’s interpretations and statements lies at 
the heart of two great questions that often confront Nietzsche’s philosophy: 1) How can 
Nietzsche claim that all is interpretation and claim that interpretation to be true?; 2) Do 
the resources found in Nietzsche’s texts provide any positive status that would justify the 
critiques of other philosophical concepts?  These questions are related, as I see it; and to 
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satisfy the first and more frequent question, the second must also be answered.  For his 
part, Ricoeur also would link these questions under the rubric of the hermeneutic poles of 
suspicion and recovery.  Of a possible hermeneutics of appropriation in Nietzsche’s texts, 
Ricoeur writes, “This positive Nietzschean philosophy, which alone is capable of 
conferring authority on his negative hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that 
Nietzsche has accumulated around him.”303  As we saw in the last chapter, Ricoeur 
believes that Nietzsche has not developed a hermeneutics of recovery which Ricoeur 
thinks is necessary for a positive philosophy.  In the text under consideration, Ricoeur 
elaborates this, saying, “Nietzsche’s major work remains an accusation of accusation and 
hence falls short of a pure affirmation of life.”304  Ricoeur reads Nietzsche as developing 
a powerful archaeological critique of morality and metaphysics but as lacking an 
affirmative account of the goal to be reached after the critical moment.  In brief, then, this 
passage demonstrates how Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche’s genealogy sees the text as 
specifically neglecting a teleological trajectory to thought on the other side of critique.  
With this development it remains for Ricoeur’s reading that Nietzsche’s hermeneutics is 
valuable as critical archaeology but ultimately inadequate outside of the narrow 
parameters Nietzsche has seemingly set for himself.  In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur 
frames the illusion that undoes Nietzsche’s project as a “transcendental illusion” that 
confuses “idols” in need of destruction with “symbols” that call for both critique and 
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positive thought.305  Ricoeur takes Nietzsche’s proclamation of “God is dead” strictly as 
having iconoclastic import and, therefore, still in need of some teleological justification 
that Nietzsche is read as not providing. 
 At this point, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic exegesis of Nietzsche’s method meets up 
with the difficulty of the seeming relativism that Nietzsche’s texts expound.  This 
problem serves as the central jumping-off point for many commentaries on Nietzsche’s 
work; and the particular attempt at its solution reveals much about the ultimate use to 
which the commentator will put Nietzsche’s philosophy.  To be sure, Ricoeur does not 
attempt a solution, for the need for this discussion to his project is only to show the 
partial and incomplete nature of a strictly archaeological approach.  But the crediting of 
Nietzsche with a hermeneutic method and the general structure of Ricoeur’s problematic 
will both figure into my attempt at a solution to the difficulties raised here concerning 
Nietzsche’s project. 
 A standard way of presenting these difficulties is found in Nehamas’s Nietzsche: 
Life as Literature:  
An interpretation, simply by virtue of being offered, is inevitably offered in the 
conviction that it is true.  But then, despite any assurances to the contrary, it is 
presented as a view which everybody must accept on account of its being true.  
When we show that some other enterprise is partial, even as we assert that ours is 
partial as well, we implicitly and perhaps against our will commend what we do 
to universal attention.  Every effort to present a view, no matter how explicitly its 
interpretive nature is admitted, makes an inescapable dogmatic commitment.  The 
point is not that the faith in truth is not questioned enough but that a view cannot 
be questioned at all while it is being offered.  Even a view that denies that there is 
such a thing as truth must be presented as true.306 
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The concern raised here is that the claim ‘there are only interpretations’ implies that 
positive statements of truth are possible, if only attributable to that particular claim.  
Laurence Lampert phrases this concern in this way: “Does the perspectivity condemn the 
perspectival knower to insurmountable skepticism about the truth of any perspective?”307  
Added to this is the compounding claim of Nietzsche’s that certain interpretations are 
better (in some sense) than others.  For example, Nietzsche’s argument against the value 
of the ascetic ideal is that the ideal looks “for error precisely where the instinct of life 
most unconditionally posits truth.”308  Nietzsche seems to enter into an epistemological 
paradox wherein, on the one hand, there can only be interpretations of states of affairs 
and, on the other, that some interpretations – most notably the one that there are only 
interpretations never are statements of fact true – are better than others.  Brian Leiter has 
characterized this as the “Received View” of interpretation regarding Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism.  He claims that this (erroneously) attributes the following four claims to 
Nietzsche: 
(i)  the world has no determinate nature or structure; 
(ii) our concepts and theories do not “describe” or “correspond” to this world 
because it has no determinate character; 
(iii) our concepts and theories are “mere” interpretations or “mere” perspectives 
(reflecting our pragmatic needs, at least on some accounts); 
(iv) no perspective can enjoy an epistemic privilege over any other, because there 
is no epistemically privileged mode of access to this characterless world.309 
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Nehamas and Leiter share the concern that an epistemology spelled out in this manner 
would be self-undermining and risk nonsensicality.  The concern that this raises for 
Nietzsche’s interpretive project is in line with the apprehension that Ricoeur points to 
with regard to the authority of the interpreter: what entitles Nietzsche to seemingly claim 
the truth regarding the interpretations and concepts that he mobilizes?  I will discuss three 
approaches to the resolution of this paradox, as I think the secondary literature tends to 
loosely divide itself and coalesce into these three camps, which I will refer to as the 
“aesthetic,” the “holistic,” and the “naturalistic.”  Some of the methods of these three 
styles will overlap; but I will refer to them in this manner based on their way of resolving 
the origin of the authority conferred to Nietzsche’s critical endeavors. 
 
II.  The Aesthetic Resolution 
 The first attempt at a resolution of the paradox that I will present is the aesthetic 
or stylistic resolution.310  The preeminent text propounding this interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s works is Nehamas’s Nietzsche: Life as Literature.  Nehamas argues that 
Nietzsche, perhaps knowingly, falls short of achieving a full critique of the will to truth 
because of the paradox generated by Nietzsche’s genealogy of the ascetic ideal.  To 
Nehamas, Nietzsche’s genealogy reveals asceticism to be a mode of life that denies itself 
as a product of life and desire while enabling life to continue.  The ascetic life negates 
itself in order that it may continue to exist, and Genealogy of Morals clearly demonstrates 
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the role of the ascetic priest in this conservation of life.  The priest articulates an 
interpretation that the suffering of the many is the result of their own sins.  Suffering, 
therefore, is interpreted as a punishment that “will necessarily continue” because it is 
coextensive with life itself.311  Nietzsche’s genealogy shows that “[a]sceticism can never 
eliminate suffering, but it succeeds in creating an interpretation that explains why it is 
inevitable.”312 
 Key to Nehamas’s account is the assertion that part of the critique of asceticism is 
Nietzsche’s fear of the spread of the ascetic ideal beyond those who “create” it: “The 
ascetic ideal does not rest content with ordering the lives of those who may actually need 
it.”313  It also seeks to impose a code of morality that anyone can follow and “thus 
necessarily addresses itself to the lowest common denominator among the people whose 
conduct it guides.  This is its ‘leveling effect,’ which Nietzsche so despises.”314  The will 
to truth that lies behind the ascetic ideal projects not only its solution to suffering but also 
necessitates the evangelization of its message as the only truth to any and all populations, 
even those who are not distinctly in need of it.  It is this promulgation of the ideal that 
allows the “belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb 
– for thus [the ascetic priests or the weak] gain the right to make the bird of prey 
accountable for being a bird of prey.”315  Genealogy here shows a double deception in the 
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mode of life that holds deception to be sinful: 1) It hides its own manifestation of the will 
to power as chosen from a free will despite the fact that it is merely the expression of the 
will’s powerlessness; 2) It denies that its interpretation of the world is interpretation at all 
and presents it as fact.  However, despite this double ruse, asceticism remains, for 
Nehamas’s interpretation of Nietzsche, an affirmation of life, albeit only of the particular 
weak form.  He writes, “Instead of attacking negative judgments of life directly, 
[Nietzsche] treats them as hints or signs of the types of people who make them and who 
are enabled to live by them.  But he also treats positive judgments in just the same 
way.”316  This entails that, given Nietzsche’s insistence on perspectivism, there can be no 
reproach for any moral evaluation, on Nehamas’s account, from Nietzsche’s perspective 
without risking the fall into the same dogmatism that is criticized.  What, then, can be the 
accusation against asceticism?  For Nehamas, Nietzsche’s point must center on the 
expansionist tendencies of asceticism and not on its particular perspective.  If all 
perspectives are ultimately affirmations of that perspective, then Nietzsche must “give up 
the very idea of trying to determine in general terms the value of life and the world.”317  
The paradox of perspectivism, following this reading of genealogy, will be resolved in 
favor of a withdrawal from the critique of the content of asceticism.  This entails that the 
general tenor of Nietzsche’s texts are not directed against a general or wholesale 
repudiation of asceticism.  Nehamas argues that “Nietzsche... does not advocate and does 
not even foresee a radical change in the lives of most people.  The last thing he is is a 
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social reformer or revolutionary.”318  If all moral judgments are false on Nehamas’s 
reading of Nietzsche, then Nietzsche’s own philosophy must avoid direct confrontations 
with that tradition, since “an explicit attack would perpetuate that tradition.”319 
 This leaves Nietzsche’s works with the problem of moving from an implicit 
rejection of the dogmatism of the philosophical tradition to generating the possibility of 
raising a general affirmative perspective without his texts becoming dogmatic 
themselves.  To Nehamas, this paradox can be resolved gotten past only in the 
aestheticization of one’s self.   The purpose of genealogy, then, is to give us a stylistic 
project whose goal is the creation of one’s own subjective perspective distinct from the 
ascetic ideal that is our birthright.320  Nietzsche’s “unparalleled solution to this problem is 
to try consciously to fashion a literary character out of himself and a literary work out of 
his life.”321  This stylistic resolution sees the paradox generated by Nietzsche’s claims 
regarding perspectivism to be avoided in Nietzsche’s attempted escape from the 
articulation of a philosophical stance towards one of an aesthetic stance: “The very notion 
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of the individual makes it impossible to say in informative terms how one an ever 
become that.”322  Briefly, epistemological paradoxes are resolved by leaving 
epistemology behind in an aesthetics of subjectivity, where any such methodological 
discipline as epistemology would be fruitless in its labors regardless.  Nietzsche’s 
theories, on this interpretation, have their ultimate aim in a construction and project of the 
self and subjectivity and not in an epistemology or cosmology.  If we think of the 
materials of Nietzsche’s art as being a philosophical subject, then Nehamas’s project is 
similar to the one Nietzsche attributes to The Birth of Tragedy in his second preface to the 
work: “to look at science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through 
the prism of life.”323 
 
III.  The Holistic Resolution 
 If what I have called the aesthetic approach wishes to deflate any epistemological 
or ontological readings of Nietzsche’s texts, the holistic exegesis offers an opposing sort 
of resolution to the dilemma of perspective and truth.324  This approach interprets 
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Nietzsche’s critique of the “will to truth” as a more successful endeavor and argues that, 
with the death of god and the negation of the will to truth, the paradox of the truth of 
Nietzsche’s pronouncement and his epistemology fades.  It also leaves room for 
epistemic and ontological claims, as long as they are understood as non-metaphysical 
claims as well.  In this way, Nietzsche’s philosophy is seen not just as a critique but also 
as having profound positive implications.  As Gilles Deleuze writes:  
Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value 
itself derives.  Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or 
distance in the origin...  But, understood in this way, critique at its most positive.  
The differential element is both a critique of the value of values and the positive 
element of a creation.325 
 
Deleuze’s influential account of Nietzsche’s philosophy reads genealogy as a critique, in 
the Kantian sense, of both sense and values.  This allows Deleuze to read Nietzsche’s 
works as not only completing the Kantian project but also as overturning the Platonic 
project.  The emphasis here is on the drives that Nietzsche conceives of as ontologically 
positive and plural forces; Deleuze’s Nietzsche is a holist because there are, for him, only 
these forces, which are responsible for both the interpretation of sense and the evaluation 
of values.  The anti-Platonism Deleuze credits Nietzsche with is a result of the 
valorization of the constant becoming of these forces from an original “differential 
element,” the will to power.326  Rather than look for the becoming of Being, as Plato’s 
texts do, Deleuze reads Nietzsche as offering a pluralist ontology of the being of 
becoming.  Through this, Nietzsche’s genealogies diagnose the reactive forces that seek 
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to deny becoming through the kind of values and senses they create – ressentiment, bad 
conscience, and the priestly incarnation of the ascetic ideal.  It is through these reactive 
forces that a weak or slavish consciousness conceives of change and becoming as a 
negative process and attempts to preserve itself, instead of understanding that 
“multiplicity, becoming, and chance are adequate objects of joy and that only joy 
returns.”327  Deleuze posits that only through the active destruction of ideals and creation 
of new ideals can critique, understood as the critique of sense and values, be 
accomplished. 
As was seen with the aesthetic interpretation, this method draws much of its 
impetus from a reading of Nietzsche’s critique of ascetic ideals.  In the third essay of the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that science is not a radical departure from 
metaphysics but only its latest, “most unconscious, involuntary, hidden, and subterranean 
ally!”328  The reason for this is what Nietzsche sees as science’s ultimate faith in the will 
to truth as being supremely valuable.  For this reason, Nietzsche claims that science 
springs from the same ground or soil as metaphysics and is traceable to an attempt to 
represent a denial of suffering and a negation of life: “science today is a hiding place for 
every kind of discontent... – it is the unrest of the lack of ideals, the suffering from the 
lack of any great love, the discontent in the face of involuntary contentment.”329  The 
only way we can speak of the “progress” from metaphysics to science is that science 
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would jettison all the faiths of metaphysics, save the faith in the will to truth.  However, 
science still suffers from the absence of ideals that characterizes a weak reaction to life.  
Thus, Nietzsche argues that science cannot create except with the same goals in mind that 
it has inherited from Christian morality.  With science we reach the “kernel and esoteric 
form of the ascetic ideal” – the will to truth.330  Science reveals, in other words, most 
starkly to Nietzsche what is at stake in the belief in the ascetic ideal.  In leaving the ideal 
of truth uncriticized, Nietzsche views science as inheriting and endorsing the key 
metaphysical concept of truth because science still emanates from the reactive morality 
that places truth as the highest good.331 
 What I term the holistic approach to the exegesis of Nietzsche’s texts takes 
seriously Nietzsche’s injunction that there can be no creation without destruction and also 
argues that the creative act in just as important an element in Nietzsche’s texts as the 
critical.  This methodology is holistic insofar as it interprets the will to power as 
constitutive of a Nietzschean naturalized ontology.332  This creative act, beyond the 
critical aspect, cannot be constructed with the same ideals or subject to the same ideals as 
what was criticized.  So although perspective is raised as a counter to dogmatic truth, the 
holistic interpretation must invent a new standpoint from which interpretations can be 
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judged.  It is through perspective that the will to truth calls itself into question for 
Nietzsche, but if we are to build an interpretation that does not fall prey to the same 
problem, the adjudication between differing perspectives must have a different standard.  
The holistic methodology turns here to the standards of the will to power as the ‘far side’ 
of the critique of the will to truth.  Nietzsche attempts to disconnect the metaphysical 
belief in the identity and banality of goodness and truth: “What is good? – All that 
heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.  What is bad? – All 
that proceeds from weakness.”333  For Deleuze and Foucault, this entails a perspectivism 
where perspectives are weighed not by their truth value but by their value for life, 
conceived of as will to power.  This has two consequences.  The first is that Nietzsche’s 
axiology must be considered as part of his epistemology, erasing any hard distinction 
between epistemology and ethics, as both are grounded in the conflicts and expressions of 
wills to power.  The second is a commitment to a thoroughgoing pluralism regarding 
wills to power.  In this way the holistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power as 
ontology entails a pluralistic ontology as well:  
[T]he object itself is force, the expression of a force... There is no object 
(phenomenon) which is not already possessed since in itself it is not an 
appearance but the apparition of a force.  Every force is thus essentially related to 
another force.  The being of force is plural, it would be absolutely absurd to think 
about force in the singular.334   
 
In the creative act, for the holist account, the paradox of the dogmatism/relativism of 
perspectivism cannot be countenanced as a problem, as this is an issue only for 
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interpretive schemes still driven by the will to truth.  The account of the Nietzschean 
determination of sense must conform instead to the essential pluralism of the wills to 
power and their conflicts:   
Consequently, I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is the father of 
philosophy, but rather than another drive, here as elsewhere, used knowledge (and 
mis-knowledge!) merely as a tool.  But anyone who looks at people’s basic 
drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as 
inspiring geniuses…, will find that they all practiced philosophy at some point, - 
and that every single one of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the 
ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives.  
Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try philosophizing.335 
 
Rather than taking Nietzsche as sidestepping the paradox, they encourage the reading of 
the paradox as a paralogism that Nietzsche solves in saying that both views are false.  
According to the very criteria of the will to truth itself, dogmatic epistemology will 
always fail in its quests for totality because it cannot, as just as Ricoeur showed, satisfy 
its desire for a self-grounding of knowledge.  Relativism, on the other hand, obviously 
fails the will to truth’s criterion of a unified account or truth.  As truth has never been 
univocal, Nietzsche suggests that it cannot be and desiring to make it such will remain a 
self-defeating undertaking.  The holists interpret Nietzsche as reading the paralogism as 
being motivated by the will to truth; and once the will to truth is suspected, both because 
of its value for life and for its perpetual failure, this problem dissipates. 
 The naturalized ontology that the holistic interpretations have in mind is a 
proliferation of perspectives evaluated by the axiology that Nietzsche presents in his later 
works.  The main target here is the hidden asceticism that all theories of truth and 
metaphysical systems promulgate.  Thus, their problem, and it is no small task, is to 
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replace this ascetic metaphysics with non-ascetic conceptions of epistemology and ethics.  
We will return to this problem later in the chapter.  For now, let us move to the third sort 
of resolution of the paradox of perspectivism. 
 
IV.  The Naturalistic Resolution 
 Recent studies in Nietzsche’s texts, largely following the suggestions of John 
Wilcox’s Truth and Value in Nietzsche336 and Richard Schacht’s Nietzsche337, attempt to 
solve the paradox of interpretation in Nietzsche’s works by arguing that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of truth subscribes to a thoroughgoing philosophical naturalism.  This, 
however, is not intended to be the naturalistic ontology seen by the holistic interpreters.  
These predominantly Anglo-American exegetes argue of Nietzsche that “he shares with 
analytic philosophy a strong naturalizing impulse – and effort to see through the 
mystifications of religion and metaphysics and to treat all aspects of the human with a 
scientific eye.  He intends that genealogical analysis to be a naturalistic or scientific 
account of human values and prejudices.”338  More specifically, Nietzsche’s naturalistic 
attitude is interpreted to be primarily a methodological one:  “[Methodological 
Naturalists], then construct philosophical theories that are continuous with the sciences 
either in virtue of their dependence upon the actual results of scientific method in 
different domains or in virtue of their employment and emulation of distinctly scientific 
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ways of looking at and explaining things.”339  On this account, Nietzsche’s genealogical 
practice is a coherent whole that does not eschew truth entirely but submits metaphysical 
claims to truth to a naturalistic criticism.  From this, the naturalists argue, we can read 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and theory of interpretation as putting forward naturalistic 
criteria for truth that can be cashed out by scientific methods.  Thus the paradox of truth 
and perspective fades when we view truth correctly as non-metaphysical truth or as 
naturalized truth.  As Leiter writes of Nietzsche (and also Freud and Marx): “When one 
understands conscious life naturalistically, in terms of its real causes, one contributes at 
the same time to a critique of the contents of consciousness: that, in short, is the essence 
of a hermeneutics of suspicion.”340   
 Justifications for this approach argue that Nietzsche’s rejection of truth is only 
partial and that the supposed paradox of truth and perspective must ignore several of 
Nietzsche’s texts to generate its problem.  Hales and Welshon point, for example, to Anti-
Christ Section 50 as the type of passage that has been overlooked:  “Truth has had to be 
fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our 
love and our trust in life depend, had had to be sacrificed to it.  Greatness of soul is 
needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest service.”341  This suggests, as do other 
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passages,342 that Nietzsche’s skepticism towards truth may not be total, that truth and 
perspective may be compatible, and that Nietzsche may indeed have a “universal sense of 
truth.”343  The Nietzschean critique is then taken to be focused on properly metaphysical 
claims of truth but will allow “truth claims about history, philosophy, the ascetic ideal, 
and the affirmation of life....”344  In the end, Nietzsche will reject metaphysical truths on 
the grounds that they are nihilist – because they refer to nothing.  Naturalistic claims of 
the methodological sciences, for example, can be countenanced as truth claims because 
they refer to something real. 
 Two of the most commonly referenced sections of Nietzsche’s texts that are cited 
in support of this interpretation are Twilight of the Idols Books Three and Four and 
Genealogy of Morals Third Essay, Section Twelve.  The passages from Twilight of the 
Idols, as I take it, support the interpretation of Nietzsche’s empiricist epistemology, while 
the section of Genealogy of Morals sketches Nietzsche’s idea of “objectivity” as well as 
its possibility.  The holistic view also reads Nietzsche as a kind of empiricist, so for the 
sake of contrast here I will focus on the “objectivity” passage from Genealogy of Morals 
since that does a specific kind of philosophical work for the naturalist position.345  If the 
naturalistic interpretation is correct, then truth will appear as a concept or value that 
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Nietzsche has not given up on and may even be advancing as the “key to Nietzsche’s 
actual epistemological position.”346 
 For the naturalistic interpretation, Nietzsche advances and articulates his theory of 
perspectivism most clearly in Genealogy of Morals Third Essay, Section Twelve in the 
context of a criticism of the Kantian theory of the necessity and unknowability of the 
thing-in-itself.347  In place of the “disinterested” knowledge that for Kant comes from the 
proper coupling of concept and intuition, Nietzsche would prefer a concept of objectivity 
that is “understood not as ‘contemplation without interest’ (which is a nonsensical 
absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that 
one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the 
service of knowledge.”348  This passage seems to posit both the desirability of objectivity 
and knowledge as well as their possibilities rising from perspective.  Leiter characterizes 
this as Nietzsche’s “Doctrine of Epistemic Affectivity” which holds that any real 
knowledge will always be conditioned by the affects or interests that motivate the 
potential knower.349  Thus, contra Kant, knowledge about the objective world cannot 
occur – it simply is not possible – without an interest in the intuition or the concept on the 
part of the knowing subject.  This interpretation also finds support in the passage that 
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follows it, which I will quote here at length, due to its importance for the naturalistic 
interpretations: 
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old 
conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing 
subject’; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure 
reason,’ ‘absolute spirituality,’ ‘knowledge in itself’: these always demand that 
we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no 
particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which 
seeing alone becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always 
demand of an eye an absurdity and a nonsense.  There is only a perspective 
seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more eyes, different eyes, we can 
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our 
‘objectivity’ be.  But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every 
affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate 
the intellect? – 350 
 
This passage reveals, for Leiter, Nietzsche’s “Doctrine of Perspectives” – that knowledge 
is essentially perspectival in an analogous fashion to the manner in which sight is 
perspectival.351  From this, most naturalistic interpreters of Nietzsche’s works will argue 
for an interpretive litmus test that would check any attempted interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s epistemology for its fitness with the optical analogue.  The limit of the 
analogy here is held to be coextensive with Nietzsche’s epistemology; and this will 
enable this “optics” of perspectives to be viewed as a privileged metaphor in Nietzsche’s 
texts. 
 On this interpretation, the paradox of truth an perspective characterized by Leiter 
as the “Received View” dissolves as there is no optical equivalent for the paradox’s 
statement that no one perspective can be privileged over another.  For Leiter, this violates 
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an epistemic analogue of the optical metaphor.  Just as sight of an object can be distorted 
due to “identifiable distorting factors” so too can knowledge of the object be distorted.352  
This entails an epistemic “purity claim” that “[t]here exists a catalogue of identifiable 
factors that would distort our knowledge of the object: that is, certain interpretive 
interests and needs will distort the nature of objects….”353  For the naturalistic 
interpretation, these optical distortions are akin to the metaphysical targets of Nietzsche’s 
method of demystification in that both present illusions that from one perspective may be 
compelling but, when seen from other perspectives, are clearly erroneous.  Knowledge 
may be perspectival; but when these perspectives more closely align with truth or human 
truths they can and ought to be valued.  These ‘truths’ on the naturalistic account must be 
squared with what Leiter terms are Nietzsche’s remarks on the “terrible truths” that only 
strong interpretive perspectives can know. 
 Ultimately, Nietzsche’s texts under this exegetic technique are interpreted as 
arguing for an epistemology where knowledge can be described as objective, real, and 
actual.  This possibility rests squarely on human perspectives:  
It is a condition of knowing objects that we do so from the standpoint of particular 
interpretive interests and needs, and against the background of the profusion of 
human interpretive interests.  If they are not to distort the real (but 
nontranscendent) nature of objects, however, these particular interests must be 
adequate to relevant aspects of the ‘terrible truth’ about reality.354   
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Also, these perspectives are not a limit on the desired totality of knowledge, as long as 
knowledge is understood as human knowledge and not as metaphysical knowledge:  
Well if by ‘absolute knowledge’ one means extra-perspectival knowledge, then of 
course there is no absolute knowledge to be had...  However, if ‘absolute 
knowledge’ refers to the knowledge of absolute truths, where an ‘absolute truth’ 
is a proposition true of all perspectives, then humans may in fact have absolute 
knowledge, and nothing in [Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, Section 12] 
suggests otherwise.355 
 
In this manner, Nietzsche’s criticisms of truth are interpreted as founding a naturalistic 
epistemology which avoids the paradox of relativism seemingly caused by the pairing of 
truth with perspective. 
 
V.  The Hermeneutic Resolution 
 These three attempts at a resolution of this apparent paradox in Nietzsche studies 
all point to differing ways of solving the problem that results, as Ricoeur articulates it, if 
Nietzsche’s texts remain only at the level of a negative hermeneutics or a philosophical 
criticism.  Viewed from this hermeneutic perspective, all three agree that Nietzsche’s 
own archaeology into traditional morality and metaphysics runs the risk, on the surface 
anyway, of duplicating some of the errors for which he reproaches each.  None of these 
competing interpretations, either, wants to abandon Nietzsche’s thought to the 
“eclecticism” Ricoeur criticizes in another context that would say that we can do 
anything we want with Nietzsche’s texts, since Nietzsche contradicts himself, knows this, 
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and approves of it.356  All three, therefore, can be read as attempting to describe the goals 
of Nietzsche’s writings as somehow distinct from the goals of traditional metaphysics.  In 
other words, in each interpretive schema, the seeming contradictions arising from 
Nietzsche’s archaeology of truth are explained by reference to an aim that is set apart 
from a metaphysics of being.  The aestheticist reading of Nietzsche’s works sees the 
trajectory here are entailing a project that ends in the radical stylization of the self – with 
no concern for truth, ethics, or epistemology.  The holistic interpretation finds a new 
teleological drive to articulate an ontology of forces, while the naturalistic view discovers 
a Nietzschean philosophy that abandons metaphysical concerns for the methodology of a 
naturalized science.  Reading these various interpretations through a Ricoeurian 
framework, it is tempting to say that all three attempt to reconstruct the hidden or absent 
teleological pole that will fulfill the sense of Nietzsche’s texts.  The disparity between 
their reconstructions, however, seems to indicate that “too many ruins” have indeed 
surrounded Nietzsche’s works (of his own doing!) and that such a figuring of a 
teleological pole is not possible.  At this point, I would like to begin my attempt at 
answering this hermeneutic challenge, while also showing how Nietzsche’s texts could be 
interpreted to avoid the “paradox” ascribed to them as well as some of the superfluous 
interpretations produced to that same end.   
                                               
356 For example, Nietzsche writes, “One is fruitful only at the cost of being rich in contradictions; one 
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interpretation. 
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If, as was said in chapter two, we see Nietzsche’s genealogies as instituting a 
critique of the meaning of the expressions of consciousness, then I believe several 
answers to these interpretations become clear.  Nietzsche, at every turn, criticizes any 
theory of knowledge that places its faith in the immediacy of that knowledge’s meaning.  
Idealism fails because its claims of immanent truth for its meanings cannot be made 
actual.  In order for its truths to mean anything, concrete ideals must be mediated in 
consciousness through experience.  This contaminates the supposed purity of the ideal 
and opens the door for Nietzsche’s evaluation of ideals as “conceptual mummies” that are 
produced out of resentment towards life.357  As soon as the genesis of ideals is enquired 
into, Nietzsche holds that we glimpse a “dark workshop” where “[weakness] is... lied into 
something meritorious....”358  The method of genealogy inquires precisely into the social 
and historical conditions for the emergence of these ideals.  Similarly, realism or 
positivism fails for Nietzsche because its methods cannot have unmediated access to 
reality: “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as science ‘without any 
presuppositions.’”359  Insofar as realism claims to grasp reality itself through the senses, it 
falls to the illusion of thinking itself perspective-less.  However, in claiming the truth of 
its phenomena, it still demonstrates an unjustified and very perspective-driven belief in 
truth: “We see that science, too, rests on a faith... The question whether truth is necessary 
must get an answer in advance, the answer ‘yes’....”360  Thus both positivism and 
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idealism are expressions of a metaphysical demand for truth – either the truth of things or 
the truth of their meanings.  This demand, above all else, is an interpretation of life 
evaluated as “weak” by Nietzsche in that a concept of truth is felt as needed in order to 
justify life. 
 With regards to the aestheticist resolution of the paradox of truth and perspective, 
I think it can be successfully argued that Nietzsche does condemn asceticism more 
strongly than Nehamas thinks he does.  Importantly, Nietzsche does not interpret every 
perspective as affirmative in the same manner.  The criterion for this condemnation arises 
in Nietzsche’s description of the ascetic priest.  The genealogy of the ascetic priest will 
also lead into my reconstruction of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics through an investigation of 
what is at stake in Nietzsche’s question of “What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?”361  
The text of the third essay of the Genealogy is one of Nietzsche’s finest examples of 
Nietzsche’s interpretive technique; and it yields for us the “first psychology of the priest” 
as well as illustrates the practice of self-interpretation in the exegesis of the aphorism “On 
Reading and Writing” from Zarathustra.362  However, I want to focus less on the aspect 
of the ascetic ideal for the moment and look more closely at the question of Nietzsche’s.  
He does not ask “what is?” the ascetic ideal but rather about what the ascetic ideal means.  
After several examples of the ascetic ideal and its various meanings as they have been 
actualized historically, Nietzsche notes:  
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that the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, is an expression 
of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui [horror of a vacuum].  It needs 
a goal – and it will rather will nothingness than not will. – Am I understood?...  
Have I been understood?...  “Not at all, my dear sir!” – Then let us start again 
from the beginning.363   
 
It is fair to say, then, that the rest of the third essay, in addition to being an exegesis of the 
aphorism affixed to it, is also an exegesis of this first section.  And it is not the truth of 
the ascetic ideal that is necessarily under question at this point but only its meanings and 
the actual forces or wills for which those meanings are signs.  For Nietzsche, the plurality 
of meanings that asceticism has borne signifies the human need of a goal.  This “basic 
fact” of the human will reveals a certain nihilistic impulse – but it is one prior to the 
advent of the ascetic priest. 
 Nietzsche’s typology of the ascetic priest begins in earnest with section eleven.  
Here the problematic of the essay is sharpened to the genealogy of the meaning of the 
ascetic ideal when uttered by the priest.  Until this point, the problem has not been 
“serious” because only with the ascetic priest do we get the “actual representative of 
seriousness.”364  Whatever the motives of the ascetic priest, with this figure arrives a 
desire to represent ideals of seriousness as being good, as opposed to a changeable and 
unconcerned external world.  It is this type – the ascetic priest – that brings together 
asceticism and its practices with the ressentiment of the weak towards a threatening 
world.  Thus, the genealogy of the ascetic priest is important to Nietzsche’s overall 
strategy because the type expresses both a negative evaluation of life as well as a belief in 
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the truth that is generated as a response to that evaluation – a truth that the priest believes 
can be represented.  Artists and philosophers still express ascetic ideals in practice, but 
the meanings of these ideals are different precisely because they seek different ends than 
the priest and employ the ascetic ideal only as a mask.  The practices of the artists and 
philosophers do not attempt to represent the ascetic ideal as somehow meaningful in 
itself.  The priest differs in taking the mask seriously and as inherently meaningful.  In 
the presence of this type, Nietzsche writes, “we stand before a discord that wants to be 
discordant, that enjoys itself in this suffering and even grows more self-confident and 
triumphant the more its own presupposition, its physiological capacity for life, 
decreases.”365  Thus asceticism does disingenuously attempt to foist its interpretation on 
others as truth, but this truth only has the ground of its meaning as a negation of life.  The 
fact that Nietzsche finds something to affirm in asceticism does not, as Nehamas states, 
mean that asceticism itself is affirmative.  The affirmation of a style of life it presents 
arises only after the negation at the root of its meaning.366  However this conservation of 
life is not meaningful other than as a type of nihilism.367  And, as a form of the will to 
truth, asceticism will continually fall short of its own goal, making it a self-defeating 
“stylization of character.”  Without this equivalence between all forms of life as 
affirmative, we can question Nehamas’s rejection of any ontology or epistemology 
attributable to Nietzsche’s texts. 
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 Nietzsche’s criticism of the ascetic ideal, I think, also extends to apply to what I 
have termed the “Naturalistic reading” of truth and perspective.  Nietzsche’s attack on the 
concept of the thing-in-itself applies not only to Kant, but as I have argued, any claim to 
immediate knowledge.  The naturalistic interpretation here claims the complement to 
immediate knowledge, that is, a fully-mediated knowledge of things through a 
transparent medium of science or the scientific method.  However, as Nietzsche notes, the 
knowledge of “things” is of secondary importance after an interpretation of their 
meaning:  “This has caused me the greatest trouble and still does always cause me the 
greatest trouble: to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than 
what they are.”368  The ability to assert that things or statements can be true is only 
possible for Nietzsche if they have already been interpreted to be bearers of some kind of 
meaning.  The illusion to which Nietzsche is calling attention here is the one that assumes 
that this meaning, and perhaps meaningfulness in general, exists prior to its being 
interpreted.  The “Naturalistic reading” ignores this question of meaning entirely in its 
swift movement to accept the scientific method as a bearer of truthfulness.  However, as 
we have seen for Nietzsche’s texts, the assertion that an absolute truth can be a 
proposition true in all human perspectives postulates an as-yet-unfound full mediation 
between all perspectives.  It interprets the existence of a unified end of meaningful 
knowledge prior to its actualization, which Nietzsche has explicitly criticized.  Therefore, 
this complete mediation is yet another version of the thing-in-itself which would regulate 
and justify our knowledge from a standpoint outside of our perspectives, a standpoint that 
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has not and cannot be actualized.  In this way, a totalized scientific mediation appears as 
another form of the will to truth – this time acknowledging perspective but positing an 
agreement or harmony between perspectives that pre-exists the actualization of those 
perspectives.   
 We do have good reason to extend this criticism of the thing-in-itself to Leiter’s 
and Clark’s accounts.  Both argue that, while there is a plurality of affects or desires or 
perspectives that enable knowledge about an object, there is some real nature to the 
object that serves as a boundary for these interpretations.  Clark notes that “perspectivism 
denies metaphysical truth, [but] it is perfectly compatible with the minimal 
correspondence account of truth and therefore with granting that many human beliefs are 
true.”369  Thus it is argued that, while Nietzsche denies the knowability of the thing-in-
itself and even the possibility of the existence of the thing-in-itself, there can be human 
perspectival agreement on some truths.  However, this idea of truth founded on a weak 
correspondence does not necessarily bring us truth, only an agreement among certain 
interpretations.  This minimal correspondence theory, however, has as its basis the same 
agreement at the heart of the more robust, metaphysical truths; and I see no reason why 
Nietzsche’s criticisms of the latter should not also apply to the former.  And it is the 
content of Leiter’s “purity claim” that does not fit will with the Nietzschean corpus.  
Leiter writes, “If we are to have the epistemic purity claim then we must be able to make 
out something like the following thought: certain interpretive needs and interests distort 
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the nature of objects.”370  But if we look more closely at the section of Gay Science 
quoted above, it seems that Nietzsche’s interest is far more devoted to the meaning of 
interpretations and not focused on the “nature of the objects” interpreted.  Thus, while 
Nietzsche addresses “error,” it is not the error that is like a distortion in sight.  Here the 
optical analogy does not serve our understanding of Nietzsche’s texts very well when 
applied past a certain point.  The analogy works as a metaphor of the perspectivism of the 
senses and interpretation.  It may also be useful in a discussion of Nietzsche’s views on 
what phenomenologists call “intentionality.”  However, there is no textual reason to 
extend the analogy as broadly as Leiter does.  The reason for this is that such an 
overextension places the optical metaphor in serious contradiction with several of 
Nietzsche’s other texts where he states that we should not be misled into taking the 
distinction between subject and object seriously.  For example, in Twilight of the Idols, 
Nietzsche states:  
[i]t is this [metaphysics of language] which sees everywhere deed and doer; this 
which believes in will as cause in general; this which believes in the ‘ego’, in the 
ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-
substance on to all things – only thus does it create the concept ‘thing’....371   
 
Thus the ascription to Nietzsche of a commonsense naturalistic theory of truth does not 
go far enough – on Nietzsche’s own criteria – towards eliminating the metaphysical 
impulse.  Questions of truth aside for the moment, it leaves here a weakened but still 
determining object-in-itself which we interpret from the standpoint of subjecthood.  As 
Ricoeur notes, any theory of interpretation that is analogical at its core will give us a 
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theory that is too narrow in its relation between meanings.  This is precisely the result 
when the optical metaphor is raised beyond its context and place as an aphorism to the 
status of a general rule.  The optical metaphor gives us no real insight into the 
relationship between the meanings produced by interpretation, which I have been arguing 
to be of primary interest to Nietzsche’s genealogy. 
 In fact, we need not abandon some ascription of a theory of truth to Nietzsche; but 
we must be careful not to reproduce the metaphysical errors that he criticizes.  In broad 
terms, I think the holistic approach is closer both to Nietzsche’s texts as well as the spirit 
of those texts.  With the holistic epistemology, however, there is also a hermeneutics; and 
it is the importance of each that ought to be stressed – after demonstrating the full import 
of Nietzsche’s archaeology.  Then we can argue that Nietzsche does have an empirical, 
yet hermeneutic, epistemology that is distinctive not just in its critical method but also in 
its construction of sense. 
 
VI.  Which God is Dead? 
 Key to Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche is his interpretation of the famous passage 
of “God is dead.”  Ricoeur interprets this as heralding the death of the god of morality, 
and it is clear that morality in its various guises, especially as metaphysics, is a target of 
the aesthetic, holistic, and naturalistic readings as well.  However it is a misreading to 
interpret Nietzsche’s texts as postulating only one “death of god.”  This point is crucial 
for seeing the depths of Nietzsche’s criticisms of metaphysics and his archaeology 
because Nietzsche employs the death of god in many ways that have several different 
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meanings.  With the adoption of a rigorous perspectivism, Deleuze notes, “Existence or 
non-existence cease to be absolute determinations which derive from the idea of God, but 
rather life and death become relative determinations which correspond to the forces 
entering into synthesis with or in the idea of God.”372  As knowledge becomes 
meaningful only through the mediation between sense and perspective, the concept of 
absolute truth becomes necessarily meaningless.  Thus the manner of its becoming 
determinate knowledge (or becoming concrete, as Ricoeur would say) is no different than 
that of any other form of knowledge.  Consequently God dies from the synthesis of 
mediating forces, as well.  But if God is a mediated idea, if it is to mean anything, then 
the meaning of the proposition “God is dead” should be capable of several different 
determinations.  That Nietzsche’s texts give us multiple actual determinations of this idea 
confirms this reading, I think. 
 The “event” of the death of God, Nietzsche writes, heralds the passing of a faith 
and the raising of the question of the event’s meaning.373  But which meaning are we to 
take from Nietzsche’s accounts?  Which god dies in Gay Science 108 with no fanfare?  
Which one is proclaimed dead by our hands by the madman in Gay Science 125?  Or is it 
the case that God sacrificed himself, as in Anti-Christ 40 and 41?  These separate 
depictions symbolize more than just a god of morality who is killed by nihilistic 
metaphysics, although that is one aspect of the symbol that can be drawn from the event.  
In each case, each death, the unity toward which morality and knowledge were held to be 
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directed has vanished and new possibilities open in that event’s wake.  Nietzsche himself 
notes that, after this event “[e]ven less may one suppose many to know at all what this 
event really means – and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must 
collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it – for example, 
our entire European morality.”374  In other words, the dead gods that appear (or fail to 
appear) in Nietzsche’s texts are the gods of morality, metaphysics and also of the 
univocity of meaning of the “world.”  It is this object of faith that holds together and 
makes possible the metaphysical and weakly moral interpretations of the “world.”  As 
Nietzsche writes, “Around the hero everything turns into tragedy; around the demigod 
everything turns into a satyr play; and around God everything turns into – what?  Perhaps 
‘world’?-”375  If, perhaps, only the two targets of morality and metaphysics were 
intended, a single death would have sufficed to symbolize their death quite elegantly.  It 
is one event for the absolute being to die, but if this being guaranteed the univocity of 
sense, then multiple meanings will appear at the event.376   
 This result of the death of God explains two of Nietzsche’s aphorisms where he 
insists that that event may or may not have been fully comprehended:  “New Battles. – 
After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a 
tremendous, gruesome shadow.  God is dead; but given the way people are, there may 
still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still 
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defeat his shadow as well!”377  “‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old woman!  I 
fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar....”378  In these 
aphorisms, the voice is undoubtedly Nietzsche’s-as-philosopher, as distinct from the 
proclamation in Gay Science that Ricoeur has criticized for its doubtful authority or 
source.  The former aphorism, I think, symbolizes in part the concern of the latter.  
Insofar as we understand language to be meaningful on its own, we have failed to 
vanquish one of the shadows left in God’s absence.  With the demise of God and 
metaphysics also goes our belief in a unified ego and in the possibility of any simplicity 
of meaning guaranteed by it, as we have shown previously.  As our language’s structure 
reflects that presupposition (about which Nietzsche is explicit in the passages leading up 
the one cited from Twilight of the Idols), it too needs to be viewed as attempting to 
represent an error in simplifying meaning as something unified on its own.  What 
Nietzsche is rejecting here is any theory of a transcending univocity of meaning, which 
would be perhaps the longest shadow of the metaphysical God.   
 
VII.  Nietzsche on Ends and Goals 
 With his criticisms of an independent, real univocity of meaning, Nietzsche 
removes another possible substitute for a real end of metaphysics or morality.  Insofar as 
philosophers have posited a definite end or boundary to knowledge (or interpretation) 
they “have seconded the Church: the lie of a ‘moral world-order’ permeates the whole 
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evolution of even the most recent philosophy.  What does ‘moral world-order’ mean?  
That there exists once and for all a will of God as to what man is to do and what he is not 
to do....”379  If Nietzsche’s critique of the concept “world” is successful, as I think it is, 
then it follows that Nietzsche’s philosophy can countenance no ideal that posits an 
eschatological end to human knowledge or to life itself.  This concept of an ultimate goal 
we have seen Nietzsche criticize throughout his genealogies of morality and truth as the 
product of a weak will that reacts against its own suffering.  Any expression of an 
eschatological end – or its correlate the causa sui – relies on a kind of knowledge that is 
impossible for us perspectivally.  Both rest on a faith that there can be some kind on 
immediate, definite object of knowledge either metaphysically or temporally behind or 
under us or a definitive end awaiting us.   But both possible final determinations of 
meaningfulness for Nietzsche would be, as he says of the causa sui: “the best self-
contradiction that has ever been conceived...  But humanity’s excessive pride has got 
itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense.”380  The 
pride of humanity of which Nietzsche writes is its moral supposition of being good when 
compared with the life around it which it has posited first as evil.   
 However, I do not believe that this removes all ability for Nietzsche’s texts to 
speak of teleology or of ends.  Nietzsche, in discussing the concept of the will to power 
regarding living beings writes:  
Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to 
power -: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent 
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consequences of this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous 
teleological principles! – such as the drive for preservation (which we owe to 
Spinoza’s inconsistency -).  This is demanded by method, which must essentially 
be the economy of principles.381 
 
The problem to which Nietzsche points here can summarized as the postulation of a fixed 
end outside of the process of becoming toward which all wills to power tend (in this case, 
self-preservation).  It is my contention that this characterization of “superfluous 
teleological principles” is essentially Nietzsche’s reproach to any eschatological 
formulation of ends.  But Nietzsche’s method, which seems to want to project as little as 
possible into the interpretation, still looks for a certain kind of limited teleology from the 
standpoint of principles.  This limited teleology lies in the workings of the will to power 
to appropriate the conflict of interpretations it finds itself enmeshed in toward some 
concrete meaning.  This production of meaning is at the heart of Nietzsche’s conception 
of “war.”  However, and this is what distinguishes this approach most clearly from 
Ricoeur’s tactic, each appropriation tends toward the creation of a meaning and not its 
recovery.  Nietzsche can be said to outline what Ricoeur refers to as archaeology in this 
way:   
The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of 
a thing – originally almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over 
things like a dress and quite foreign to the nature and even their skin – has, 
through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly 
grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started as 
appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its 
essence!382 
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This is a concise statement of exactly the “suspicion” for which Nietzsche’s texts are 
famed.  Interpretations are made for historical, social, and even accidental reasons over 
prior interpretations, which gives a new meaning to practices and become over time and 
use what are taken to be actual essences of things.  Ricoeur and others would be right if 
this is all that Nietzsche does, but the same passage continues in this way:   
What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this 
misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as ‘real’, so-
called ‘reality’!  Only as creators can we destroy! – But let us also not forget that 
in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances 
of truth in order to create new ‘things’.383 
 
Here Nietzsche explicitly criticizes taking only half of the genealogical project and 
making it stand for the whole.  Without the appropriative activity of giving things new 
names and values, by which I understand creating new concepts and evaluations, 
Nietzsche is stating that old conceptions cannot be gotten rid of through criticism alone.   
 It is not the case, then, that Nietzsche lacks a hermeneutic pole of appropriation.  
Instead he configures it in a manner consistent with the scope of his criticism of truth and 
of ideals.  As we have seen, any eschatological impulse to a final end, either in reality or 
in sense, will be resisted by Nietzsche’s method; and it is for this reason that Nietzsche 
would reject the characterization of the poles of hermeneutics as Ricoeur describes them.  
“Suspicion” would be apt, but the pole of appropriation cannot be the recovery of 
anything lost, but the creation of something different.  Specifically, the creation must lie 
in the realm of sense and meaning; and it is this directedness towards meaning that 
constitutes the teleological aspect of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics.  In the next chapter, I will 
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flesh this out further, following a thread which was laid out earlier.  Nietzsche does not 
only set out the principles for his hermeneutic method but, in many of his works, actively 
employs them in the cause of “explaining” and interpreting many of his own works.  
Specifically, Ecce Homo is, I contend, a Nietzschean version of the philosophical 
anthropology that Ricoeur set out to find in a phenomenological manner.  If my 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s method is viable, then the utilization of that method with 
regards to the exegesis of Nietzsche’s own self-commentary should shed light on the ends 
that Nietzsche is writing towards.
  168 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NIETZSCHE’S TEXTUAL SELF-INTERPRETATIONS 
 Nietzsche’s genealogical method lies at the core of his philosophical project.  The 
overlapping iconoclasms of his critique of dominant cultural values and his attempts to 
create “counter-ideals” to philosophical idealism both find their motivating force in 
Nietzsche’s claim that all knowledge claims are based on interpretations.384  Nietzsche’s 
deployment of genealogy rests on his method of taking different perspectives on concepts 
that have previously been held to be necessary in order to show their reliance on the 
activity of interpretation for their meaningfulness.  In this way, genealogy fractures a 
general theory of knowledge or meaning by revealing the contradictory interpretations 
possible from perspectives that, seemingly, have been synthesized within a general 
framework of knowledge.  Against the “contradictory concepts” of pure objectivity or 
pure meaning associated with a unified subject of knowledge, he writes: 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more 
affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can 
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our 
“objectivity,” be.  But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every 
affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate  
the intellect? -385   
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Knowledge, rather than being a pure object grasped by reason alone, is a conglomerate of 
the various perspectives of our affects and their interpretations.  Here, Nietzsche’s 
“counter-ideals” are not meant to replace entirely idealism with another form of idealism; 
rather, they are intended to illustrate the contingent character of any teleological ideal:   
The “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus by no means its progressus 
toward a goal, even less a logical progressus by the shortest route and with the 
smallest expenditure of force – but a succession or more or less profound, more or 
less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they 
encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, 
and the results of successful counteractions.386   
 
This is the case for Nietzsche because his conception of interpretation is always of an 
expression of an affect or force (the will to power) acting from a particular perspective 
upon and with the remainder of other forces.  Nietzsche dramatizes interpretation as the 
interaction and conflict of forces with one another.  What is “interpreted” from the 
standpoint of any perspective is the remainder of the other forces that any particular 
perspective can subdue and synthesize with itself as dominant.  Insofar as it is possible to 
speak of only one of these forces, we can say that a particular force’s interpretation of its 
perspectives will be “regional” in Ricoeur’s sense of the term.  A more general or “more 
complete” concept of any thing or text can only be available through the summation of 
various perspectival forces on the thing.  However, total interpretive completion, or 
univocity of meaning, is not possible because any individual force cannot perfectly 
reflect on its own interpretative activity.  The self-interpretation of any text will, 
therefore, never be complete.  Eric Blondel states this in this manner: “[A] text is not 
controlled by a code which it contains and dominates, but by one or several possible 
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codes which lie outside it.  This implies that the text should be ‘interpreted’ rather than 
‘explained.’”387  As an example, the method of genealogy investigates states and events – 
the states of ‘asceticism’ or ‘bad conscience,’ for example – from the differing 
interpretive perspectives of the various forces involved in the syntheses of their 
meanings.  In other words, a state like ‘asceticism’ has more possible meanings than a 
normal discourse would attribute to it, as Nietzsche demonstrates in the Third Essay of 
Genealogy of Morals.  Genealogy aims to untangle those forces that compose these states 
from their normal interpretations and evaluations and show how other perspectives within 
those states are suppressed or forgotten.  This activity demonstrates how interpretation 
provides the possibility for the meanings of these phenomena as well as the possibility for 
different meanings. 
To this end, Nietzsche’s major concepts of “will to power” and “perspective” are 
explicated as principles of how the interpretation and evaluation of concepts ought to be 
performed in a genealogical investigation.  I have argued thus far that it is right for 
Nietzsche to be counted as a hermeneutic philosopher – a reading of his texts that 
Ricoeur’s interpretation wholly endorses; but also I have attempted to demonstrate that 
Ricoeur’s casting of the limits of hermeneutics is called into question by Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutic method as it is presented as genealogy.  What is often seen as a shortcoming 
of Nietzsche’s approach, the seeming absence of a determinate goal or end to the task of 
genealogy, is actually the result of a more rigorous critique of meaning undertaken in 
Nietzsche’s texts than is often appreciated.  Nietzsche’s texts emphasize the continual 
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process of becoming that characterizes each interpretive force or desire, against the 
traditional philosophers’ “lack of historical sense for one thing, their hatred of the very 
idea of becoming, their Egypticity.”388  “Becoming” alone is not the most important 
criterion of “aesthetic” nobility or health for Nietzsche – it must be coupled with the 
principle of expenditure – but it is a necessary aspect of the hermeneutic method.389  
Because of the constant change of forces, any determination of the meaning of an event 
according to the conflict of these forces will always be subject to reinterpretation as that 
meaning comes into contact with other competing forces that may necessitate a 
reinterpretation.  In Nietzsche’s explication of interpretation, it is always possible for the 
synthesis of forces that determines any meaning to be subject to a re-synthesizing or 
reinterpretation that alters the meaning of an event in accordance with a new force that 
seizes control of that process of determination.  This implies that interpretation and 
reinterpretation will never cease, that a final determinate meaning will never arrive if it 
has not already done so, that every interpretation is always already a reinterpretation.  
Interpretations are given in a field that is already mediated and will continue to be.  This 
is what Foucault means when he says in the context of a discussion of the postulates of 
hermeneutics: “[I]f interpretation can never be completed, this is quite simply because 
there is nothing to interpret.  There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all 
everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to 
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interpretation but an interpretation of other signs.”390  The hermeneutic circle is 
inescapable because every sign it can consider is already a mediated interpretation of 
some other sign. 
 With this in mind, it is possible to see that there are two kinds of “castration” that 
the intellect may suffer against which Nietzsche is advising us in the above quote from 
Genealogy of Morals.  The first is easily identified as the lure of “knowledge in itself,” a 
knowledge that can be known independently of any particular interpretation.  The second 
reveals itself as the prospect of a knowledge that is a summation of all perspectives.  This 
view would treat knowledge as already constituted, with each perspective giving a 
particular adumbrated view on it.  Knowledge in this case would simply be the sum 
totality of all perspectives, with each will giving a particular Leibnizian mirroring of the 
totality of the world.  However this view would relegate Nietzsche’s conception of forces 
to the status of representative agents of their particular slice of the increasingly realized 
object of knowledge.391  In this case the “active and interpreting forces” that Nietzsche 
expounds in such detail would be curtailed by a predetermined end in the object.392  This 
conception of knowledge, then, is eschatologically determined in the speculative goal of a 
unified object that determines each individual perspective.  However, in Nietzsche’s texts 
what is denied as possible is the prospect of any eschatology in the absence of an already 
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actualized end.  This is demonstrated in Nietzsche’s rebuke of Spinoza’s theory of the 
superiority of the drive for “self-preservation” in the will as a “superfluous” teleological 
principle.393  While Nietzsche rarely makes use of the term ‘eschatology,’ this 
characterization of the “superfluous teleological principle” fits squarely with Nietzsche’s 
criticism of the concept of a final end.  Thus it is “castration” to assume both the 
existence of a unified subject or object prior to its determinate realization.  But this does 
not rule out the more limited concept of a teleology of sense as determined by whichever 
force happens to be dominant in the synthesis of meaning at a given moment.  Thus, the 
“shortcoming” of Nietzsche’s method of interpretation is only apparent if the goals of 
eschatology and teleology are confounded.  If these are clarified such that teleology is 
understood as the particular aim of the “dominating instinct” in a synthesis and 
eschatology as the general aim of a system towards a final end or meaning, then I think it 
is arguable that Nietzsche’s genealogy can operate under the conditions of the former 
while explicitly critiquing the latter.394 
 In this chapter, I want to consolidate the reading of Nietzsche’s method as 
containing both a critical and an appropriative moment.  The exegetical tactics that 
Nietzsche employs in genealogical investigations demonstrate the actual conditions under 
which concepts have acquired their meaning; and Nietzsche accounts for this production 
of meaning by describing it as a synthesis of forces which can only be deciphered from 
their symptoms, symptoms that appear as expressed meanings and never in their “own 
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dynamism” as forces.395  The second intention of this chapter is to confirm this reading 
through two avenues given by Nietzsche which have yet to be considered: his self-
interpretation of his works and his account of the production of his own subjectivity or 
perspectives in Ecce Homo.  It is possible to view Nietzsche’s methods of interpretation 
not only in his genealogies of morality and criticisms of other philosophical texts but also 
through a study of Nietzsche’s self-interpretations published along with the second 
editions of some of his earlier works, as well as in Ecce Homo.  As Nietzsche was 
composing and publishing what are considered the works of the start of his “mature 
phase” – Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals – in 1886 and 1887, he 
was also writing prefaces (or postscripts396) to his early works The Birth of Tragedy, 
Human, All too Human, and Daybreak.  He also composes during this time a new preface 
for The Gay Science as well as adding a fifth book to that text.  These prefaces and 
additions show Nietzsche actively engaged in the process of coming to terms with the 
development of his own concepts while demonstrating the techniques of interpretation he 
has developed in determining what is of value in his earlier work.  In this series of texts, 
Nietzsche recasts these works in terms of their conceptual relationship to his mature 
works, selects what he finds of value from their investigations, assumptions and 
conclusions, and often submits them to a more penetrating analysis that they have 
received elsewhere.  In brief, we can see Nietzsche’s process of critique and 
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appropriation at work regarding even his own texts in these prefaces.  The same can be 
said to be true of the sections of Ecce Homo under the heading “Why I write such good 
books.”  This task will primarily be approached through a reading of Nietzsche’s 
recasting of The Birth of Tragedy in its second preface and in the reading he offers of it in 
Ecce Homo.   
 The final part of this chapter will be an examination of a possible Nietzschean 
resolution to Ricoeur’s motivating problem as it was developed in Chapters One and 
Two.  As we saw in Chapter One, Ricoeur takes up hermeneutics as a way of recapturing 
a philosophical anthropology that could not be cashed out through the methodology of 
phenomenology alone.  In order to fill in the genetic accounts of meaning that purely 
eidetic phenomenology could only assume or gesture towards, Ricoeur is forced to 
undertake a series of regional hermeneutics of the various fields of human inquiry.  Any 
general hermeneutics could only be constructed from these regional investigations, lest it 
begin under the sway of its own preconditions regarding the unity of meaning and, then, 
fall short for similar reasons as eidetic phenomenology does.   
In a similar vein, Nietzsche’s genealogies also constitute regional hermeneutic 
approaches that, taken together, can indicate what a human subject is.  The studies of the 
bad conscience, ressentiment, modernity, and philosophical idealism all show the 
subterranean aspects of what it is to be human.  However, these are predominantly the 
products of the critical or archaeological moments of the genealogical method.  In terms 
of the appropriation of a human subjectivity, Nietzsche’s account of his own subjectivity 
in Ecce Homo is as alien a result of philosophical anthropology as can be expected, given 
  
   176 
 
both the traditional concerns of philosophical anthropology as well as Nietzsche’s own 
starting-point in philological research.  Nothing in Ecce Homo gives us any reason to 
hope for a unified concept of the human subject.  “I am not a human being,” Nietzsche 
declares in the last part of Ecce Homo, “I am dynamite.”397  However, I wish to show that 
it is precisely Nietzsche’s hermeneutic method that leads to this result – a much different 
end than the one envisioned by Ricoeur in his attempt to reconstruct a philosophical 
anthropology through a phenomenological hermeneutics.  The Nietzschean poles of 
critique and appropriation become concretized in Ecce Homo in the subject of Nietzsche 
himself; and this appropriative pole is what is at stake in the subtitle “How One Becomes 
What One Is.”398  In spelling this out, I hope also to show that the “positive” Nietzschean 
philosophy cannot be adequately forecast before it is enacted as an event – an event 
Nietzsche attempts to describe in Ecce Homo. 
 
I. Nietzsche’s Genealogical Method 
 The essence of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics lies in the dynamics of his conception of 
the will to power.  The idea of the will to power is conceptualized by Nietzsche as 
approachable in thinking only as already entangled and related to other wills.  That is, 
there are only multiple manifestations of willing; there are always already many wills to 
power in any synthesis of meaning.  A singular will to power cannot be known simply as 
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it is for at least two reasons:  a will to power is never encountered in actuality alone but 
always as part of a complex of wills, thus it is a theoretical construction that does not 
necessarily have an individual existence;399 and, also, as this complex of wills is always 
in constant change due to the nature of its relations and conflicts, any attempt to pick out 
only one aspect of it will mislead us as to the activity of the remainder of wills.  Any 
particular interpretation of a will to power, therefore, is approachable only as a heuristic 
device and only through the work and interpretation of symbols, to use Ricoeur’s 
vocabulary.  For these reasons, Nietzsche argues that a singular will to power cannot be 
fully determined, for only that which has no history or only one appearance is ever 
definable in its totality.  But, as Deleuze rightly attributes to Nietzsche, “Even 
perception... is the expression of forces which appropriate nature.  That is to say that 
nature itself has a history.”400  All phenomena can be treated as symbols which give to 
those forces capable of appropriating them the opportunity for the actualization of 
differing meanings.  As an example of this, Nietzsche points to the meaning of 
punishment in his (and, arguably, our) culture.  For him: 
the concept of ‘punishment’ possesses in fact not one meaning but a whole 
synthesis of ‘meanings’: the previous history of punishment in general, the history 
of its employment for the most various purposes, finally crystallizes into a kind of 
unity that is hard to disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized 
especially totally indefinable.401   
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The apparent unity of the concept of punishment is undermined as soon as the many 
actualizations of the act of punishment and their varying meanings are observed.  The 
various events of punishment may appear similarly, but each historical instance of 
punishment is determined as meaning something different in each context.  When 
examining a concept that appears to be simple (like that of punishment), Nietzsche, 
without fail, finds it to be overdetermined by a variety of historical and cultural meanings 
in its various and varying expressions.  In this way, even Nietzsche’s concept of will to 
power cannot be fully determined.  Any attempt at a description of it must involve its 
becoming (of which I will speak more of in a moment) and its plurality.  By the plurality 
of the will to power, I mean to convey the same thing as what Ricoeur means when he 
refers to the problem of the conflict of interpretations.  The issue with knowing and 
determining the will to power as a determinate thing lies not in its scarcity or secrecy but, 
rather, in its superabundance.  Raising the issue of the meaning of a will to power 
immediately draws into consideration the meanings of all its interactions with other such 
wills.  Thus, a will to power cannot be known determinately in itself but only as it has 
been actualized in complexes of meaning with other wills.  It is possible to say, therefore, 
that a will to power must be thought as the condition for the possibility of these 
actualized meanings, although the existence of a will to power cannot be determined 
absolutely.  Just as the abundance of the symbol for Ricoeur demands interpretation, so 
too does the plurality of the manifestations of meanings demand for Nietzsche the 
development of an interest in perspectives as well as in the differences produced in 
interpretation by them.  
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 If a will to power cannot be known simply, then Nietzsche’s genealogies must be 
of the complexes of meanings that have been produced through the interaction and 
conflict of the various wills to power.  Knowledge of these complexes only arises out of 
inquiries into these already mediated or synthetic relationships:  “I sense a contradictio in 
adjecto in even the concept of ‘immediate knowledge’ that is permitted by 
theoreticians.”402  This suspicion of any assertion of immediate knowledge, such as 
claims buttressed by a supposed immediate relation to the ego or to “reality,” gives us 
reason to question the meaningfulness of any truth built upon those discredited 
certainties.  It is certainly the case for Nietzsche’s genealogy that each study will be 
undertaken from a particular standpoint or perspective.  But, with immediacy gone as a 
guarantor of meaning, the study of any meaning becomes a matter of the interpretation of 
how that meaning is produced from the perspective that motivates it.  Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutics attempts to account for these productions of meaning; but there are always 
at least two aspects to the syntheses of meaning of which the hermeneutics must account.  
The first is the archaeology of the various forces that are synthesized in the meaning.  
The second is the determination of which force is the active agent in the production of 
that synthesis.  The former illuminates the archeological moment of the genealogy, but 
the latter will give us insight into how teleology is accounted for in the Nietzschean 
hermeneutics.  Interpretation encompasses both movements, decoding the wills to power 
present in a given meaning and determining which one is dominant in that synthesis.  It is 
the dominant will to power that is said to determine the meaning of the event.  Nietzsche 
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refers to this as “the fundamental will of the spirit” in Beyond Good and Evil and 
describes it in this way:   
The commanding element (whatever it is) that is generally called “spirit” wants to 
dominate itself and its surroundings, and to feel its domination: it wills simplicity 
out of multiplicity, it is a binding, subduing, domineering, and truly masterful 
will… The power of spirit to appropriate foreign elements manifests itself in a 
strong tendency to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, to 
disregard or push aside utter inconsistencies….403 
 
Thus the act of interpretation by the dominant will to power selects what suits its 
purposes from the multiplicity it encounters and appropriates that towards its goal.  
Nietzsche’s “archaeological” moment uncovers the context surrounding the selection of 
the multiplicity that the will to power will synthesize, while the “teleological” moment 
accounts for the type of appropriation that those selected elements are used towards.  
In the genealogy of the “bad conscience,” from Genealogy of Morals, Second 
Essay, we see both of these moments at work.  The phenomenon that we have taken to 
calling the “conscience” is reconfigured by Nietzsche as a construction designed to 
address the problem of how humans have “the right to make promises....”404  Nietzsche’s 
critical project is evident as he examines “by what right” humans are able to promise, or 
on account of what syntheses of forces is a human “able to stand security for his [sic] 
own future, which is what one who promises does!”405  The implicit criticism of Kantian 
moral theory here lies in this exhumation of a ground beneath morality, where how it is 
that we are able to promise is a more fundamental question than what it is that we are to 
                                               
403 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 230. 
 
404 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, Section 1. 
 
405 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, Section 1 (emphasis in original). 
 
  
   181 
 
promise.  Nietzsche finds human action to be only secondarily determined by an 
adherence to a law of morality.  In short, Nietzsche is asking how lawfulness is possible 
in human actions and answering that it is only possible through the creation of a faculty 
of memory.  What the archaeological moment of the genealogy reveals is that promising 
and, thereby, lawfulness can only be possible if a memory has already been formed 
against “the opposing force, that of forgetfulness.”406  The abstract question of how 
promising is possible is decoded by Nietzsche as a physiological question of how 
memory is formed.  That memory and, thereby, promising exists is the result of the 
domination of certain forces over those active forces of forgetfulness: “Forgetting is no 
mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense 
positive faculty of repression....”407  Of particular importance is the role of active 
forgetfulness in making possible the experience of the present by “[closing] the doors and 
windows of consciousness for a time.”408  Nietzsche is suggesting that consciousness, 
without forgetting, would be constantly awash in sensations and reactions to those 
sensations.  As we will see shortly, without this faculty, consciousness becomes sick, and 
“[p]eople and things become obtrusive, events cut too deep, memory is a festering 
wound.  Sickness is itself a kind of ressentiment.”409  There would be no space on the 
surface of consciousness for the development of concepts or forethought without the 
filtering of sensations by an active forgetting.  This entails that there could be no 
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promising, no morality as we know it, without forgetting, as there could be no present or 
the awareness of it without forgetfulness.  Memory, as a promise toward the future, is 
thus dependent on and in conflict with the active forgetfulness necessary for its 
development.  The force by which memory prevails momentarily over forgetfulness is 
that of the application of pain, either by the forces of consciousness itself or by forces 
external to consciousness, such as cultural forces.  The state of tension in the conflict of 
opposing forces of memory and forgetfulness allows a phenomenon like promising to be 
possible as long as the pain associated with forgetting is sufficient to allow memory to 
dominate.  For this reason Nietzsche remarks on the bodily or physiological nature of 
these forces that oppose forgetfulness in order to accent “the instinct that realized that 
pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”410   
 Thus, the “shameful origin” of promising and morality out of a desire to avoid 
pain is discovered in the many revealed meanings of punishment.  However, Nietzsche’s 
genealogy makes no explicit ethical judgment on this finding.  Instead, Nietzsche uses 
this conclusion to launch an inquiry into the meaning of the kind of memory created in 
response to the application of punishment.  And this meaning of memory lies both in the 
forces that produce it and the end toward which these forces are organized.  In the case of 
those forces that Nietzsche will diagnose as “healthy,” the forces derive their efficacy 
from an active resistance to the forces of repression and forgetting:  
an active desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something 
desired once, a real memory of the will: so that between the original ‘I will,’ ‘I 
shall do this’ and the actual discharge of the will, its act, a world of strange new 
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things, circumstances, even acts of will may be interposed without breaking this 
long chain of will.411   
 
This active origin of memory arises for the purpose of guaranteeing a future action.  
Memory may be of the past, to paraphrase Aristotle, but it exists in this construction as 
the necessary precondition for a meaningful future.  In response to pain, this active 
memory grounds future actions with the end of “conscience” as its target.  The meaning 
of the construction of the conscience lies in its active resistance to the forces of forgetting 
and its goal of appropriating desire into the formation of a new dominant instinct counter 
to the instinct of forgetting: “The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of 
responsibility, the consciousness of the this rare freedom, this power over oneself and 
over fate, has… become instinct, the dominating instinct.”412  This may result in or come 
from a being that is “calculable, regular, necessary” but this is no reason for its negative 
evaluation as a phenomenon.  It is only with the construction of conscience that humans 
“possess the right to also affirm oneself.”413  The capacity for affirmation here stands as 
the seal of the active origin of the conscience and its desirability despite its origins out of 
pain.  In fact, here pain is exactly seen as the type of “stimulus to life” in the conscience’s 
directedness to the future.  The meaning of this sort of memory is an affirmation of life 
and a self-affirmation of the conscience that is constructed.  Here the forces are 
appropriated toward an end sympathetic with the expression and continuing expression of 
the wills that form it. 
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 This may seem a strange version of the genealogy often remarked upon in the 
Second Essay of Genealogy of Morals; however, it is the second genealogy of the essay 
that is much more elaborated.414  This first genealogy that I have presented here is of the 
less common, affirmative response to the problem of forgetting.  This follows, I think, 
Nietzsche’s suggestion regarding Genealogy of Morals that each section has “a beginning 
that should be deceptive: cool, scientific, even ironic, intentionally foreground, 
intentionally evasive.”415  What is “evasive” in the second essay is the affirmative 
appropriation of the conscience, the possibility of which has largely been undiscovered 
because of the forces elaborated in the remainder of the essay.  Most of the Second Essay 
offers Nietzsche’s genealogy of the more prevalent, more human reaction to the problem 
of forgetting.  After the meaning of the conscience is uncovered, Nietzsche turns to “that 
other ‘somber thing,’ the consciousness of guilt, the ‘bad conscience.’”416  This is crucial 
to the understanding of the Genealogy and of the genealogical method as a whole.  While 
the conscience generally appears as a moral underpinning to behavior, built on memory, 
it can possess, as Nietzsche would say, as many meanings as there are forces that can take 
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command of it, can dominate it.  In the abbreviated genealogy of the first sections of the 
Second Essay, it is a generally affirmative, active force that affects the synthesis of forces 
called ‘conscience.’  In order to more easily differentiate it from the similar synthesis of 
reactive forces, Nietzsche christens the object of the second, more widely referenced, 
genealogy as that of the ‘bad conscience.’  But again, this second genealogy demonstrates 
both the excavation of the forces that compose the bad conscience as well as the 
differentiation in their goal from the other phenomenon of conscience.   
 The problems that the concept of the bad conscience addresses are still the 
problems of how a memory, and thereby a kind of promising, is possible against 
forgetfulness; but, due to a difference in the origin of the construction of that memory, 
the meaning of the conscience composed is nearly wholly opposed to the active 
conscience.  Nietzsche focuses on the differing appearances of the phenomenon of guilt 
to reveal this other meaning.  The traditional, moral interpretation of guilt is established 
as a relation to a past debt that serves to cause pain, the memory of which is intended to 
act as a corrective to future desires and actions.  However, Nietzsche reverses this in two 
ways in his genealogy of guilt.  First, he points to a material or psychical (and not 
spiritual) origin of the concept of guilt:  “Have these genealogists of morals had even the 
remotest suspicion that, for example, the major moral concept Schuld [guilt] has its origin 
in the very material concept Schulden [debts]?”417  Nietzsche locates this material sense 
of guilt in a failure to repay a debt, with punishment being the alternate form of 
repayment in order to settle the debt.  The second reversal is that the outcome produced 
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by the spiritual concept of guilt multiplies the pain caused by guilt and does not constitute 
an avenue around it, despite claims to the contrary on the part of traditional morality.  
Through the mechanism of punishment, guilt is intended to be instilled as a preventative 
to the expression of any instinct or force: “Punishment is supposed to possess the value of 
awakening the feeling of guilt in the guilty person; one seeks it in the actual 
instrumentium of that psychical reaction called ‘bad conscience.’”418  However, the 
meaning of punishment is by no means secure or indubitable either.  As is the case with 
all phenomena, it possesses for Nietzsche a “relatively enduring” aspect in its action but a 
“fluid” series of meanings that are correlated to all those actions based on the kind of 
synthesis that is operating on it.419  The same is true of the phenomenon of guilt, although 
here it takes on a meaning useful to the ends to which this kind of memory is directed.  
Guilt, understood in this perspective, is the feeling of indebtedness; but Nietzsche is 
arguing that this form of indebtedness is invoked not for any determinate material reason.  
Instead, the indebtedness is intended to remain unresolved in the psyche to act as an 
opposing force to any instinct that we possess: “punishment tames men, but it does not 
make them any ‘better.’”420  This guilt bears a different meaning from the memory of the 
conscience as it is meant to facilitate the development not of a conscience but of a sense 
of indefinite indebtedness to some other thing – others, a society, a leader, a deity.  With 
the option of an external discharge removed, those instincts are left only with avenue of 
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internalization.  Therefore, the only appropriation of this guilt that is possible is one that 
would further implicate and reinforce the indebtedness of the instincts.  This does not 
presuppose a soul that is now imbued with this conflict; but, rather, this alteration of the 
instincts causes them to produce the ‘soul’ as a construction:  “All instincts that do not 
discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of 
man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul.’”421  In this 
way, a soul is created as a thing with depth, whereas consciousness is merely a surface; 
and it is the construction of the soul that is coextensive with the bad conscience: 
“Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all this 
turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the ‘bad 
conscience.’”422  The archaeology of the forces that produce the feeling of guilt as infinite 
indebtedness also reveals the phenomenon of the soul to be present with the creation of 
the bad conscience, as bad conscience consists of a conflict of forces that are forced to 
discharge their power inwardly upon themselves.  The link between the Second Essay 
and the First and Third Essays of the Genealogy becomes clear here when we note that it 
is with the priest – the artist of guilt and asceticism – that “man first became an 
interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and 
become evil – and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been 
superior to other beasts!”423  The depth of soul, which is normally marked as the element 
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of human exceptionalism, is created in the conflict between memory and forgetting.  
Humans are interesting precisely because they are sick in ways other animals are not. 
 In this way, the meaning of the soul lies in the sense of indebtedness and guilt 
elicited as responses to the problem of pain.  This bad conscience is revealed to be the 
meaning of the soul – an interiorization of both hostile forces from outside and also 
desires redirected because of a stronger, commanding desire to avoid pain.  The memory 
of the pain creates a conscience predominantly concerned with avoiding that which 
causes it pain, which, in turn, causes the internalization of desires, causing even more of 
the pain that was to be avoided.  The figure of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues 
diagnoses this as well; but, whereas the prescription there is to purify the soul of these 
vicissitudes of desire, Nietzsche diagnoses the soul as only these vicissitudes turned back 
upon themselves.  And Nietzsche labels this conscience as ‘bad’ precisely because it is a 
conscience of inaction preoccupied with the past whose appropriative actions only 
deepen this interpretation of infinite indebtedness.  The bad conscience vows to never 
forget its sufferings and to remember them precisely in order to keep them from 
recurring.  When they do recur, the bad conscience, being inactive, can only vent its 
ressentiment on itself, through guilt.  As it cannot prevent its suffering, any release from 
suffering must be thought as emanating from an external source.  We see here the 
preparation for the genealogy of asceticism.  Nietzsche writes, “In a certain sense, the 
whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-
present, unforgettable, ‘fixed,’ with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and 
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intellectual system with these ‘fixed ideas….’”424  This kind of asceticism – that practiced 
by the bad conscience – has as its goal the conscious ridding of pain from the conscience 
that suffers from it through the mechanism of the ascription of guilt to some thing, which 
turns out to be the conscience itself.  Thus, the bad conscience is constructed in such a 
way as to suffer from the past and from the constellation of forces that create it.  As all 
change causes it to suffer, only the unchanging can be thought to bring it relief or 
salvation. 
 The result of Nietzsche’s genealogy of the bad conscience reveals not only the 
forces that compose this phenomenon but also the ends that those forces tend toward.  
The meaning ascribed to the bad conscience lies at the intersection of its composing 
forces, which react against suffering, as well as its orientation towards future events.  It is 
not only the archaeological uncovering of its response to pain that is important to 
Nietzsche’s analysis; of equal weight is the way in which the bad conscience’s future 
actions are prescribed as a continual recrimination of itself and its past.  The end towards 
which the bad conscience claims to tend is, therefore, rendered impossible by its actual 
tendency to react to every pain and to interiorize that reaction as guilt.  The contrasting 
phenomenon of the active conscience means something quite different for Nietzsche, as 
both its composition and orientation are distinct from those of the bad conscience’s.  
Archaeologically, the conscience is composed as a memory of a promise.  This is a 
reaction to pain as well; but, even at this origin, the memory is directed towards the 
future.  It tends here toward future action and becoming and not to further interiorization 
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of pain or guilt, like the symbol of the “agony of the woman in labor” that Nietzsche 
employs in Twilight of the Idols.425  Nietzsche writes:  
In the doctrines of the [Dionysian] mysteries, pain is pronounced holy: the ‘woes 
of a woman in labor’ sanctify pain in general, - all becoming and growth, 
everything that guarantees the future involves pain…  There has to be an eternal 
‘agony of the woman in labor’ so that there can be an eternal joy of creation, so 
that the will to life can eternally affirm itself.426   
 
The end of the conscience is active and meaningful only through the expression of the 
forces that compose it towards the future.  In this way the conscience can be affirmative 
towards the pain that enables it because it makes and continually remakes a future as 
being possible.  For the bad conscience – the conscience of guilt – every future is a future 
experienced as painful because its composing forces work toward conservation of the 
past.  The events of the conscience and those of the bad conscience are thus also 
differentiated in Nietzsche’s work by their respective teleological impulses toward 
becoming and toward conservation.  The bad conscience seeks an eternal end in its 
eventual ascetic incarnation’s devotion to fixed ideas.  Its memory is devoted to a prior 
state without suffering that is held as a fixed point and also on supposedly objective states 
of reality that hold out redemption from suffering.  In both cases, this memory serves to 
deepen the inability to act on the part of the bad conscience. 
 This does not, however, entail that that bad conscience is a terminus from which 
nothing can ever be extracted or appropriated.  Nietzsche makes this clear, stating: “The 
bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as pregnancy is an 
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illness.”427  Just as the Third Essay surprises its interpreters by insisting that life can only 
deny itself in appearance, so too does the Second Essay turn our own metaphysical 
presuppositions against us by claiming that even the bad conscience is worthy of 
affirmation:  
For fundamentally it is the same active force that is at work on a grander scale in 
those artists of violence and organizers who build states, and that here, internally, 
on a smaller and pettier scale, directed backward… creates for itself a bad 
conscience….  [E]ventually this entire active “bad conscience” – you will have 
guessed it – as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to 
light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty 
itself. – After all, what would be ‘beautiful’ if the contradiction had not first 
become conscious of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself: “I am ugly”?428 
 
As the bad conscience forces more and more energy to be expended inwardly, it enables, 
should it become active and not engage in further self-pity, a transformation of that bad 
conscience into a conscience.  When the pain of the bad conscience is taken as fuel for 
creativity and not as fuel for self-recrimination, affirmation and expenditure again 
become possible as the bad conscience actively reinterprets itself. 
 
II. Nietzsche’s Self-Criticism of The Birth of Tragedy 
 The interpretive character of Nietzsche’s philosophy is further revealed in his 
readings and commentaries on the import and value of his own texts.  Although 
Nietzsche has very little critical commentary on the texts composed after Zarathustra, his 
new prefaces as well as his commentaries on earlier texts exemplify the dual approach 
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that I have argued Nietzsche adopts toward interpretation.  In these cases, Nietzsche reads 
his earlier writings as addressing, even obliquely, the problems toward which his late 
writings are directed: the critiques of culture, morality, philosophical idealism, and, in the 
case of The Birth of Tragedy, the symbol of Dionysus.  Archaeologically, Nietzsche 
attempts to uncover the forces that lie beneath these texts and also to critique those 
impulses present in the texts that run counter to his new goals.  However, he also intends 
to gesture towards those concepts and methods that he appropriates from his earlier work 
and expands upon in his later texts.  In this process of interpretive reading of his own 
texts, Nietzsche demonstrates what he means for a reader or thinker to have “turned out 
well”: “He instinctively gathers his totality from everything he sees, hears, experiences: 
he is a principle of selection, he lets many things fall by the wayside. He is always in his 
own company, whether dealing with books, people, or landscapes: he honors by 
choosing, by permitting, by trusting.”429  The great health that Nietzsche sets as the goal 
of interpretation is attempted in these repeated self-interpretations: “a health that one 
doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one gives it up 
again and again, and must give it up!”430  Its techniques are the selection of the texts or 
concepts that are relevant to his task, his weighing of their value for life, and his 
construction of a “totality” that is aware of its contingency.   
 In the case of his readings of The Birth of Tragedy, the contrast between 
Nietzsche’s perspectives is the most apparent.  Because of the “Romanticism” that 
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permeates the earlier book in Nietzsche’s estimation, his technique of interpretation is 
allowed the most distance possible in which to operate.431  The distanciation is apparent 
as Nietzsche states: “I shall not suppress entirely how unpleasant [the book] now seems 
to me.”432  This unpleasantness stems from a variety of cited factors.  Among these, 
Nietzsche cites prominently that the book is “badly written,” that it smacks of enthusiasm 
for its own positions, and that the “artiste’s metaphysics” that it expounds expresses a 
deep resentment.433  In other words, Nietzsche diagnoses the work as expressing desires 
of weakness and intending an aim of a final comfort from the suffering of a lack of 
meaning.  The author of Birth of Tragedy is, in Nietzsche’s own interpretation, like those 
sufferers “who suffer from an impoverishment of life and seek quiet, stillness, calm seas, 
redemption from themselves through art and insight, or else intoxication, paroxysm, 
numbness, madness.”434  Romanticism and the impulse to it both arise on Nietzsche’s 
estimation from a deep dissatisfaction with culture; but both hope and claim that relief 
from that pain is to be found in a return to a fictional past.  In the case of The Birth of 
Tragedy, that past is one that offers a reconciled relationship between the impulse to art 
and the impulse to knowledge.  Essentially, Nietzsche is diagnosing the effects of 
ressentiment operating through his text in its devotion to a messianic force that will return 
the status of the arts, and thereby human existence, to a previously existing state of 
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balance.  Nietzsche, in Birth of Tragedy, is attempting to turn back the clock of artistic 
and scientific expression – a sure symptom of ressentiment.  These two illusions, of the 
possibility of a final comfort (as calmness or madness) and the invention of a past state 
where it has been actualized, are diagnosed as motivating Birth of Tragedy.  Taken by 
itself, the essay could be titled “The Re-birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music;” and 
Nietzsche laments it has often been cited as such.435  This (mis)reading of the title and of 
the book’s project emphasizes what underlies the book, but Nietzsche insists that “this is 
why people failed to hear what was really valuable in the essay.”436  It can easily be 
thought that the younger Nietzsche who composed the book could be among those 
offenders for thinking the return of the Dionysian in art is imminent.  Thus, the 
archaeology of the text and its concepts reveals them to be “politically indifferent,” 
“offensively Hegelian and only a few formulas are tainted with the cadaverous fragrance 
of Schopenhauer.”437  The distinction of the Dionysian and Apollonian instinct as 
opposing and yet reconciling halves of the artistic impulse points, in the text of Birth of 
Tragedy, to a future resolution between the two that re-expresses the harmony between 
the two that Nietzsche reads in the Attic tragedies.  This promised re-birth of the tragic 
sensibility is, for the younger Nietzsche, a return to a healthier, tragic synthesis of the 
human instincts to art and knowledge. 
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 However, these shortcomings of the book, along with its Romanticism, can be 
placed as the results of one misstep on Nietzsche’s part.  In a sweeping claim about the 
manner in which it was written, Nietzsche attributes most of the problems of Birth of 
Tragedy to his choice of a grammar and a vocabulary:   
I now regret very much that I did not yet have the courage (or immodesty?) at the 
time to permit myself a language of my very own for such personal views and acts 
of daring, laboring instead to express strange and new evaluations in 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran 
counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer.438 
 
The vocabulary that Nietzsche employs in Birth of Tragedy is remarked upon as being 
unsuitable for the type of work that was needed to express what was of value in the text.  
The positive interpretation of Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche is embarking on here 
employs two features of the concept of health that Nietzsche has set as desirable: active 
forgetting and the principle of selection.  But to accomplish this, Nietzsche is remarking 
that an appropriate form of mediation in language for his desired ends had to be invented 
first.  So long as he remained tied to the Kantian or Schopenhauerian vocabulary, 
Nietzsche could not keep from expressing concepts that approximate theirs regarding art 
and metaphysics.  Precisely what has been diagnosed as troublesome in Birth of Tragedy 
is the desire for art to be a metaphysical comfort – as Nietzsche alleges Schopenhauer to 
be seeking – as well as a broadly Kantian impulse to see beauty in art as being the 
expression of a hidden harmony in the observer.  The Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy seeks 
in art the genesis of this harmony (and the comfort it provides) through the creation of 
artworks that demonstrate the natural harmony in action.  But it is the alternate forms of 
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mediation that Nietzsche develops in his explicitly interpretive approach – before his 
return to Birth of Tragedy in the Second Edition of the work as well as in Ecce Homo – 
that allow him to reinterpret the work in terms of its importance to his later products. 
 Regarding Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche first remarks, “You need to 
forget about a couple of things if you are going to be fair to The Birth of Tragedy 
(1872).”439  In order for the work to have a new present, in the terms of its interpretation, 
it is necessary to actively displace the memory of what made the book remarkable on its 
first appearance – its dedication to Wagner and the Romantic project that it represents to 
Nietzsche.  If the text of Birth of Tragedy is to find any sort of new determination of its 
meaning, these past interpretations need to be suspended or bracketed so as to allow the 
possibility of other meanings emerging.  In other words, despite the use of a kind of 
Wagnerianism that people “remind [Nietzsche]… is on [his] conscience,” Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of that text cannot allow the development out of it of a bad conscience on 
his part.440  The invocation of forgetting shows that Nietzsche’s conscience is not 
inverted in its action by this past work.  The existence of one type of interpretation of the 
work, even if he licensed it as well at one point, does not eliminate other possible 
readings of the text. 
 The expression of one of these other meanings is at stake in Nietzsche’s selection 
of the concepts of value in Birth of Tragedy.  In both the “Attempt at Self-Criticism” and 
in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche elaborates the role of Birth of Tragedy in the invention of the 
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symbol “Dionysus” and of the “understanding of Socratism: Socrates recognized for the 
first time as the instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent.”441  Obscured 
by the many problems of that text are the dual preoccupations of the later works of 
Nietzsche – the problems of the affirmation of life as well as the various phenomena that 
demonstrate the forces of life turned against itself – a “[d]isgregation of the instincts.”442  
In these cases the instincts are degenerated sufficiently that the manners in which they 
have been synthesized begin to crumble.  This later evaluation of the type of Socrates as 
decadent intends to capture more precisely what is at stake in adopting the strategy of 
“Socratism” criticized in Birth of Tragedy.  The issue is the feeling that only reason can 
bring a relief from suffering and injustice; but this use of reason manifests itself as 
another self-dissection, another case of forces turned against themselves.  The diagnosis 
of Socratism in Birth of Tragedy is the first step towards elaborating the concept of 
decadence.  As the concept of Socratism and its associated evaluation of truth is 
diagnosed as a creation of a certain type of force as a reaction against specific problems it 
encounters in life.  This evaluation of truth manifests itself in the scientific impulse, as 
this scientism is, for Nietzsche, one expression of the Socratic type.  In short, Nietzsche 
characterizes the book as the first that dared “to look at science through the prism of the 
artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.”443  Nietzsche’s appropriation of 
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Birth of Tragedy focuses on the meaning of his initial question in that text, “What is 
Dionysiac?” viewed through the language of forces that he has since adopted.  He finds 
that, although he contrasted the Dionysiac too strongly with the Apollonian instinct, the 
logical extension of that question serves later to undermine much of the work of Birth of 
Tragedy and provides the force for his criticisms of it.  The “prism of life” has come to be 
the central perspective in Nietzsche’s philosophy; and in his “self-criticism” he asserts 
that it was this force that stood behind both his concern with the creativity of art as well 
as the truthfulness of science.  If both are viewed as symptoms of the kind of force that 
creates and needs them (art and science), then Nietzsche has not substantially changed his 
basic diagnosis of culture and science.  However, the criticism reveals that, despite this 
similarity, Nietzsche’s own text is implicated as yet another failed attempt at self-
affirmation.  The text identifies the problem of affirmation in its invocation of Dionysus, 
but the Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy, does not recognize it as such, as he had not yet 
conceptualized the regulative end that it serves in his later work.  But this does not stop 
the later Nietzsche from retroactively affirming the concepts created as elements in his 
own becoming: “Everything is announced in advance in this essay….”444  Nietzsche 
means here that the symbolic ends that he will turn toward are present in nascent form in 
Birth of Tragedy as is the basic critical thrust toward decadence and its associated 
moralities.  There is much to be forgotten or destroyed in Birth of Tragedy as far as the 
later Nietzsche is concerned, but its central concepts and his appropriation of them point 
the way to his interpretive criterion of health.   
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 Nietzsche regards “health” as a precondition for an affirmation of life, but the 
affirmation that is the stated goal of Nietzsche’s thought must be regarded as a product of 
a process that exists only in its becoming.  Like the Aristotelian concept of “eudaimonia” 
Nietzschean health exists as an activity and not as a finished product that, once complete, 
needs no further actualization to continue.  The reason for this is that the criterion of 
health can only be demonstrated in action – specifically the action of interpretation:   
Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previous values and 
aspiration, to sail around this ‘inland sea’ of ideals, anyone who wants to know 
from the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discoverer or 
conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker, a sage, a scholar, a 
pious man, an old-style divine loner – any such person needs one thing above all – 
the great health, a health that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually, 
and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it 
up!...445 
 
All of these types, as they have been set out in Nietzsche’s other texts, give a meaning to 
their interpretations of reality from a perspective and expression of life.  The squandering 
here that Nietzsche associates with health is the ability to endow continually one’s 
interpretations of the world with a meaning from the synthesis of one’s experience.  If the 
goal is to experience as many of these possibilities as one can, then that health will also 
require the ability to disassociate from old interpretations and take up new ones.  This is 
not only the principle of expenditure in action, it also demonstrates that, even in sickness, 
it is possible for the “strengths” of a philosopher to philosophize: “[F]or [this type, 
philosophy] is only a beautiful luxury, in the best case the voluptuousness of a triumphant 
gratitude that eventually have to inscribe itself in cosmic capital letters on the heaven of 
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concepts.”446  Nietzsche states that his facility in this has been developed as a result of his 
illnesses.  In giving himself reason here to display gratitude to even a questionable 
occurrence such as being sick, Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate the freedom from 
ressentiment that he claims is his good fortune.  It also helps explain his claim that 
“[g]ranting that I am a decadent, I am the opposite as well.”447  The value of the 
fluctuations in Nietzsche’s health has been in their enabling of the discovery of multiple 
perspectives from which to look at life: “I have a hand for switching perspectives: the 
first reason why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone.”448  The 
abrupt changes in Nietzsche’s own health have provided him with a distance from 
everyday concepts.  As Klossowski writes, “The observation of his own valetudinary 
states led Nietzsche to live in a growing perplexity concerning what, in his own 
experience, would be valuable or not – and always in terms of… health and 
morbidity.”449  The actuality of having occupied different perspectives on health has 
given Nietzsche the capacity for the perspectival revaluation of phenomena and concepts 
based upon these new criteria.  There is a direct link in the texts between the “giving up” 
of one’s health and the distanciation involved in interpretive acts.  To squander such 
health and certainty implies the continual reapplication of interpretation in the 
genealogical manner to settled concepts.  Nietzsche’s correlation between health, 
sickness, and distanciation is stated this way in Ecce Homo:  “To be able to look out from 
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the optic of sickness towards healthier concepts and values, and again the other way 
around, to look down from the fullness and self-assurance of the rich life into the secret 
work of the instinct of decadence – that was my longest training, my genuine experience, 
if I became the master of anything, it was this.”450  The optics of sickness and health 
supplement the optics of art and life that were examined previously in this chapter.  The 
Birth of Tragedy’s breakthrough was to see science and other inquiries into truth as 
creative responses to problems motivated by specific types of forms of living.  
Nietzsche’s expansion of this critique lies in the application of the evaluative criteria of 
health and sickness to the expressions of life and art and not only to products of the 
search for truth. 
To condense the work of the Second Preface of Birth of Tragedy as well as Ecce 
Homo’s reading of that volume to its methodological core, recall the work of Nietzsche’s 
genealogy.  In Nietzsche’s critiques, the genealogical method looks at the disguised 
forces that form commonplace as well as philosophically considered concepts.  The 
moment of archaeology, I have argued, following Ricoeur, is formed out of a mistrust of 
the products of consciousness.  Even the act of seeing the contents of consciousness as 
products of something other than consciousness itself is to have already introduced a 
moment of suspicion to thought.  The Nietzsche-author of Birth of Tragedy offers the 
suspicion that Socratism, thought devoted to rationality, might be built on forces that it 
could not acknowledge or would not acknowledge as rational.  Nietzsche’s archaeology 
reveals a conflict in the meaning of the artistic synthesis between differing types of 
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instincts – the Dionysian and the Apollonian – beneath the surface of rational thought.  
Only by repressing the former instinct could the rational demands of Socratism be 
formulated as an extension of the latter, denying the Dionysian instinct that made it 
possible in the first place.  However, the Nietzsche-author of Ecce Homo and the 
“Attempt at Self-Criticism” expresses further archaeological concerns about the 
motivation of the Birth of Tragedy.  Nietzsche’s work subsequent to Birth of Tragedy 
discovers that the forces of life can be redirected negatively back upon themselves, 
however these are still expressions of life, albeit of a declining life.  Granting its 
conceptual contributions, Nietzsche criticizes the attempt at a re-birth of tragedy that the 
book heralds as motivated by a similar disgust with life and its attending suffering.  
Therefore, denials of life and its continual becoming need not be “Socratic.”  The denial 
can also make its appearance as the Romantic impulse to return to a state of nature that is 
supposed to hold a brand of harmony that we lack.  This second kind of resentment is 
detected by Nietzsche in the motivation of the text of Birth of Tragedy in its nostalgic 
evocation of Attic tragedy and its impending return through Wagner’s operas.  For this 
reason, the archaeology offered in Birth of Tragedy is incomplete and will lead to 
unnecessary illusions caused by its failure to see the forces of resentment active in his 
interpretations of art and Socratism. 
However, beyond the archaeological critique, Nietzsche notes a teleological 
failure in Birth of Tragedy and attempts to re-appropriate it through his interpretations of 
it.  Nietzsche’s reading of the introduction of the symbol of “Dionysus” states that the 
problem raised by it in Birth of Tragedy remains unsolved as long as the question “what 
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is Dionysiac?” is unanswered.451  While Birth of Tragedy offers an answer to this 
question, Nietzsche laments that he understood the end of the object of his praise, a new 
German culture, too poorly to estimate its fitness with the symbol of “Dionysus.”452  
However, “Dionysus” also points Nietzsche to the problem of its affirmation.  The 
“Greek Problem” that he references here is exactly the issue of the formation of a 
pessimism of strength or – said differently – an affirmation of life, “an art of 
apotheosis.”453  In addition to developing a more critical eye into the formation of 
concepts, Nietzsche has also developed a different conception of the goals of his 
inquiries.  This end, I have been arguing, is a concrete affirmation of life and the creation 
of a type that is capable of it.  The Birth of Tragedy could not affirm life as it understood 
goals only in the realm of art and of culture and, then, as bound to a particular German 
culture.  Its Romanticism did not allow the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s demand in Ecce 
Homo: “Nothing in existence should be excluded, nothing is dispensable….  To 
understand this requires courage and, as its condition, a surplus of force….”454  In 
viewing Socratism as dispensable, in advocating the return to the pre-Socratic synthesis 
of tragedy, the Nietzsche-author of Birth of Tragedy is not yet able to affirm even the 
base things.  In lacking a vocabulary of concepts adequate to this end, Nietzsche does not 
yet have the surplus of force necessary to lift his critique to this level.  His development 
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after Birth of Tragedy, with his illness and its “gift” of increased perspective, allows the 
formulation of a concrete meaning that can begin to approximate the affirmation of the 
symbol Dionysus:  “I do not know any higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of 
the Dionysian.  It gives religious expression to the most profound instinct of life, directed 
towards the future of life, the eternity of life, - the pathway to life, procreation, as the 
holy path….”455  This future of life, affirmation, is only discovered in the symbol of 
Dionysus after the composition of Birth of Tragedy. 
 
 
III. Concrete Meaning, Great Health, and Philosophical Anthropology: Ecce Homo 
To begin to tie together these disparate strands of Nietzsche’s thinking, let us turn 
fully to the text where Nietzsche – or so I will argue – constructs his subjectivity and 
sketches an outline for a philosophical anthropology.  This task is necessary for 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, as we have seen, because the human being has no a priori 
determinate meaning but only acquires a meaning through interpretation.  Part of 
Nietzsche’s advance in the project of philosophical anthropology is to insist on its 
regional character and the impossibility of its acquisition of a universal character.  By 
this, I mean that Nietzsche sees the concretization of the meaning of a subject as the 
outcome of a process of interpretation.  There cannot be a determinate general theory of 
the being of humans because direct intuition into that being is impossible.  With the 
possibility of a direct and general intuition or deduction of human nature ruled out, its 
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being can only be explicated through the process of interpreting itself.  However, this 
self-interpretation for Nietzsche ends up constructing the meaning of the “object” of its 
interpretation.  The construction of the subject ‘Nietzsche’ in Ecce Homo is Nietzsche’s 
response to the demand as he feels it to “say who I am.”456  It is fair, I think, to read this 
as a plausible attempt to articulate content adequate to the apodictic judgment of the 
Cogito.  In this way Nietzsche can also be read as ensuring that he does not fall under the 
rebuke he levels in Genealogy of Morals that “[w]e are unknown to ourselves, we men of 
knowledge – and with good reason.”457  If Nietzsche is to become known as a subject, or 
philosopher, as the precondition of his work, it is in spite of his usual dominant instincts; 
but if we see a philosopher’s concepts, as Nietzsche does, as the expression of the type of 
the philosopher, then the only way to ascertain the preconditions for the attainment of 
Nietzsche’s concepts and goals is to know the type from which they have sprung.  In this 
way, Nietzsche is attempting to account for the phylogenesis of the type ‘Nietzsche’ 
through the interpretation of ‘Nietzsche’ on the basis of the forces that compose him.  In 
order to demonstrate the grounds adequate for an affirmative appropriation of life, 
Nietzsche is constructing his own subjectivity and giving it meaning according to both 
poles of the interpretive strategy that I have laid out.  As Ernst Behler writes, 
“Nietzsche’s practice of ‘active interpretation’ appears to consist in [the] reciprocal 
interaction of different types of interpretation, the deliberate exchange of 
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perspectives.”458  This concrete meaning of ‘Nietzsche,’ the Nietzsche composed from an 
interpretation that gathers the vicissitudes of desire and the appropriation of those forces, 
vindicates the methodology of genealogy in its capacity to produce an affirmative (or 
positive) end.  The status of Ecce Homo, is, according to Sarah Kofman, “as a test book 
which is to put spirits to the test, to gauge whether or not they will be capable of bearing 
the radical inversion of values, whether or not they will be strong enough to tolerate and 
thus understand the boldness of the immoralist, this hitherto unheard-of type which 
Nietzsche the artist invented as his own.”459   
This end, I will argue, grants us both a look at the concretized meaning of the 
subject ‘Nietzsche’ but also fulfills Ricoeur’s requirement for a kind of philosophical 
anthropology.  In effect, Ecce Homo is an accounting of the proximate forces that are 
synthesized in the production of the subjectivity of Nietzsche – a subjectivity that is 
importantly marked by Nietzsche as “healthy.”  The text is simultaneously the description 
of the mediation that the subject is as well as the active productive mediation of the 
subject ‘Nietzsche’ itself.  Nietzsche’s writing is the “test” to which he has put himself 
and the accounting of the manner in which he has tempered his character.  However, 
since the activity of mediation (like interpretation) is never finished, this philosophical 
anthropology reveals a subject that is not unified in its meaning but is always 
“simultaneously decadent and beginning.”460   
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 Nietzsche begins Ecce Homo with the articulation of the “duty” he feels “to say: 
Listen to me!  I am the one who I am!  Above all, do not mistake me for anyone else!”461  
At first glance, this is a strange sort of statement for Nietzsche to make – and one that he 
remarks with which “the pride of [his] instincts rebel.”462  Given that one of the hallmarks 
of decadence is the self-mutilation of the instincts, how is it possible that Nietzsche here 
avoids self-incrimination is responding to this duty?  However, if we remember 
Nietzsche’s many remarks about the necessity of masks to the becoming of the 
philosopher, then it is not only possible but probable that we will have misunderstood 
Nietzsche: “the philosophic spirit always had to use as a mask and cocoon the previously 
established types of the contemplative man – priest, sorcerer, soothsayer, and in any case 
a religious type – in order to be able to exist at all….”463  This is not to say that Ecce 
Homo will reveal the real or authentic ‘Nietzsche’ behind these masks; instead Ecce 
Homo will only heighten the differences between Nietzsche, his contemporaries, and the 
works of other philosophers.  The ‘who’ that is Nietzsche is articulated here according to 
the duty to make the conditions under which Nietzsche’s texts were composed visible.  
Ecce Homo is, accordingly, a genealogy of the concepts and symbols signed with the 
name ‘Nietzsche.’  Consequently, what it offers is not the key that will allow Nietzsche’s 
interpretation to be metaphorically unlocked but, instead, further interpretations of 
Nietzsche’s works and, therefore, also a meta-hermeneutic commentary on the conditions 
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for interpretation in general.  These conditions set out what, for Nietzsche, are the 
conditions for the possibility of any future creation of meaning.  The “health” that 
Nietzsche insists he embodies in his philosophical anthropology signifies the condition 
for new interpretations.  But the concrete philosophical anthropology that Ecce Homo 
offers is that of a human nature that has no unity except through interpretation; and, even 
then, it is debatable whether this unity that is produced is a sign of health or of decline.  
The various concepts of “human nature,” far from being bulwarks against the possibility 
of shifting meaning, are themselves products of various forces which have made them 
possible.  “Human nature” is no more fixed in its meaning than any other object of 
interpretation.  In telling the reader who he is, Nietzsche articulates a theory of human 
nature that is not unlike the nature of a Ricoeurian symbol: multiple, open to 
interpretation, and often over-determined in its meaning.  “Saying who he is means 
showing how he has become who he is,” Kofman writes regarding Nietzsche’s 
subjectivity.  The self that Nietzsche constructs in Ecce Homo as the condition for his 
works is, to echo Ricoeur’s formulation, a mediation or mediating construction.  To grasp 
its quality for affirmation, it becomes necessary to see how “Nietzsche” has been 
synthesized.   
The development of the conceptualization of the subject will be forced to square 
with Nietzsche’s insistence that “I am one thing, my writings are another.”464  This points 
us to the problem of the location of the coincidence between the forces of instinct and the 
expressed meaning of a text.  The author, Nietzsche, is signaling that the meaning of his 
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texts is not to be found through an excavation of his conscious intentions toward the text.  
Similar admonitions can be found in other of Nietzsche’s texts, which raises the dual 
questions of: how are we to make sense of Nietzsche’s writings (what do these writings 
reference?)?; and what are we to make of the figure ‘Nietzsche’ who is presenting 
himself in Ecce Homo?  The latter question, Nietzsche himself attempts to answer, saying 
of the artist “that one does best to separate an artist from his work, not taking him as 
seriously as his work.  He is, after all, only the precondition of his work, the womb, the 
soil, sometimes the dung and manure, out of which, it grows – and therefore in most 
cases something one must forget if one is to enjoy the work itself.”465  The function that 
the author of a text has is the condition of the composition of the work.  The text emerges 
as an expression of the vicissitudes of the author; but in describing the production of the 
phenomenon of the text, Nietzsche is in no way claiming to determine entirely the 
meaning of that text, which appears epiphenomenally.  In other words, the text of 
Nietzsche, in this case Ecce Homo, has no meaning without the activity of interpretation 
upon it.  Previously determined interpretations can serve to guide another interpretation, 
but there is no given text that is recoverable before the advent of interpretation.  As 
Nietzsche has grounds to treat consciousness as another kind of text, this same general 
principle regarding interpretation will apply to it as well.  “Consciousness,” Klossowski 
writes, “is nothing other than a deciphering of the messages transmitted by the 
impulses.”466  Subjectivity is constructed much the same way as a text is; and its meaning 
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is determined as part of the same process of interpretation by which any meaning is made 
adequate to its “object.”  Thus far, we have been treating the objects of interpretation 
largely as symbols; but Nietzsche’s genealogies in general are less directed toward texts 
and more implicated with events as pieces of lived experience.  This subtle difference 
will help us spell out the further implications of Nietzsche being one thing and his 
writings another. 
 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche does not claim to be communicating either his 
consciousness or a neutral subject’s consciousness to the reader directly.  Although the 
text is reflexive in its tone, it is not a story of an interior of a consciousness in the manner 
of Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology or Descartes’s Meditations, for example.  Nietzsche 
asks a rhetorical question of his technique of appropriation and then remarks on its 
necessarily mediated nature: “How could I not be grateful to my whole life?  And so I 
will tell myself the story of my life.”467  In other words, the task of the appropriation of 
an affirmative mode of existence must pass through the mediation of language if it is to 
be communicated.  The goal of Ecce Homo is this concrete appropriation of an 
affirmative life, but it can only be accomplished through the “telling” of Nietzsche’s life 
to himself and to his readers.  This appropriation of the subject Nietzsche, more than 
those in any of Nietzsche’s other texts, has the resources to demonstrate the concrete 
appropriation of the forces beyond the critical thrust of the genealogical method.  
Nietzsche touches on this elsewhere, most notably in Zarathustra and Genealogy of 
Morals, but neither of these texts approaches the philosophical question of the future with 
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the same clarity.  Zarathustra ends with the title character able to overcome pity only 
through his withdrawal from even the “higher men.”  Nietzsche notes in the text of the 
Genealogy of Morals that each essay achieves “an ending with absolutely terrible 
detonations, a new truth visible between thick clouds.”468  But the visibility of the 
counter-ideal is not yet the enunciation or concretization of affirmation or health.  
Although the Genealogy of Morals articulates the contingency of the ascetic ideal as a 
form of life, it does not articulate other ways that one could live, only different previous 
meanings to asceticism.  In this way, Ricoeur’s charge concerning Nietzsche and 
affirmation, that “Nietzsche’s major work remains caught up in the attitude of 
resentment; the rebel is not, and cannot be, at the same level as the prophet.  Nietzsche’s 
major work remains an accusation of accusation and hence falls short of a pure 
affirmation of life,” might be correct but only as applied to works like the Genealogy.469  
But there are two concerns here that can be answered if we consider the text of Ecce 
Homo.  The first is the question of how a not-yet-realized future ideal can be articulated 
meaningfully before the actualization.  The provisional answer to this – it cannot – is the 
reason for Nietzsche’s reluctance to provide it in the Genealogy.  The second concern 
however is whether or not a future is at all possible.  Nietzsche addresses the latter 
explicitly in Ecce Homo, and his articulation of it allows him to concretize something like 
a philosophical anthropology, albeit in a manner consistent with his conception of 
determinacy of meaning and not Ricoeur’s. 
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Nietzsche notes in Ecce Homo that the sense of his life in not fully determined.  
He does this by referring to the futurity of the definition of who he is:  “The happiness of 
my existence, perhaps its uniqueness, lies in its fatefulness; to give it the form of a riddle: 
as my father I am already dead and as my mother I am still alive and growing old.”470  In 
this case, his own case, who Nietzsche is is as yet not fully determined.  If we determine 
who he is on the basis of the texts he has written, we miss the aspect in which he is like 
his mother – still alive, or textually, still capable of becoming something different.  
Nietzsche refers to this eventuality by saying “The time has not come for me either.  
Some people are born posthumously.”471  The account that Nietzsche is giving of himself 
is knowingly incomplete as he is attempting to depict the likelihood of his becoming 
different or, with respect to his works, our changing interpretations of them:  “I am one 
thing, my writings are another.”472  We can never get, and Nietzsche can never give, a 
full philosophical anthropology of himself or any other human because of the method that 
must be followed in order to determine meaning.  The meaning of ‘Nietzsche’ is multiple 
at its origin – his “double birth” that is both active and reactive.  In the way that the 
meaning of ‘Nietzsche’ is both partially determined by the signs and masks he inhabits 
but also is directed away from them and toward the future.  This is the route he must take 
away from “vengeance” and ressentiment towards affirmation.473 
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 The ways in which Nietzsche is “dead” and a “decadent” reflect the manner in 
which – archaeologically – meaning is determined by the signs that are available for use 
by the forces that compose it.  These signs are those that we have seen critiqued in his 
“Attempt at Self-Criticism” before the reprint of Birth of Tragedy.  Insofar as no one can 
completely break from the use of commonplace signs, to that extent they are forced to 
utilize the types of masks described in the Third Essay of Genealogy of Morals in order 
to be understood.  It its application to a philosophical anthropology, this outcome 
dramatizes that human being must be expressed and find its meaning beginning with the 
signs and symbols that are already available to it.  But, as Nietzsche notes, he is also a 
“beginning.”  By this he means that every interpretation, even of those decadent signs, is 
a new interpretation that could be carried out as an active task.  For Nietzsche, the sign of 
a successful appropriation is its ability to affirm itself, its health.
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CONCLUSION 
NIETZSCHE AND A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 
 Nietzsche subtitles Beyond Good and Evil a “Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future.”  As the first full book composed by Nietzsche after Zarathustra, Beyond Good 
and Evil appears, according to Nietzsche, as a “critique of modernity, including modern 
science, modern art – even modern politics -, along with indications of an opposite type 
who is as un-modern as possible, a noble, affirming type.”474  The critique of modernity 
here takes center stage, but it would be a hasty reading that did not also connect to this 
the statement that Beyond Good and Evil is primarily a prelude to another task – a 
philosophy of the future.  As Nietzsche indicates, this other and more obscure task of 
assembling an affirmative type capable of affirming the future begins to appear here as 
well.  Just as a musical prelude contains prefigurations of themes that will be repeated 
and expanded upon in a full score, so too does Beyond Good and Evil introduce the 
concern of Nietzsche’s mature works on the whole.  Although the strongest appearance 
here is of the critical apparatus that Nietzsche has developed, the structure of Beyond 
Good and Evil and Nietzsche’s own interpretation of it also consider the possibility of 
this other type – the noble.  It is this noble, or strong, or healthy, type which, I have 
argued, functions as the goal for Nietzsche’s hermeneutic genealogical method.  The act 
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of the appropriation of sense through interpretation is strongly allied with Nietzsche’s 
goal of affirmation, which I have argued in Chapters Three and Four that he achieves.  It 
is the “noble” or affirmative type that is able to affirm becoming instead of being and, 
thus, will possess an ability to speak for itself, to signify for itself in the future.475  In 
order to affirm the possibility of a future in philosophical terms, Nietzsche thinks it is 
necessary to take up the active tasks of interpretation and evaluation.  Along with the 
“noble,” Nietzsche’s remarks about “culture” and a “great politics” must be read in this 
light, as they are intended as other products of an affirmative interpretation and 
evaluation of becoming.476  
 Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as interpretive and evaluative, which is itself 
an act of criticism towards the philosophical tradition.  As Ricoeur states, “[I]n Nietzsche, 
life itself is interpretation: in this way, philosophy itself becomes the interpretation of 
interpretations.”477  The traditional philosophical task of the pure exegesis through 
description of “truth” and “the good” meets with considerable difficulty when 
consciousness, which can justify its existence to itself, cannot justify the unity of 
meaning in the same manner.  If description as an enterprise discovers that the ground of 
its own descriptions is problematic, then it can no longer assume that the thesis of the 
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univocity of meaning that it has relied on is certain.  In this case, the assumed unity of 
“truth” and “the good” itself must be questioned.  But, Nietzsche does not practice 
interpretation and evaluation solely as reductive enterprises, to show the groundlessness 
of traditional philosophical and moral concepts, as those who assert that his philosophy is 
incapable of appropriation often state.  As the moment of Nietzsche’s self-interpretation 
of Beyond Good and Evil in Ecce Homo shows, his critique of modernity not only 
exposes the conditions for the possibility of that modernity (including a belief in the 
univocity of meaning) but can also express the possibilities that may yet be actualized 
from the synthesized forces whose effects appear as modern science, modern art, and 
modern philosophy.  Each essay of the Genealogy of Morals presents a similar diagnosis 
of those forces in ressentiment, bad conscience, or asceticism that could yet become 
active and be capable of affirming life, as was shown in Chapter Four.  The appropriative 
aspect of genealogy includes the necessity of affirming this plurality of possible 
meanings and indicates that the loss of univocity gives philosophy an orientation towards 
future constructions of meaning. Prior (and subsequent) attempts to interpret existence as 
univocal are, for Nietzsche, efforts “to strip [existence] of its ambiguous character.”478 
 As a way of concluding this study, I would like to revisit several themes here that 
have earlier been mentioned but from this outlook towards a philosophy of the future.  If 
Nietzsche is correct in his formula that all philosophical concepts are interpretations of 
the drives, then this leads us to a different understanding of how philosophy can proceed 
in its future attempts to determine meaning and any prospects for a philosophical 
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anthropology.  Nietzsche’s method, I have argued, is a hermeneutic genealogy – a 
procedure which treats the conscious expressions of concepts as effects of pre-conscious 
forces, which Nietzsche has called the wills-to-power:  “[M]ost of a philosopher’s 
conscious thought is secretly directed and forced into determinate channels by the 
instincts.”479  As Ricoeur has clearly shown, these instinctual forces cannot be known 
directly in consciousness but only through a process of mediation that brings them to 
consciousness.  Without the presumption of their immediate appearance in consciousness, 
these forces are destined to appear only through competing interpretations and the 
varying methods of mediating between the multiple meanings that these concepts have 
been able to bear.  But whereas Ricoeur characterizes the “symbol” as the unit that 
reveals this conflict between varying interpretations because of its excessive meaning, 
Nietzsche effectively considers any concept to be capable of the same surplus of 
meaning.  This entails that genealogy is a method of mediating between the various 
interpretive and evaluative claimants to a concept’s meaning.  Genealogy accomplishes 
this primarily through its progressive attempt to demystify the sources from which these 
interpretations and evaluations spring.  This is the first sense of the way in which 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is a critique of meaning and value.  What makes possible any 
given meaning or morality is a synthesis of the instinctual forces that are in conflict with 
one another and capable of being synthesized in a different way, that is, with a different 
dominating will directing the synthesis.  The plurivocity of meaning that makes Ricoeur’s 
“symbol” possible is what makes genealogy possible as well.   
                                               
479 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, eds. Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Section 3.   
 
  218  
 
 
 
 This sense of genealogy is identifiable as the moment of archaeology in 
Nietzsche’s method, following Ricoeur’s terminology.  To the suspicious eye, every 
event of meaning can be seen as concealing as much as it reveals; every meaning is an 
apparent univocal meaning that is selected and synthesized from a web of plurivocal 
possibilities.  Therefore Nietzsche feels justified in treating all meanings as sites where 
interpretation is selecting a particular meaning and disavowing others.  In this way, 
Nietzsche is able to proceed, for example, from the analysis of our everyday sense of 
“good” and “evil” to the conclusion that an affect of ressentiment rumbles underneath it 
and is expressed in it.480  The genealogical unpacking of the senses of “good” and “evil” 
reveals an intentional structure of meaning that is explicitly denied in those concepts’ 
everyday usage – that those evaluations contain a kernel of hostility toward others and do 
not emanate from strictly benevolent impulses.  Additionally, genealogy shows that this 
intentional structure is not of a simple or immediate kind.  For the work of suspicion, the 
process of deciphering a concept’s meaning begins from a complex nexus of multiple 
interpretations and proceeds to the conditions under which these interpretations are 
expressed and the value these interpretations have.  Problems arise, however, when we 
treat these interpretations as bearing a simple or univocal meaning themselves.  
Nietzsche’s archaeological work may reveal a matrix of unconscious or instinctual forces 
to be involved in the production of meaning, but that does not entail that this is a fully 
determinate arche for meaning.  This sort of reading of Nietzsche’s texts condemns his 
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hermeneutics to the status of a mere exercise in criticism and, more importantly, fails to 
appreciate the full extent of the critique of univocal meaning that genealogy engenders. 
 In other words, when commentators treat the will-to-power as a simple concept 
with a determinable, univocal meaning, it is quickly assimilated into a reading that 
attempts to characterize it as a determinable archaeological origin for future interpretive 
activity.  In these systems, the will-to-power becomes a kind of determinate univocal 
concept that shows only what other attempts at univocity have missed.  This kind of fixity 
in the origin of interpretation brings about the same logical effect in the types of 
“interpretations” possible as would a fixed eschatological destination, which Nietzsche 
clearly criticizes on a number of occasions.  Both would put an end to hermeneutic 
interpretation, as all elaborations of a concept would be dictated by the fixed starting or 
end point, which renders interpretation into description.  Determination would be 
immediately identified not only as possible but as already actual, either in the origin or 
the fixed end.  This appearance of interpretation, then, does not work its critique as 
extensively as Ricoeur or Nietzsche would desire from interpretation, as it merely 
replaces interpretation with a process of deciphering meaning according to a pre-existing 
analogy.481  In this case, an already determined interpretation cannot be immanently 
critical, cannot find its possibilities within itself, but must refer to an exterior, 
transcendent point at the beginning or the end, with which to justify its conclusions.  
Every instance of an indeterminate meaning could simply be regarded as a case of the 
concept’s not yet being fully articulated in the meaning that it lacks.  From this 
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standpoint, it is then relatively simple to generate paradoxes regarding how Nietzsche’s 
philosophy supposedly critiques a concept of “truth” and then merely proposes a different 
justification for it.  The attempts to overly naturalize Nietzsche’s “theory of truth,” which 
were discussed in Chapter Three, raise even more questions as to how we should read, for 
example, Nietzsche’s criticism of science as being just another form of the ascetic ideal.  
Insofar as both science and the ascetic ideal treat “truth” as a non-problematic concept, 
for Nietzsche, to that extent do they assume that “truth” is univocal in its meaning.  This 
assumption of the univocity of any concept is the primary target of Nietzsche’s 
introduction of the method of genealogy.  To interpret genealogy and the will-to-power as 
a strictly determinable, univocal arche of meaning is to misinterpret the bulk of the 
remainder of Nietzsche’s texts.  In treating Nietzsche’s archaeological moment as a piece 
of the genealogical method, I mean to avoid the problems associated with a 
characterization of Nietzsche’s philosophy as strictly reductive.  However, to fulfill the 
Ricoeurian insistence on a concretized interpretive method, that moment must be 
supplemented with what I have called Nietzsche’s teleological moment.   
 Like Freud, Nietzsche tends to utilize his archaeology along two lines, one 
economic and one topographic.  The wills-to-power function along an economic model 
where their relationships of dominating and being-dominated serve to determine the 
character of the synthetic meanings that are produced.  They exist, as Ricoeur says of 
Freud’s theory of instincts, as a diagnosed reality and not as an absolute reality.482  
Likewise, Nietzsche’s “types” of the bad conscience, priest, noble, etc., are topographic 
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interpreted realities that come to exist through the genealogical method.483  Nietzsche, as 
a physician of culture, diagnoses and synthesizes into meaningfulness the series of 
concepts that appear to him through his analyses of our cultural symptoms.  Ricoeur’s 
general criticism of Nietzsche’s archaeological method is that it fails to adequately 
account for its own meaning by not making explicit the teleological trajectory needed for 
a concretizing of sense.   In other words, the archaeologist may interpret a domain for the 
critique of consciousness but often fails to be able to justify its methods itself from the 
standpoint of consciousness.  Ricoeur’s example here is Freud’s “implicit and 
unthematized teleology” which is involved in the ego’s becoming-conscious of its non-
mastery over itself.484  Ricoeur maintains that the entire methodology of psychoanalysis 
cannot be generated unless there is a teleology of consciousness already at work in 
Freud’s thinking that serves as a contrast to the analytic.485  The ego appears as the 
topographical feature that will come into existence from the vicissitudes of the 
unconscious instincts.  Freud’s failure to account for this in the same interpretive manner 
in which he accounts for the instincts leads psychoanalysis into two problems.  The first 
is that Freud’s insistence on the natural, archaeological origin of religion causes him to 
posit a mythologized primal scene that goes beyond anything analysis can justify 
                                               
483 See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983), 143-146.  Technically, Deleuze refers to “typologies,” instead of “topologies” in the final 
analysis of Nietzsche’s work, but this emphasizes the types of structures created by forces in both their 
relationship to the individual and to society at large.  Insofar as I am here referring primarily to the forces 
contributing to the production of consciousness, I feel reference to Nietzsche’ “topology” alone is 
warranted. 
 
484 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 459. 
 
485 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 473. 
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according to its own methods.  The second is that Freud’s work remains non-concretized 
from his failure to appreciate his own resources, in the mechanism of sublimation, for a 
appropriative course for psychoanalytic interpretation.  The charge Ricoeur makes 
against Nietzsche appears similarly.  Ricoeur states, regarding Nietzsche’s methods: 
“What Nietzsche wants is the increase of man’s power, the restoration of his force; but 
the meaning of the will to power must be recaptured by meditating on the ciphers 
‘superman,’ ‘eternal return,’ and ‘Dionysus,’ without which the power in question would 
be but worldly violence.”486  Although it is not explicitly remarked upon in Ricoeur’s 
text, this horizon of “restored power” would have to appear for Ricoeur as the 
unthematized teleological element of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  It would be this sense of 
power that would be recovered, on Ricoeur’s reading, but there is no indication given of 
how this power would act differently given its new knowledge of its conditions.  Thus, he 
can say that Nietzsche remains mired in the accusation of metaphysics and morality that 
he seeks to critique because this archaeological movement cannot discover the 
teleological trajectory that would build meaning, instead seeing only idols that must be 
destroyed.  Nietzsche’s work, for Ricoeur, remains unable to contemplate a concretized 
sense of consciousness or fulfill the task of a philosophical anthropology because it 
cannot treat “symbols,” with their multiple interpretive possibilities, as anything more 
than idols.487  
                                               
486 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 35 
 
487 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 464-467. 
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 As I argued in Chapter Two and Three, although Freud and Nietzsche share 
much in common, this ascription to Nietzsche of an un- or under-developed teleology is 
not well-founded in the texts.  Two issues are of note here, the first being that Nietzsche’s 
critique of consciousness goes further than Freud’s in doubting the necessity of that 
consciousness.  Ricoeur is right to see in Freud an unthematized teleological directedness 
in the diagnosis of the unconscious:  “It is of this quasi-Hegelian operation that Freud 
speaks in the celebrated saying: Wo es war, soll ich werden – ‘Where id was, there ego 
shall be.’”488  But this, under a Nietzschean critique, would be no more than the setting 
up of not a teleological but of an eschatological end toward which the id must tend.  The 
possible meaning of the id or the unconscious desires is already tied to a determinate end 
– the end of the ego.   Therefore, in the case of psychoanalysis, interpretation of the 
unconscious forces is not bound to a symbol with a double meaning but to a moral ego 
that is merely yet to be reclaimed from the din of the instincts.  This assumed, fixed 
moral point that Freud assures us the healthy ego must develop acts as an external judge 
by which a kind of diagnostic law can be handed down to interpretation. 
 Nietzsche’s critique of final ends acts in this case as a criticism of Freud’s 
methodology; and it should be considered that it acts as a critique of Ricoeur’s method on 
this point as well.  The Freudian teleology that Ricoeur develops in the last sections of 
Freud and Philosophy is based on Freud’s “recovery” of the ego through sublimation.  
Ultimately, the deciphering of consciousness by Freud only leads to a less ill, more 
                                               
488 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 241, citing Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis and Other Works, Vol. XXII of Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. 
and trans. James Strachey (London, 1964), 80. 
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realistic reconstruction of the ego that now is totalized into meaning by the 
psychoanalytic perspective.  Consciousness and its possible meanings, in this case, can 
never become anything other than what the psychoanalytic framework have set out for 
them to be – either as healthy or as sick.  Thus, there is no future possible for 
consciousness or for its meaning outside of psychoanalysis once psychoanalysis is done 
with it.  Similarly for the Ricoeurian pairing of suspicion and recovery, what is to be 
recovered is a full and determinate immediacy with meaning, or a fully mediated, and 
therefore still determinate meaning.489  As we saw with Nietzsche’s conception of the 
will-to-power, even this hope for full mediation must be set aside for the critical project if 
the criterion of immanence is to be met.   
 If there is to be a philosophy of the future, for Nietzsche, it is to be one based on 
the interpretation of our origins, which cannot be fully explicated, for the purpose of 
building and creating new meanings.  But merely showing the origins of our conscious 
meanings is insufficient for the purposes of creating new meanings, just as Ricoeur 
maintains.  What is often neglected is Nietzsche’s insistence on the goal of 
reinterpretation through critical genealogical analysis of concepts.  Nietzsche writes:   
What kind of fool would believe that it is enough to point to this [arbitrary] origin 
and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as 
‘real’, so-called ‘reality’!  Only as creators can we destroy! – But let us also not 
forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and 
appearances of truth in order to create new ‘things’.490 
 
                                               
489 Ricoeur’s later work, as it turns to the problem of poesis more explicitly as its thematic, seems to move 
away from the dominant metaphor of ‘recovery’ and towards ‘creation,’ suggesting some validity to this 
projected Nietzschean reading.   
 
490 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 58 (emphasis in original). 
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In this highly suggestive text, Nietzsche lays out his sense of the teleology for which I 
have been arguing.  The ability of philosophy to affirm the future, to affirm interpretation 
and evaluation themselves, hinges on its ability to synthesize new meanings from what 
has counted as ‘reality.’  In order to displace any of the unhealthy meanings which have 
dominated consciousness and culture (or ‘reality’), simple diagnosis is insufficient.  A 
new meaning capable of assembling a new arrangement of those existing forces is 
necessary.  In other words, this Nietzschean teleology cannot be imposed on a synthesis 
of meaning from outside that synthesis but is brought to it internally by whichever will or 
force happens to dominate in the synthesis.  Meaning is never produced or destroyed 
from an external critical action – meaning, too, is perspectival.  Likewise, it cannot seek a 
new meaning by introducing never-before-synthesized forces or meanings into these new 
productions, as he has argued that there are only interpretations, meaning that there 
always already only other synthesized meanings with which to work.   
For these reasons, new creation of meaning can only occur alongside the 
dissolution of other meanings; and, more importantly, the critical destruction of meanings 
which are no longer viable must be accompanied by an appropriation of a new 
construction of meaning.  To do otherwise, Nietzsche suggests, is not creation but merely 
the recovery of our old metaphysical and moral instincts from their idolized/idealized 
existence.  The most remote level of this prejudice, Nietzsche argues, is our reliance on 
the idol of “truth.”  For interpretation and evaluation to be possible, its effects must be 
critiqued wherever they are found.  This is perhaps the most dominant sense of 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘death of God.’  He writes: “God is dead; but given the 
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way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – 
And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!”491  To accomplish this goal, 
Nietzsche relies both on the archaeological excavation of the illusion of univocal 
meaning as well as the teleological appropriation of this critique towards the affirmation 
of the creative use of interpretation and evaluation. 
 However, “given the way people are,” how is this possible?  I have tried to show 
in Chapter Four that the possibility of realizing Nietzsche’s goal of affirmation can only 
come about if Nietzsche is able to re-interpret humanity itself.  As Nietzsche says in The 
Anti-Christ: “The problem I am posing is not what should replace humanity in the order 
of being ( - the human is an endpoint - ): but instead what type of human being should be 
bred, should be willed as having greater value, as being more deserving of life, as being 
more certain of a future.”492  Nietzsche ties the fate of humanity to its ability to create 
meanings which are capable of affirming life.  The goal of Ecce Homo is just that, an 
interpretation and evaluation of the forces that make it possible to say “Behold, the man” 
(the decadent Nietzsche) as well as the excesses of that concept that allow for re-
interpretation and re-evaluation of its composing forces (the “beginning” Nietzsche).  
Whereas man suffers from a lack, Nietzsche has “only ever suffered from multitudes.”493  
In this manner, Nietzsche is attempting to demonstrate that what he refers to as 
“Dionysus” is still a possible actualization of human meaning: “it is explicable only as an 
                                               
491 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 108. 
 
492 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight 
of the Idols and Other Writings, eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), Section 3 (emphasis in original). 
 
493 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I am so clever,” Section 10.  
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excess of energy.”494  Nietzsche’s strange philosophical anthropology in Ecce Homo is 
designed to show not the meaning of the human being but the things that a human being 
has meant and can mean.  An identification of any excess remaining in the concept 
‘human being’ or ‘man’ will indicate that new meanings for it are still possible; and, 
therefore, that this gives it a justification for the having of a future.  For this reason, 
Nietzsche attempts to make clear as many of the compositional elements of ‘Nietzsche’ 
that he can discover, in order to interpret and affirm them all – questions of location, 
climate, course of study, nutrition, etc. – insofar as they have produced him.495  The 
anthropology of ‘Nietzsche’ exhibits already the excess of meaning that cannot be 
totalized in the simple designation of ‘man’ or ‘human being’:  “One day my name will 
be connected with the memory of something tremendous, – a crisis such as the earth has 
never seen, the deepest collision of conscience, a decision made against everything that 
has been believed, demanded, held sacred so far.  I am not a human being, I am 
dynamite.”496  The method of genealogy, applied to the man Nietzsche, shows us that the 
name ‘Nietzsche’ is not irreducibly tied to the man ‘Nietzsche’ but, instead, is associated 
with an event of meaning.  ‘Nietzsche’ is, like all of genealogy’s other analysands, 
plurivocal and capable of exploding into as many meanings as there are instincts that can 
become dominant over it.  In this way, Nietzsche becomes a subject for us through his 
interpretation of his own texts while demonstrating the meaning that is able to be created 
                                               
494 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “What I owe to the ancients,” Section 4 (emphasis in original). 
 
495 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I am so clever,” Section 10. 
 
496 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I am a destiny,” Section 1 (emphasis in original). 
 
  228  
 
 
 
from his own works as well as others’.  This particular event of meaning, the meaning of 
the human being, as of yet, bears no dominant meaning on its own because no one, until 
Ecce Homo, had been able to interpret it actively and evaluate it affirmatively.  It is in 
this manner that genealogy, as a hermeneutic method, is able to give the philosopher 
Nietzsche the right to a future.  This future is indefinite, thanks to his conception of 
teleology but infinitely determinable through the entire genealogical operation.
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